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Abstract 
 
In the past three decades, China has become the manufacturing hub of the world 
through its robust economic development momentum. Since the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in 2008, however, the Chinese manufacturing industry has suffered an 
unprecedented slowdown while the world economy has experienced only sluggish 
progress. Studies reavel that the low value-adding, labour-intensive, export-oriented 
development model of the Chinese manufacturing industry has become inappropriate 
and requires upgrading. As many leading world manufacturing firms have engaged in 
sophisticated supply chain collaboration (SCC) initiatives to enhance their competitive 
edge, it has become vital for Chinese manufacturing firms to embark on SCC to retain 
competitiveness.   
The present study explores how effectively SCC is being implemented by electrical and 
electronic (E & E) manufacturing firms in China, through the identification of key 
elements and major barriers. It also attempts to develop a capability-based strategic 
framework to aid Chinese manufacturing firms to improve their collaborative capability 
so as to enhance competitiveness. 
This thesis integrates insights from multiple theoretical perspectives, including Agency 
Theory (AT), Social Exchange Theory (SET), Extended Resource Based View (ERBV), 
and Institutional Theory, to enable a broader understanding of the implementation 
practices of SCC by Chinese manufacturers. A multiple-case study method was used 
to collect data from four leading E & E manufacturers in China for analysis.  
The findings of this study reveal some unique characteristics of SCC in China. Various 
Western SCC practices are partially imitated by Chinese manufacturing firms (CMFs) 
to maximize their own short-term benefits at the expense of overall SC performance 
and efficiency. The collaborative capabilities of CMFs, manifested in objective 
alignment, SC partnering, information sharing, process integration, and collaborative 
synchronization, are in general not mature. Existing institutional barriers, such as 
traditional Chinese culture, lack of trust, and insufficient government effort and 
innovation, are found to exert significant negative influences on the implementation of 
SCC initiatives.  
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In an effort to help the industry achieve advanced synchronization capabilities, a 
capability-based strategic framework has been proposed, which depicts how the key 
elements and major barriers can impact on the successful implementation of 
collaborative initiatives. This framework can serve as a comprehensive guide for CMFs 
to make continuous improvement in this regard.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a brief introduction of the thesis. Firstly, it states the rationale for 
the study and the research context, in which the importance of enhancing the SCC 
capabilities of CMFs is highlighted. Then, it develops the research questions and the 
key objectives, which will tackle the challenges or barriers associated with the 
successful implemention of SCC capabilities. Finally, it discusses the scope and the 
contribution of this study.  
1.1 Motivation for This Study 
During the past three decades, China emerged as the world’s second-largest economy, 
based on its continuous double-digit annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Schuman, 2013). It is generally agreed that such an enormous economic boom is 
largely built upon a low-value-adding, labour-intensive, export- and investment-oriented 
development model (Li, 2012). However, in recent years, this powerful growth engine 
has experienced an obvious slowdown, owing in part to gradual exhaustion of all those 
once abundant resources. The deceleration in economic growth emits a clear signal 
that the low-value-adding development model is not sustainable in the long run (Zhang, 
2014).   
Suffering from a prolonged economic stagnation from 1800 to 1978, China’s 
industrialization process had almost come to a halt until the adoption of an open-door 
policy by the Chinese government in the early 1980s (Thomas, 2006). The production 
model of the manufacturing industry in China is regarded as having being primitive for 
a long time. The majority of the manufacturing companies originated in unsophisticated 
family businesses on a small scale, and scattered widely across different regions 
(Zhang, 2012). Products produced were usually low in added value, and manufactured 
with outdated technology and low efficiency.  
As international competition intensifies due to globalization, the CMFs are being 
compelled to pursue higher levels of operational excellence in order to maintain their 
competitive advantage. Clearly, a more intensive development model characterized by 
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high added-value, improved efficiency and enhanced innovative capabilities has to be 
fostered. To achieve this, an unprecedented transformation of the Chinese 
manufacturing industry will be needed. 
As a result of China’s one-child policy introduced in 1979 to reduce the rapid growth in 
population, the pools of cheap workforce filling the assembly lines of factories are 
drying up (Li, 2013; Collins, 2013). In 2010, the outbreak of labour suicides and large-
scale strikes in multinational corporations resulted in significant labour wage increases 
(Berthelsen, 2010). Subsequently, labour cost in China has become much more 
expensive by comparison with its Asian neighbours such as Vietnam, Thailand and 
India (Wang et al., 2010). Although Chinese workers earn less than US$1 per hour, 
their income is significantly higher than that of workers in other developing countries. 
For example, in Vietnam, workers receive less than half the wage of their Chinese 
counterparts (Bradsher, 2008). Consequently, many foreign firms have adopted a 
“China+1” strategy by building an additional production base in another, lower-cost 
Asian country (Toloken, 2013; Yang, 2012). In recent years, labour shortage in coastal 
areas of China has become a common phenomenon (China Daily, 2011). Apparently, 
the idle and cheap workforce in China is rapidly diminishing. Therefore, for the Chinese 
manufacturing industry, more advanced manufacturing approaches, with increased 
excellence in management of the supply chain (SC), have to be sought in lieu of cheap 
labour, in order for the industry to maintain its long-term attractiveness.  
Furthermore, the competitiveness of China’s exports has dramatically deteriorated due 
to the occurrence of financial crises in the US and Europe, which have further 
weakened the global demand (Pettis, 2012). As a result, the once flourishing and fully 
occupied Chinese manufacturing industry is now struggling with issues of excess 
production capacity, and even survival, in a viciously competitive business environment.  
Multiple challenges, such as surging raw material prices, the strong urge for sustainable 
business, and lack of investment and innovativeness, have left manufacturing firms 
with very little profit margins (Eloot et al., 2013). For example, it is reported that the 
profit of making an iPhone for Apple by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) is 
less than US$1, which only accounts for 0.5 per cent of the selling price, while the total 
profit for each iPhone for Apple can be up to 58.5 per cent of the selling price (Beijing 
Daily, 2012). If the manufacturing firms in China continue to focus merely on pure 
Page 17 / 220 
 
assembly and stay at the point on Stan Shih’s ‘smiling’ curve with the lowest value, they 
can no longer provide a profitable return in the long run (Shih, 2005, p. 213-215). To 
maintain its competitive position in the global market, the Chinese manufacturing 
industry has to climb up from the bottom of the smiling curve to participate in a wide 
range of supply chain management (SCM) initiatives to export more skill-intensive, 
technology-oriented and high-value goods and services. 
During the past decade, SCC is increasingly perceived as the key driving force of 
effective supply chain management (Horvath, 2001) and the ultimate core capability to 
survive inexorable competition (Sanders and Premus, 2005). SCC involves two or more 
individual corporations working together to attain greater success than can be achieved 
in isolation (Daugherty et al., 2006; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2004). Forming 
external collaborations becomes a viable strategy to compete in a dynamic global 
environment (Simonin and Ruth, 1998).  
By engaging in various SCC initiatives, many world leading corporations have enjoyed 
superior advantages, such as improvement of efficiency, effectiveness and market 
positions (Min et al., 2005), improved customer service (Ellinger, 2000), increased sales, 
lower product inventories, higher order fill rates, faster cycle times, improved forecast 
accuracy, and lower system expense (Fliedner, 2003). Through joint effort, 
collaborating partners can achieve operational excellence and create synergies, 
thereby generating competitive advantages (Bowersox et al., 2005; Simatupang and 
Sridharan, 2004). Consequently, SCC can be leveraged by Chinese manufacturers as 
a possible source of competitive edge.  
However, the SCM capability of the Chinese manufacturing sector is still nascent (Chen 
and Yang, 2003). Many world-class best practices have not been well implemented or 
even recognized by most Chinese companies (Daly and Cui, 2003; Huettner and Song, 
2007a). For example, less than 10 per cent of the companies use formal sales and 
operations planning (S&OP) processes (Handfield and McCormack, 2005), which 
percentage is significantly less than that for companies in developed countries.   
Supply chain visibility is a rarity in Chinese manufacturing firms (Handfield and 
McCormack, 2005). Timely, accurate and reliable information across the entire supply 
chain, to enable quick response to market demand and efficient distribution, is usually 
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not available (Ganster, 2009). Owing to the lack of visibility, it is very hard for Chinese 
manufacturers to forecast downstream demand and control unstable upstream supply 
(IT168, 2008). 
A high level of demand-forecast accuracy is rarely achieved by Chinese manufacturers 
(Byrne, 2006). Since there is a lack of training and education in supply chain operations, 
Chinese manufacturers have difficulty in coping with unsynchronized fluctuations in 
demand from customers or supplies from suppliers, which can result in excess 
inventory or high rates of stock-out (Feuling, 2008; IT168, 2008).  
Overall acceptance of new information and communication technologies by Chinese 
manufacturing corporations remains quite low. Only a few major companies, such as 
Lenovo, Haier and Huawei, have embarked on implementation of a supply chain 
management system, including Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and just-in-time 
(JIT), for their business processes from 2004 onwards (IT168, 2008). Feuling (2008) 
points out that many Chinese companies still track activities such as raw material order 
placement and production scheduling by hand, or transfer data over the phone.  
Higher utilization of inter-organizational technologies needs to be enforced for 
purposes such as maximizing data visibility, making global business decisions quickly 
and correctly, tracking demand in real time, and enhancing flexibility and 
responsiveness (Byrne, 2006). However, the astute application of advanced 
technologies is hampered by the reality that very few personnel exist in any part of the 
country with the requisite training and knowledge to implement ERP, JIT, total quality 
management, or other sophisticated logistics systems (Daly and Cui, 2003). By and 
large, the SCM competency of the Chinese manufacturing sector is far from 
outstanding, and needs to be significantly improved. Leveraging SCC capability can be 
a viable path for CMFs to improve efficiency and retain competitiveness.  
1.2 Research Context 
While tremendous benefits of SCC are widely mentioned in the literature, the exact 
nature and constructs of SCC are not properly elucidated. Most managers are uncertain 
about what constitutes SCC, what inhibits extensive SCC, and how successful SCC 
can be achieved. As a result, there are empirical evidences showing that, in practice, 
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progress of SCC is often slow or fails to live up to expectations (Frankel et al., 2002; 
Barratt, 2004; Holweg et al., 2005; Bowersox et al., 2003; Kampstra et al., 2006; 
Fawcett et al., 2008a; Hyland, 2002).   
There are many plausible explanations for this phenomenon. They include lack of 
understanding about the concept of SCC (Barratt, 2004; Holweg et al., 2005; 
Simatupang and Sridharan, 2004; Ellinger et al., 2006; Fawcett et al., 2007), weak 
management skills and capabilities to remove various barriers to SCC (Hyland, 2002; 
Gulati et al., 1994; Spekman et al., 2002; Vereecke and Muylee, 2006; Kampstra et al., 
2006), and underestimation of the required, substantial changes of attitude, mindset 
and organizational architectures (Liedtka, 1996; Daugherty et al., 2006; Gulati et al., 
1994; Fawcett et al., 2008b; Fawcett et al., 2012; Bowersox et al., 2003).  
First of all, the body of knowledge explicating the concept and dimensions of SCC is 
sketchy (Bowersox et al., 2003). Many of the problems concerning SCC are due to a 
lack of understanding of what collaboration actually implies (Barratt, 2004), since the 
definitions of SCC vary considerably (Holweg et al., 2005; Simatupang and Sridharan, 
2004). The slow progress to date is closely related to the difficulty of internal and 
external integration (Holweg et al., 2005). Studies such as Ellinger et al. (2006) and 
Fawcett et al. (2007) highlight the prevalence of limited knowledge about the 
collaborative process through which companies leverage internal and external 
resources to produce distinctive customer value. In short, an improved understanding 
of the notion and attributes of SCC is urgently required.  
Secondly, an examination of prior literature shows that SCC management skills and 
capabilities of managers are inadequate to mitigate various barriers. The concept of 
SCM has not been fully operationalized by businesses (Spekman et al., 1998), and 
managers do not understand the proper approaches for organizing a variety of alliances 
(Gulati et al., 1994). Consequently, the SCC endeavours of many corporations are often 
unorchestrated (Vereecke and Muylee, 2006). Similarly, Fawcett et al. (2012) highlight 
that only a small number of managers have the anticipated management capabilities 
to orchestrate complementary resources and competencies along the supply chain. Of 
those firms that claim to be involved in collaboration, what most of them can do is 
provide visibility (Hyland, 2002), which is insufficient for the realization of the full 
potential of collaborative advantages. SCC can end up being a failure if it is not 
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implemented properly (Kampstra et al., 2006). Many managers remain unclear about 
what the major barriers to SCC are and how to manage SCC effectively by overcoming 
multiple obstacles. As such, an investigation into the major barriers to SCC is essential 
for better adoption of SCC initiatives.  
Thirdly, previous research has paid little attention to the challenges and substantial 
changes of attitude, mindset and organizational structures (Liedtka, 1996) required for 
the successful adoption of SCC. Collaborative efforts often fail because critical long-
term details are overlooked (Daugherty et al., 2006). Supply chain partners often 
remain opportunistic, and view collaboration as prisoner’s dilemma situations (Gulati et 
al., 1994), which means that each member suspects that the other will get a larger 
share of benefits through opportunistic behaviour. Fawcett et al. (2008b) also stress 
that some managers are conservative and unwilling to develop true mutually 
advantageous collaborative relationships. Although some companies indicate their 
involvement in cross-organizational collaboration, they tend to apply adversarial 
strategies, which often lead to aggressive price squeezing (Bowersox et al., 2003). 
Fawcett et al. (2012) conclude that very few corporations have been able to realize the 
substantial cultural and structural transformation necessary for advanced collaboration. 
Some even revert to hostile strategies. It appears that many managers have 
underestimated the scope and breadth of SCC. Therefore, further research on SCC, to 
facilitate clearer understanding about the challenges and the appropriate attitude and 
mindset required for successful SCC, is essential for companies to fully exploit the 
exceptional advantages of collaboration in their supply chains. 
A review of existing academic literature shows that comprehensive research on the 
SCC of CMFs is currently unavailable. Most existing studies provide a very brief 
introduction to the development of SCM in China (Zhao et al., 2007; Jhangiani and 
Stocking, 2006; Feuling, 2008; Tornquist, 2009; Easton, 2003; Ganster, 2008; Pyke et 
al., 2000; Huang and Tan, 2012; Chen and Yang, 2003; Byrne, 2006; Ganster, 2009; Li 
et al., 2009), whilst others focus on particular aspects of SCC, such as logistics 
competencies (Jiang and Prater, 2002; Jahns, 2007; Li and Lin, 2006; Rahman and 
Wu, 2011; Daly and Cui, 2003; Lau and Wang, 2009; Lau and Zhang, 2006), information 
sharing (Du et al., 2012; Ye and Wang, 2013), buyer-supplier relationships (Chen et al., 
2010), risks in China’s supply chain (Carbone, 2004), the SC planning process 
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(Huettner and Song, 2007b), SC order fulfillment (Huettner and Song, 2007a), CPFR 
of the Chinese retail industry (Wang et al., 2005), supply chain hurdles in China 
(Huffman, 2003), RFID technology adoption (Lin and Ho, 2009), SC competitiveness 
(Song and Chatterjee, 2010), the collaborative operations reference model for the 
regional manufacturing industry in China (Han and Chu, 2009), and cooperative 
behaviour (Li et al., 2011). However, very limited scholarly research has been 
conducted involving a thorough investigation of the initiatives and the constructs of SCC 
between Chinese manufacturers and their SC partners.  
As a result, the state-of-the-art of SCC between Chinese manufacturers and SC 
partners remains largely unknown. Owing to the lack of knowledge on SCC, most of 
the SC managers in CMFs have little idea about the notion of SCC (Daly and Cui, 2003), 
not to mention the key elements of and major barriers to the implementation of SCC 
between Chinese buyers and suppliers. Such managers generally do not possess the 
management skills and capabilities for the adoption of SCC initiatives (Feuling, 2008; 
Chen and Yang, 2003). Therefore, a comprehensive research investigating the 
contemporary status of SCC of Chinese manufacturers, and the key elements of and 
major barriers to SCC between Chinese manufacturers and SC partners, is essential 
for the improvement of management skills of practitioners in China.   
Although the concepts of SCM, supply chain integration (SCI) and SCC have been 
evolving rapidly from the 1980s onwards, and are widely accepted by scholars, 
industrial professionals and Western firms, they are relatively new to CMFs. There is a 
lack of detailed frameworks and concrete recommendations for CMFs to engage in 
collaborative endeavour. Spillan et al. (2013) claim that the existing frameworks of SCM 
developed in the context of practices in Western countries are independent of culture, 
and should therefore be appropriate for Chinese firms from a theoretical perspective. 
However, their views might not be shared by practitioners in China, due to many 
differences in setting. Consequently, implementation of SCC in Chinese firms might be 
more difficult than in those well-developed, Western firms.  
The existing frameworks of SCC might not be appropriate for Chinese companies for 
at least three reasons. Firstly, based on a systematic review of literature, the existing 
frameworks of SCC (e.g. Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005a; Fawcett et al., 2008a; 
Matopoulos et al., 2007; Forme et al., 2007; Singh and Power, 2009) have largely 
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originated from developed countries. Some of these frameworks hold one or more 
implicit assumptions, such as that partnerships are desirable, inter-organizational 
information systems (IOSs) are mature, and SC processes are streamlined and 
integrated. Some of those frameworks are too complicated for managers to 
comprehend or too simple to capture the nature of SCC. Some researchers have 
pointed out that certain existing frameworks are difficult even for Western practitioners 
to implement (Ireland and Bruce, 2000; Frankel et al., 2002; Johnston et al., 2004), let 
alone their Chinese counterparts. 
Secondly, the industrial and logistics foundation of CMFs is very weak when compared 
with that of their Western peers (Pyke et al., 2000). Thirdly, the unique institutional 
environment in China is very distinctive compared to Western nations. As many 
scholars have revealed, the institutional condition plays a significant role in the adoption 
of SCM practices (Liu et al., 2010; Su et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2010; Yeung et al., 2009; 
Shi et al., 2012). Although the basic concept of SCC might be generic for a cross-
cultural audience in some senses, the framework of SCC for Chinese firms could be 
idiosyncratic given the fundamental impact of institutional factors. Fourthly, the 
knowledge of SCC and management capability of supply chain managers in Chinese 
firms is insufficient. A very complicated framework with numerous steps might be 
beyond the capability of such managers to comprehend.  
Based on the above considerations, the development of a new framework of SCC for 
CMFs is necessary. This new framework has to provide full consideration of the current 
level of SCM and SCC in China. It also has to provide detailed guidance for Chinese 
manufacturers that engage in various levels of SCC with different domestic and 
international partners in diverse ways. Furthermore, it has to take the above-mentioned 
institutional factors into consideration, and provide strategic guidelines for 
manufacturing firms to mitigate the negative impact of institutional barriers, so that the 
superior merits of SCC can be capitalized.   
In the present research, the Chinese electrical and electronic (E & E) manufacturing 
industry is selected for investigation and analysis of SCC between manufacturers and 
their SC partners. This industry is selected because of the size and significance of the 
E & E manufacturing industry to the Chinese economy. While China developed to 
become the world E & E manufacturing centre in the early 2000s, its E & E 
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manufacturing industry has encountered severe rounds of factory closure since the 
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 (Chan, 2011). SCM of the Chinese E & E 
manufacturing industry is facing enormous challenges, such as sharply rising costs, 
shortened product life cycle, volatile demand, and a great deal of inventory overstock 
(Cho, 2006). Thus, embarking on SCC initiatives to foster a truly agile SC is critical for 
E & E manufacturers to improve efficiency and retain competitive advantages. 
Consequently, multiple Chinese E & E manufacturing firms are examined in this 
research.                   
1.3 Statement of Research Questions 
The present research attempts to answer the following, main research question:  
How effectively is supply chain collaboration being implemented by the 
manufacturing firms in China? 
To answer the main research question, the following subsidiary questions are raised: 
1. What are the unique characteristics of SCC in China? 
2. What are the key elements of and the major barriers to SCC implementation 
in China? 
3. What strategic framework can be formulated to enhance SCC capabilities of 
the Chinese manufacturing firms? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The research objectives for the present study are outlined as follows: 
1. To investigate the unique characteristics of SCC of the manufacturing firms in 
China, through case studies and in-depth interviews with practitioners. 
2. To investigate the key elements of and the major obstacles to the 
implementation of SCC by the manufacturing firms in China. 
3. To develop a framework to facilitate extensive supply chain collaboration of 
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the Chinese manufacturing firms. 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
The present study will focus only on identifying the key elements of and major obstacles 
to the implementation of SCC in the Chinese E & E manufacturing industry. This is 
believed to be critical to helping China to improve SCC capabilities, and hence 
maintaining competitiveness and its leading position in global manufacturing. The 
purpose is to develop a framework for cross-organizational collaboration that takes into 
consideration the distinctiveness of the Chinese economic, political and cultural 
environment. Successful industry-wide collaboration can improve SCM capability of the 
entire industry, thereby reducing total SC cost. While further research may develop 
strategies and detailed measures to implement the changes involved in SCC, the scope 
of this study is confined to revealing the main dimensions and major barriers, through 
case studies and in-depth interviews, for the E & E manufacturing firms in China. 
1.6 Contribution of the Research 
The major contributions of the research are as follows: 
1. This study provides a comprehensive view of the unique landscape of SCC in 
China. The implementation of SCC in the Chinese manufacturing industry is 
much more complex than a simple adoption of the concepts and models from 
Western developed markets. The idiosyncratic Chinese institutional factors play 
an indispensable role in the application of SCC practices to, and hence 
improvement of SCM capabilities of, the entire industry.  
2. This research employs multiple theoretical perspectives to investigate whether 
SCC is effectively implemented to remove current SC inefficiencies in the 
Chinese manufacturing industry. Few studies in operations management and 
supply chain management have integrated economic, social, competency and 
institutional paradigms to account for SCC in developing countries.  
3. Taking the E & E manufacturing industry in China as an example, the present 
study is an effort to investigate how advanced SCC can be achieved, from both 
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the manufacturers’ and the suppliers’ perspectives. It also attempts to make a 
comparison of the collaborative initiatives between international and domestic 
manufacturing firms.  
4. The study develops a holistic strategic framework to indicate the key elements 
of and the major barriers to SCC of the CMFs. It also depicts the interaction 
between each construct of the framework. It is expected to serve as a guide for 
practitioners to improve SCC capabilities.       
5. The results of this study can help manufacturers to identify factors that affect the 
success of strategic collaboration. They can also provide proper direction for 
developing robust and effective collaborative relationships between supply chain 
partners.   
1.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of this research. It has stated the motivation for 
this study and explained the research context in detail. It has also highlighted the 
research questions and the objectives followed by the scope and the contribution of 
this study. The next chapter of this thesis will review the literature relevant to SCC and 
the related conceptual framework.     
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter firstly reviews the theoretical paradigms underpinning collaborative 
activities of CMFs. Furthermore, it reviews the literature on SCM, SCI, SCC and SCC 
of CMFs. Then, a tentative framework of SCC in China is proposed. Subsequently, all 
key elements of and the major barriers to SCC in China are also discussed.  
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives  
A combination of various theories is employed by this study to provide explanation for 
the implementation of SCC practices in China. Owing to the unprecedented complexity 
and diversification of SCC behaviour, Halldorsson et al. (2007) claim that “a unified 
theory of SCM” is currently unavailable. Chen et al. (2009a) also point out that it is 
almost impracticable to give thorough elucidation to a SC phenomenon with a single 
theory, owing to the complexity of today’s SC interactions. 
Existing literature shows that multiple perspectives have been suggested or adopted 
by researchers in SCM areas. For example, Halldorsson et al. (2007) recommend that 
multiple perspectives, including Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), AT, Network 
Theory (NT) and Resource Based View (RBV), can be employed in conjunction to 
enable a holistic view of SCM in practice. Ketchen Jr. and Hult (2007) discuss how 
several theoretical perspectives, such as TCE, AT, NT, Institutional Theory and RBV, 
jointly discriminate traditional supply chains from best value chains. Cao and Zhang 
(2010) employed a mixture of TCE, RBV, Relational View (RV) and Extended 
Resource-Based View (ERBV) to explore how SCC can be used to generate 
collaborative advantage through improved firm performance. Chen et al. (2009a) also 
borrow four theoretical perspectives in an effort to develop a comprehensive framework 
of SCI. Halldorsson et al. (2007) address the issue that, based on the specific 
circumstance, one theory can be chosen as the prime explanatory perspective, 
supplemented with one or several other theoretical perspectives. As such, many 
believe that a single theory is insufficient to elucidate the distinctive nature and richness 
of SCC structures and activities. In other words, an integration of various theories from 
multiple disciplines is essential for the present research.  
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2.1.1 Agency Theory 
AT describes the negative (traditional AT) and positive (contemporary AT) relationships 
between two parties, in which the principal delegates authority to the agent (Eisenhardt, 
1989a; Mitnick, 1975). An agency problem arises when coordinating parties have 
conflict goals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and different attitudes towards risk 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). More specifically, in agency relationships, the principal generally 
strives to minimise the agency costs, such as by specifying, rewarding and monitoring, 
and policing the agent’s behaviour, while the agent attempts to maximise rewards and 
moderate principal control (Fleisher, 1991). The principal and the agent may also prefer 
different actions due to their different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989a). AT assumes 
that both shareholders and managers who are agents for the shareholders act in their 
own self-interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Subsequently, these parties may act 
opportunistically when there is information asymmetry. In order to govern the 
relationship between the principal and the agent, AT aims to design the most efficient 
contract, including the right mix of behavioural and outcome-based incentives to 
motivate the agent to act in the interests of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Logan, 
2000). In other words, the field of AT describes relationships that reflect the fundamental 
agency arrangement of a principal and an agent who are involved in collaborative 
performance, but who have divergent goals and contradictory attitudes toward risk.  
The traditional AT perceived the purpose of organizations is profit maximization in free 
markets, under the assumption that contracts were impeccably monitored and enforced 
at zero cost (Beckert and Zafirovski, 2006). The contemporary AT perceived an 
organization as an institution among other institutions in an ecosystem. Based on this 
latter assumption, competition for limited resources and profit maximization is 
eventually replaced by collaboration and coordination in an aim to create more value.  
AT can be applied to SCM studies from both the positive collaboration perspective and 
the negative conflict perspective. In the traditional negative AT, the theory contends that 
conflict between agents and principals can create an abusive relationship in which the 
agent abuses its power throughout the SC (Ketchen and Hult, 2007). Thus, this theory 
might help us understand under what conditions a SC member is likely to attempt to 
exploit other members (Ketchen and Hult, 2007). The contemporary view of AT is 
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suitablefor justification of the opportunistic behaviour under a rational system view. In 
the new institutionalism environment, the fundamental purpose of organizations is 
survival and value creation through collaboration, and agents seek to gain competitive 
advantage through coordination with their environment.  
Recently, increasing numbers of SCM scholars use AT to explain how members within 
the SC manage risks, align incentives and structure relationships (Halldorsson and 
Skjott-Larsen, 2006; Norrman, 2008; Plambeck and Gibson, 2010). Fayezi et al. (2012) 
carried out a comprehensive review pertaining to how AT has been applied, to illuminate 
relationship development within the SC, and reached the conclusion that AT provides 
valuable insights for the relationship arrangement within a SC. Norrman (2008) 
borrowed AT to shed light on how incentive alignment issues can be improved through 
various solutions. Plambeck and Gibson (2010) propose that a blend of AT, TCE and 
SET can be adopted to achieve more collaborative relationships between SC members 
which yield greater collaborative competitiveness. It can be seen that AT has been used 
to progressively enlighten different SCM issues.   
2.1.2 Social Exchange Theory 
While some theoretical paradigms, such as RBV, TCE and AT, have been widely 
adopted within the literature, the recent prevalence of SET is mirrored by its frequent 
application to the studies of SC relationships (e.g. Griffith et al., 2006; Narasimhan et 
al., 2008; Wu et al., 2014; Liao, 2008). SET is largely utilized to examine collaborative 
issues among SC partners, such as the development of the SC relationship (Griffith et 
al., 2006), inter-firm information sharing (Wu et al., 2014; Zouaghi et al., 2012), 
knowledge sharing (Bock and Kim, 2002; Liao, 2008), sourcing arrangement 
(Narasimhan et al., 2008), strategic alliance (Sambasivan et al., 2013), and buyer 
cooperative actions (Zhang et al., 2009).  
SET states that individuals or organizations are motivated to interact with others with 
the anticipation of a reward from the interaction, and strive to maximize benefits and 
minimize costs when engaging in an exchange (Homans, 1958; Emerson, 1976). While 
economic exchange theory concerns extrinsic benefits, SET concerns intrinsic rewards 
(Blau, 1964). The social elements of exchange vary from the economic elements of 
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exchange, given that the obligations of the exchange members are often unspecified 
and the criteria of measuring each member’s contributions are ambiguous (Masterson 
et al. 2000). The social exchange rewards do not have a precise price for a single, 
quantitative medium of exchange. Hence, social obligations are unable to be assessed 
on a transaction-by-transaction basis (Masterson et al., 2000). 
SET comprises a set of propositions exhibiting the tenet of social exchange (Blau, 
1964). Firstly, the success proposition of SET highlights that, the more often a particular 
interaction is rewarded, the more likely a member in an exchange is to repeat that 
interaction again (Homans, 1961). The reward proposition states that, the more 
valuable to a member of an exchange is the result of the member’s action, the more 
likely the member of the exchange is to perform the action again. Furthermore, the 
value proposition contends that rewards gain value when deprived. In addition, the 
aggression proposition describes that, when an exchange member’s action does not 
receive the expected reward, or receives unexpected punishment, the exchange 
member will aggressively avoid the action in the future. Lastly, the rationality proposition 
argues that, in choosing between actions, a member to an exchange will choose the 
one for which the value of the reward multiplied by the probability of receiving the 
reward is greater. 
The SET is applicable for SCM and can be a valuable mechanism when analysing 
buyer-supplier relationships (Holthausen, 2013). It is especially appropriate for the 
selection of supplier strategies and for decision making about how to manage suppliers. 
A purchaser should fully consider social norms such as trust and commitment when 
participating in an exchange, so that a trustful exchange relationship can be nurtured 
for a long-term continuation of the relationship. Becoming a favourite customer, instead 
of simply being a regular customer or even an exit customer, enables a supplier to 
provide privileged treatment and an ensured supply, which leads to reduced uncertainty 
of supply. SET suggests that establishing a long-term relationship through increased 
trust and commitment outweighs the costs of supplier management.  
2.1.3 Extended Resource Based View  
While RBV argues that a firm’s internal resources and capabilities are a source to 
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generate sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Day, 1994; Collis and 
Montgomery, 1995; Wernerfelt, 1984), it is widely acknowledged as being insufficient 
to explain how external resources are linked to competitiveness of the organizations. 
Many scholars have attempted to incorporate network resources to extend RBV (Gulati, 
1998; Gulati, 1999; Lavie, 2006). Gulati (1998) introduces a social network perspective 
and emphasizes the profound importance of social networks to organizational 
performances. Lavie (2006) examined the applicability of RBV in the networked 
environment and attempt to extend RBV to incorporate network resources of inter-
connected firms. He concludes that network resources could contribute to the rents 
extracted from alliance networks. 
The main tenet of ERBV is that cross-boundary resources create competitive 
advantage (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Das and Teng, 2000; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Ireland et al., 2002; Lavie, 2006; Lewis et al., 
2010). McEvily and Zaheer (1999) propose that a firm’s embeddedness in social 
networks could be an important source of competitive edge. Das and Teng (2000) put 
forward a resource-based theory of strategic alliances, and argue that firms could 
leverage alliances to maximize the value of inter-partner resources. Similarly, studies 
such as Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) and Ireland et al. (2002) posit that the 
formation of alliances yields competitiveness. By examining the network-level 
knowledge sharing process between Toyota and its suppliers, Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) 
argue that a dynamic learning capability would require a company to go beyond the 
firm’s boundaries to create competitive advantage. Lewis et al. (2010) analyse the 
evolution of competitive advantage and contend that external resources could generate 
long-term competitive advantage, together with classic resources. In essence, ERBV 
advocates that boundary-spanning activities play an important role in business 
performance and in generating competitive advantage. 
ERBV has been used by researchers to explain that inter-organizational collaborative 
initiatives between SC partners improve competencies, and therefore generate 
competitive advantage (Arya and Lin, 2007; Rungtusanatham et al., 2003; Kale et al., 
2000; Dyer, 1996; Dyer et al., 2001; Xu et al., 2014; Oliveira et al., 2003; Lai et al., 
2012). For instance, Arya and Lin (2007) and Dyer et al. (2001) demonstrate that 
organizations could enhance their capabilities by participating in a collaboration 
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network. Rungtusanatham et al. (2003) put forward the view that SC linkages with 
suppliers and customers could improve the operational performance of a firm. Kale et 
al. (2000) argue that collaboration with alliance partners could be critical to inimitable 
competencies. Dyer (1996) examine the interfirm relationships in the auto industry, and 
indicate that specialized supplier networks could be a source of competitive advantage. 
Xu et al. (2014) further present that inter-organizational resources, such as SCI, could 
improve business performance significantly. Thus, ERBV is borrowed by the present 
study to be one of the theoretical lenses to investigate SCC of CMFs.  
2.1.4 Institutional Theory 
Institutional Theory highlights that the institutional environment is one of the 
fundamental determinants of economic growth (North, 1997). Institutions are 
composed of ‘formal rules (laws, constitutions, regulations and rules), informal 
constrains (norms of behaviour, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct) and 
their enforcement characteristics’ (North, 2003, p. 2). Scott (2004) contends that 
institutional forces, including natural economic laws, and cultural, social and political 
processes, shape an organizational system and set various guidelines for social 
behaviour, thereby generating an impact on economic development. Institutions form 
the incentive structure that may either encourage or restrain productive activity (North 
1997; Williamson, 2000). Likewise, Khalil et al. (2007) claim that a proper legal and 
economic environment, such as with property rights and economic freedom, can 
address economic growth. Rossiaud and Locatelli (2010) further emphasize that the 
institutional configurations stimulate companies in terms of their exploration and 
production strategies. By and large, institutional factors have significant impact on 
economic activities.  
Owing to the existence of various institutional constraints in China, institutional reform 
is especially crucial for the adoption of SCC. Liu et al. (2010) examine how institutional 
pressure incentives the firm to adopt an Internet-enabled Supply Chain Management 
System (eSCM), through a survey of 131 Chinese firms. They conclude that institutional 
pressures, including a firm’s competitive status and the powerful firms’ influence, are 
positively related to eSCM adoption intention. Su et al. (2008) evaluate the SCM 
activities of Chinese firms from the institutional perspective, and state that the level of 
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SCM of the Chinese logistics industry is affected by institutional factors such as the 
influence of planned economics, lack of professionals, and inefficient use of information 
technology (IT) systems. Cai et al. (2010) explore the relationship between institutional 
environment and the development of trust and information integration of CMFs, in terms 
of the aspects of legal protection, government support, and the importance of guanxi. 
They highlight that both government support and guanxi affect information sharing and 
collaborative planning considerably. Some scholars have realized the importance of 
examining institutional forces while investigating SCM activities (Yaibuathet et al., 2008; 
Zhang and Dhaliwal, 2009). Institutional theorists advocate that the implanting of SCM 
practices in different institutional contexts might not be successful (Yeung et al., 2006; 
Shi et al., 2012). Therefore, it is proper for the present research to include an 
institutional perspective, given the vital impact of a complex and uncertain institutional 
environment on the development of SCC in China. 
Overall, in view of the key elements of SCC proposed in the present study, four theories, 
i.e. AT, SET, ERBV and Institutional Theory, are considered priorities for this research. 
While both TCE and AT provide an economic approach for understanding SCC 
behaviours, TCE addresses dependence relationships of SC members by emphasising 
the SC member’s cost minimization efforts (Williamson, 2002). TCE exclusively 
translates the many trade-offs within a make-or-buy decision into cost. On the contrary, 
AT provides guidelines for inter-organizational incentive alignments to achieve efficient 
relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Therefore, AT is the preferred economic perspective, 
which provides an explanation for the collaborative nature of SCC. 
Supply chain relationships not only incorporate economic elements explicated in a 
contract but also incorporate elements of social exchange (Johnston et al., 2004). 
Incorporation of SET could provide substantial insights for understanding complex and 
dynamic SCC activities, and allow the present study to consider both financial and non-
financial measures for SC performance, in a complementary manner. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to encompass an ERBV perspective owing to the fact that 
inter-organizational collaboration is an important source of competitive advantage. In 
addition, given the unique institutional environment in China, incorporating institutional 
constraints into the decision-making process is essential for the successful 
implementation of SCC by Chinese manufacturers. As such, Institutional Theory is 
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indispensable for the present study. On the whole, four theoretical lenses are borrowed 
to account for the complex nature of SCC practices of Chinese E & E manufacturing 
firms by this study.   
2.2 Supply Chain Management 
The concept of SCM first appeared in the logistics literature in the 1980s (Cooper and 
Ellram, 1993). Since then it has received substantial attention among scholars and 
practitioners (Lambert et al., 1998). Initially, it was introduced to facilitate the physical 
transfer of products and the management of inventory of the entire SC (Bechtel and 
Jayaram, 1997; Ellram and Cooper, 1990), as the traditional approach of mitigating 
uncertainty by accumulating excess inventory and capacity turned out to be frustrating 
and expensive (Ellram and Cooper, 1990; Stevens, 1989; Stevens, 1990).  
While the term SCM continued to be used interchangeably with logistics by some 
scholars and practitioners, the differences between the two terms were gradually 
clarified by researchers (Cooper et al., 1997; Croxton et al., 2001; Lummus et al., 2001). 
They consider that SCM goes beyond logistics and incorporates activities and 
processes, such as information system integration, demand management, design of 
products, coordination of processes, and planning and scheduling, that are traditionally 
not included in the definition of logistics (Cooper et al., 1997; Lummus et al., 2001).  
A review of the SCM literature shows that various definitions were provided by scholars 
from different disciplines (see Table 2.1). Bechtel and Jayaram (1997) reviewed 
literature from multiple disciplines and identified various schools of thought on SCM. 
Their findings reveal that there is confusion about what SCM essentially means. Ellram 
and Cooper (1993) explain that SCM is an innovative Western approach to coordinating 
SC activities while maintaining many features of the Japanese Keiretsu approach, such 
as stability and efficiency. Hewitt (1994) opines that SCM includes not only flow of 
materials and information but also the processes that enable this flow. Stevens (1990) 
contends that SCM spans from the source of supply to the point of consumption. Ellram 
and Cooper (1990) emphasize that SCM uses a system approach to perceive the 
supply network as a whole entity rather than a set of separated units. Some researchers 
consider that SCM is an effective approach to managing inventory by focusing on the 
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determination of optimal location and quantity of inventory to be held for the entire SC 
Table 2.1 Definitions of SCM 
Definitions of SCM Author(s) 
‘··· deals with the total flow of materials from suppliers through end-users.’ 
Jones and Riley (1987, p. 
97) 
‘··· to synchronize the requirements of the customer with the flow of material 
from suppliers in order to effect a balance between what are often seen as the 
conflicting goals of high customer service, low inventory investment and low unit 
cost.’ 
Stevens (1989, p. 3) 
‘··· as an integrative philosophy to manage the total flow of a distribution 
channel from supplier to the ultimate user.’  
Ellram and Cooper (1990, 
p. 2) 
‘··· is a strategic management tool used to enhance overall customer 
satisfaction that is intended to improve a firm’s competitiveness and profitability.’   
Giunipero and Brand (1996, 
p. 30) 
‘··· as the delivery of enhanced customer and economic value through 
synchronized management of the flow of physical goods and associated 
information from sourcing to consumption.’ 
Lalonde (1997, p. 7) 
‘··· is the integration of key business processes from end user through original 
suppliers that provides products, service, and information that add value for 
customers and other stakeholders.’  
Lambert et al. (1998, p. 1) 
‘···is a continuously evolving management philosophy that seeks to unify the 
collective productive competencies and resources of the business functions 
found both within the enterprise and outside in the firm's allied business partners 
located along intersecting supply channels into a highly competitive, customer-
enriching supply system focused on developing innovative solutions and 
synchronizing the flow of marketplace products, services, and information to 
create unique, individualized sources of customer value.’ 
Ross (1998, p. 9) 
‘··· is systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional business functions and 
the tactics across these business functions within a particular company and 
across businesses within the supply chain, for the purpose of improving the 
long-term performance of the individual companies and the supply chain as a 
whole.’  
Mentzer et al. (2001, p.11) 
‘··· is the collaborative design and management of seamless value-added 
processes to meet the real needs of the end customer. The development and 
integration of people and technological resources as well as the coordinated 
management of materials, information, and financial flows are critical to 
successful supply chain integration.’  
Fawcett and Magnan 
(2004, p. 68) 
‘··· is the design and management of seamless, value-added processes across 
organizational boundaries to meet the real needs of the end customer.’  
Fawcett et al. (2007, p. 8) 
‘··· is a set of approaches utilized to efficiently integrate suppliers, 
manufacturers, warehouses, and stores, so that merchandise is produced and 
distributed at the right quantities, to the right locations, and at the right time, in 
order to minimize system-wide costs while satisfying service level requirements.’ 
Simchi-Levi et al. (2008, p. 
1) 
 
 (Ellram and Cooper, 1990; Jones and Riley, 1987; Cooper and Ellram, 1993; Skjoett-
Larsen, 1999). Lambert et al. (1998) define SCM as a new method of coordinating 
business and relationships with other SC players so as to achieve overall business 
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process excellence. Overall, SCM is a broad concept incorporating various variables. 
Multiple frameworks of SCM have been proposed by researchers to promote better 
understanding of the concept and facilitate wider implementation of SCM by 
practitioners (Hewitt, 1994; Lambert et al., 1998; Croxton et al., 2001; Min and Mentzer, 
2004; Chen and Paulraj, 2004; Kotzab et al., 2011). For example, Hewitt (1994) 
developed a conceptual framework to demonstrate the evolvement of SCM practices 
from being perceived as a narrow term to a much broader concept. Lambert et al. (1998) 
operationalized the SCM framework and indicated that managing the SC would involve 
three closely inter-related elements: 1) the SC network structure; 2) the SC business 
processes; and 3) the management components. Min and Mentzer (2004) answered 
the research call of Mentzer et al. (2001) for empirical research to offer a general 
theoretical framework of SCM for the development and testing of measurement scale. 
Chen and Paulraj (2004) attempted to develop a research framework that could 
improve understanding of SCM and promote both theoretical and empirical 
examination of the critical SCM variables. Kotzab et al. (2011) developed a conceptual 
model and provided a set of measurement scales to operationalize the constructs 
included in the model. From the above, it can be seen that a sizeable effort has been 
exerted to promote a better understanding of SCM.   
A well-executed SCM is considered to lead to higher operational efficiency and 
effectiveness, superior firm performance, and stronger competitive advantage (Jones 
and Riley, 1987; Ellram, 1991a; Cooper and Ellram, 1993; Hewitt, 1994; Lalonde, 1997; 
Clendenin, 1997; Lambert et al., 1998; Fawcett and Magnan, 2004; Croxton et al., 2001; 
Langley and Holcomb, 1992; Ross, 1998; Tan et al., 2002; Hsu et al., 2011). Ellram 
(1991b) posits that SCM offers a tremendous opportunity for firms to enhance 
competitive advantage, but not for every situation. Cooper and Ellram (1993) state that 
the involvement in SCM can help reduce inventory and improve customer service. 
Hewitt (1994) advocates a process-oriented SC redesign for operational efficiency and 
effectiveness, so as to retain channel-wide cost reduction and excellent customer 
service. While various important benefits of SCM are cited in the extant literature, most 
of this literature focuses mainly on theoretical discussion of the concept (e.g. Giunipero 
and Brand, 1996) and provide limited empirical evidence.    
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2.3 Supply Chain Integration 
While SCM is receiving increasing attention, a more integrated perspective has been 
advocated by academics and practitioners to overcome the functional conflicts and 
retain more significant benefits (Stevens, 1989; Hines, 1993; Houlihan, 1985; Houlihan, 
1988; Bowersox and Morash, 1989; Scott and Westbrook, 1991; Morgan and Monczka, 
1996; Daugherty et al., 1996). Kim (2006) claims that a firm needs to seek integration 
with others for valuable resources and technological know-how. Consequently, the firm 
is able to concentrate on their core capabilities and become an expert in a particular 
area (Simchi-Levi et al., 2003; Lummus et al., 2008). 
As most definitions of SCI are seemly unclear and not widely accepted (Pagell, 2004), 
many scholars have attempted to provide a more comprehensive definition for the 
notion (see Table 2.2). Essentially, SCI is the internal and external collaborative 
activities with SC partners to achieve more efficient and effective operational 
performance. Scott and Westbrook (1991) suggest that SCI is a new strategic tool for 
the enhancement of SC effectiveness. While Pagell (2004) considers that SCI is the 
foundation of SCM, Morgan and Monczka (1996) and Fawcett and Magnan (2002) 
argue that SCI is the second level of SCM. Mentzer et al. (2001) contend that SCI is 
essential to the implementation of SCM practices.   
SCI has been classified by academics in various ways, the majority taking an internal - 
external perspective (Morash and Clinton, 1998; Pagell, 2004; Droge et al., 2004; Kim, 
2006; Das et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2009a; Chen et al., 2009b; Kim, 2009, Richey et 
al., 2009, Flynn et al., 2010; Wong et al., 2011; Danese and Romano, 2011; Droge et 
al., 2012). Internal integration is to eliminate functional conflicts and inefficiencies, and 
promote inter-functional cooperation (Pagell, 2004; Flynn et al., 2010; Morash et al., 
1997). External integration refers to the coordination and streamlining of the 
interactions and flows spanning organizational boundaries (Morash and Clinton, 1998). 
Arguably, internal integration is a prerequisite for subsequent external integration 
(Stevens, 1990; Bowersox and Closs, 1996; Croxton et al., 2001), whereas external 
integration can be an incentive for internal integration (Morash and Clinton, 1998). 
Daugherty et al. (1996) claim that both internal and external integration are necessary 
to facilitate chain-wide connections and improve SC efficiency. Many academic 
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researchers emphasize the importance of engaging in both internal and external 
integration to obtain superior performance (Stevens, 1989; Richey et al., 2010; Stank 
et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2009b; Danese and Romano, 2011, Morash and Clinton 1998). 
Stevens (1990) posits that development of an integrated SC involves four stages, 
namely baseline, functional integration, internal integration, and external integration. 
Table 2.2 Definitions of SCI 
Definitions of SCI Author(s) 
‘··· a useful method for evaluating alternative channel flow arrangements in terms of 
efficiency and customer satisfaction. They emphasize the importance of the need to 
integrate market flow strategies for overall customer satisfaction.’ 
Bowersox and Morash 
(1989, p. 66) 
‘··· a multidimensional process where interaction and collaboration have unique, 
significant contributions.’ 
Kahn and Mentzer 
(1998, p. 56) 
‘··· the extent to which separate parties work together in a cooperative manner to 
arrive at mutually acceptable outcomes. Accordingly, this definition encompasses 
constructs pertaining to the degree of cooperation, coordination, interaction and 
collaboration.’ 
O’Leary-Kelly and 
Flores (2002, p. 226) 
‘···a process of interaction and collaboration in which manufacturing, purchasing 
and logistics work together in a cooperative manner to arrive at mutually acceptable 
outcomes for their organization.’ 
Pagell (2004, p. 460) 
‘···activities that acquire, share, and consolidate strategic knowledge and 
information with parties outside the immediate organization.’ 
Swink et al. (2007, p. 
148) 
‘···linking major business functions and business processes within and across 
companies into a cohesive and high-performing business mode.’  
CSCMP Glossary of 
Terms (2013, p. 187) 
‘··· a set of continuous restructuring activities aimed at seamlessly linking relevant 
business processes and reducing redundant or unnecessary processes within and 
across firms.’  
Chen et al. (2009a, p. 
29) 
‘··· the management of various sets of activities that aims at seamlessly linking 
relevant business processes within and across firms and eliminating duplicate or 
unnecessary parts of the processes for the purpose of building a better-functioning 
supply chain.’ 
Chen et al. (2009b, p. 
66) 
‘··· the co-ordination and management of the upstream and downstream product, 
service, financial and information flows of the core business processes between a 
focal company and its key supplier (and potentially the supplier’s key suppliers) and 
its key customer (and potentially the customer’s key customers).’ 
Naslund and Hulthen 
(2012, p. 496) 
‘··· the alignment, linkage and coordination of people, processes, information, 
knowledge, and strategies across the supply chain between all points of contact 
and influence to facilitate the efficient and effective flows of material, money, 
information, and knowledge in response to customer needs.’   
Stevens and Johnson 
(2016, p. 22) 
  
SCI is also collapsed into other dimensions by researchers. For example, Frohlich and 
Westbrook (2001, p. 185) examined supplier and customer integration strategies and 
employed “arc of integration” to represent the direction and degree of integration activity. 
Their research demonstrates that, the wider the degree of arc of integration with both 
suppliers and customers is, the stronger the association with performance 
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improvement. Swink et al. (2007) categorize SCI into four types, comprising strategic 
customer integration, strategic supplier integration, product-process technology 
integration, and corporate strategy integration. Their study shows that each type of 
integration activity has unique pros and cons.  
Many studies report that SCI competencies have positive impact on firm performance. 
Most of these studies indicate the significant impact of SCI on the improvement of firm 
performances, such as cost reduction, efficiency, effectiveness, quality, flexibility, 
customer service, innovative capability, and problem solving capabilities (Daugherty et 
al., 1996; Pagell, 2004; Stank et al., 2001; Lambert, et al., 2004; Droge et al., 2012; 
Danese, 2013; Chen et al., 2009a; Stank et al., 2001; Richey et al., 2009; Flynn et al., 
2010; Wong et al., 2011). Danese and Romano (2011) examine the interactions 
between customer and supplier integration, and highlight the importance of 
implementing customer and supplier integration simultaneously to improve 
performance. 
While SCI has been advertised to have a sizeable positive impact on firm performance 
and competitiveness, the achievement of those benefits can be a significant challenge. 
Bowersox et al. (2000) and Fawcett and Magnan (2002) opine that realizing neither 
internal nor external integration is an easy task. Richey et al. (2010) suggest that a 
company’s capability to reap the benefits of SCI depends on how successfully SCI 
practices can be implemented. The impact of SCI on firm performance is also 
moderated by a company’s business strategy and demand variance (O’Leary-Kelly and 
Flores, 2002). Danese and Romano (2011) highlight that supplier and customer 
integrations have to be implemented simultaneously to improve performance. Kim 
(2009) argues that, even if a firm possesses excellent SCM practices and competitive 
capabilities, it has to engage in close strategic alignment and coordination with SC 
partners to make the improvement of firm performance possible.    
Multiple studies show that there is limited empirical evidence of extended integration 
with SC members (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002; Lambert et al., 1998; Bagchi et al., 
2005; Mejza and Wisner, 2001; Naslund and Hulthen, 2012). Fawcett and Magnan 
(2002) indicate that corporations rarely have developed extensive SCI with SC 
members beyond the first tier. After twenty-five years of evolution, Stevens and 
Johnson (2016) re-examined the state-of-the-art of SCI, and demonstrate that the 
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majority of firms have failed to capitalize on the full advantage of this practice.     
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that various barriers hindering 
integration have to be overcome before the benefits of SCI can be reaped. Morgan and 
Monczka (1996) state that integration is not a simple merger. It requires substantial 
changes in vision, culture and routines. Hines (1993) suggests that integration of the 
material value pipeline requires the primary functions of individual firms to work 
together as a unified team and the traditional arms-length silos to be removed. Firms 
also must be open to goal alignment, frequent communication, and partner 
interdependence (Richey et al., 2009; Forslund and Jonsson, 2009). Performance 
advancements are not guaranteed if SCI initiatives are not accompanied by the 
adoption of a coherent mix of SCM practices (Danese et al., 2006; Kim, 2006). Recently, 
Stevens and Johnson (2016) conclude that the biggest challenge associated with the 
success of SCI is the joint effort by SC partners to act collaboratively to operationalize 
SC orientation and ensure measurable, sustainable improvement on a consistent basis. 
All these antecedents have to be nurtured and enhanced through continuous effort so 
that successful integration can be achieved.  
2.4 Supply Chain Collaboration 
Supply chain collaboration has been strongly advocated by academics and 
practitioners during the past two decades. Collaboration is described as an inter-
organizational process where participants work collectively to make investment, share 
information (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002), resources, awards and responsibilities, 
and make decisions and solve problems jointly to achieve common goals (Stank et al., 
2001; Soosay et al., 2008). Other similar definitions are provided by other academics 
(See Table 2.3). Fawcett et al. (2008a) point out that collaboration is more than the 
traditional management of transactions for cost efficiency, but is, rather, leveraging 
close relationships for continuous improvement and innovation. Lambert et al. (1999) 
emphasize that collaboration is an evolving journey, instead of a static process, which 
sits between arm’s-length relationships and joint ventures. Basically, SCC involves 
multiple collaborative activities such as information sharing, joint decision making, and 
synchronization of operations for the achievement of mutual goals so as to retain 
distinctive advantages. 
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Table 2.3 Definitions of SCC 
Definitions of SCC Author(s) 
‘···a complex interaction of business and interpersonal activities whose purpose is 
to achieve mutually beneficial goals.’ 
Spekman et al. (1996, 
p. 350) 
‘···a process of decision making among interdependent parties. It involves joint 
ownership of decisions and collective responsibility for outcomes.’ 
Liedtka (1996, p. 21) 
‘…an affective and volitional process where departments work together with mutual 
understanding, common vision, and shared resources to achieve collective goals.’ 
Kahn and Mentzer 
(1998, p. 55) 
‘···two or more chain members working together to create a competitive advantage 
through sharing information, making joint decisions, and sharing benefits which result 
from greater profitability of satisfying end customer needs than acting alone.’ 
Togar and Sridharan 
(2002, p. 19) 
‘···Two or more independent companies work jointly to plan and execute supply chain 
operations with greater success than when acting in isolation.’ 
Simatupang and 
Sridharan (2002, p. 19) 
‘···Diverse entities working together, sharing processes, technologies, and data to 
maximize value for the whole group and the customers they serve.’ 
Foster and Srikanth 
(2005, p. 31) 
‘··· diverse entities work together by sharing processes, technologies, and data to 
try to maximize value for the whole group and their customer.’ 
Daugherty et al. (2006, 
p.63) 
‘··· the ability to work across organizational boundaries to build and manage unique 
value-added processes to better meet customer needs.’ 
Fawcett et al. (2008a, p. 
93) 
 
To better understand the concept, researchers have further classified SCC into different 
levels. For instance, Whipple and Russell (2007) identify three major types of 
collaborative relationships: Type I is collaborative transaction management; Type II is 
collaborative event management; and Type III is collaborative process management. 
The Type I relationship is a limited collaboration that involves high volume data 
exchange and operational task alignment, such as Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI). 
The Type II relationship is a developing form of collaboration that incorporates decision-
making at a tactical level, as in initial CPFR. The Type III relationship is an advanced 
form of collaboration that requires strategic collaboration that relies on knowledge 
sharing and joint decision-making, such as advanced CPFR. This classification will be 
used by the present research to distinguish the different levels of collaboration between 
CMFs and their SC partners (see Figure 2.1).  
Spekman et al. (1998) depict that the development of collaboration moves from 
cooperation, coordination to collaboration. Cooperation is the threshold level of 
interaction characterized by the exchange of limited valuable information and the 
engagement of some partners in longer-term contracts. Coordination requires the 
exchange of specified workflow and information, which enables JIT and Electronic Data 
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Interchange (EDI). Collaboration demands high levels of mutual trust, commitment and 
information sharing among SC partners. 
Figure 2.1 Different levels of SCC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
In a similar vein, Kampstra et al. (2006) divide SCC decisions into three loops: the 
strategy loop, the change loop, and the control loop. They argue that the step-wise 
development of SC performance can be described as being from communication, 
through coordination and intensive collaboration, to partnerships. Danese (2007) 
classifies SCC into communication, limited collaboration and full collaboration, based 
on the depth of collaboration and number of interaction units involved in collaboration. 
Skjoett-Larsen et al. (2003) argue that SCC can be implemented in various ways. In 
line with variation in scope and depth, they group SCC into three levels: basic CPFR, 
developing CPFR, and advanced CPFR. 
The basic motivation for collaboration among chain members is to exploit profit-making 
opportunities that cannot be realized alone while customers are more demanding and 
competition is intensified (Hoyt and Huq, 2000; Leeuw and Fransoo, 2009). Through 
collaboration, firms are able to enhance their efficiency through resource pooling, taking 
advantage of complementary skills, and information sharing. Whipple and Frankel 
(2000) propose that strategic collaboration facilitates buyers and suppliers to combine 
their individual strengths and work cooperatively to eliminate non value-adding 
activities and enable better performance. Ireland and Bruce (2000) consider that 
inventory accumulation is actually the driver of collaboration. This is because 
collaboration is an effective way to diminish the “bullwhip” effect of inventory and 
become more responsive to a turbulent market (Holweg et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
Scope of 
collaboration 
Depth of 
collaboration 
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some other issues, such as cost reduction, technological uncertainty, shorter product 
life-cycles, an ability to deal with uncertainty, and new product development (NPD) 
(Hoyt and Huq, 2000; Mclvor and McHugh, 2000), are also key impetuses for SCC. 
The immense prevalence of collaboration is mainly owing to the remarkable benefits it 
may provide to organizations. As Bowersox et al. (1992) reports, strategic logistics 
alliances among partners, and even competitors, lead to better customer satisfaction, 
and lower distribution and storage cost. Chan et al. (2004) contend that SCC is able to 
provide faster customer responsiveness, enhancement of flexibility for unstable market 
conditions, and reduction of inventory buffer stock. In addition, according to the findings 
from interviews with 23 managers in ten logistics organizations, Soosay et al. (2008) 
assert that a collaborative relationship is able to integrate operations for improved 
effectiveness together with embarking on both radical and incremental innovation. With 
a higher degree of collaboration and a timelier sharing of information between retailer 
and manufacturer, greater stability makes inventory planning more accurate (Fliedner, 
2003). Overall, collaboration is believed to be an effective SCM tool enabling various 
benefits for all members, to achieve cost reduction, quality enhancement, and operation 
acceleration through streamlining cross-organizational processes (Simatupang and 
Sridharan, 2005a).  
Furthermore, scholars have obtained some empirical support for successful application 
of collaborative practices. As Parks (2001) reports, Wal-Mart, the first retailer 
implementing collaborative initiatives together with Warner-Lambert and Sara Lee, 
achieved great results in terms of improved in-stock levels, shortened leading times, 
lower on-hand inventory, streamlined production cycles, and increased sales. Based 
on a survey of companies in New Zealand, Simatupang and Sridharan (2005b) prove 
that SC members who had higher levels of collaboration practices could achieve better 
operational performance. Stank et al. (2001) conducted a survey among manufacturing, 
wholesale/distributing, and retailing industries in North America, and reveal that both 
internal and external collaborations affect logistics service performance significantly. In 
addition, in a survey of Korean firms carried out by Ha et al. (2011), they report that 
collaboration had considerable impact on logistics competency. By contrast, Vereecke 
and Muylle (2006) find that increased collaboration is associated with higher 
performance but that the improvements are not always significant.     
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Despite the enormous advantages that might be produced by SCC, substantial 
practical difficulties inherent in the application of SCC have been widely acknowledged 
and discussed (Gulati et al., 1994; Spekman et al., 1998; Johnston et al., 2004; Barratt, 
2004; Holweg et al., 2005; Fawcett and Magnan, 2002; Fawcett et al., 2008b; Bowersox 
et al., 2003; Beth et al., 2003; Ellinger et al., 2006; Min et al., 2005; Daugherty et al., 
2006). For example, Barratt (2004) points out that collaboration is not unproblematic. 
Some assert that true adaptive and synergistic SCC is scarce (Fawcett et al., 2008b; 
Beth et al., 2003; Ellinger et al., 2006; Min et al., 2005). Some posit that collaborations 
often fail because many SC members are concerned that, while they cooperate 
faithfully, others could act opportunistically for their own interests. Consequently, the 
mutual suspicion often ends up in a lose-lose situation (Gulati et al.,1994; Fawcett et 
al., 2008b). Bowersox et al. (2003) and Spekman et al. (1998) highlight that many firms 
understand the strategic importance of SCC but easily revert back to adversarial and 
aggressive cost-cutting policies for immediate benefits. Clearly, adopting the concept 
of SCC requires substantial change from traditional management skills and a new 
mindset (Fawcett et al., 2010).    
Various barriers inhibiting successful SCC have been reported by researchers. They 
include lack of collaborative and strategic planning, difficulties of real-time information 
exchange, substantial investment, no shared target, lack of trust, and unequal 
distribution of risk and reward (Barratt and Oliveira, 2001; Chan et al., 2004; Fliedner, 
2003; Ramesh et al., 2010). However, there is a trend toward greater collaboration. 
Matopoulos et al., (2007, p. 177) argue that, ‘despite the barriers that potentially 
deteriorate collaboration among companies for many industries all over the world, 
collaboration is becoming more of a necessity than an option’. Barratt (2004) found that 
failure of SCC is caused by a lack of understanding of what collaboration really means. 
Consequently, important enablers, such as developing front-end agreement (Barratt, 
2004), top management involvement (Sandberg, 2007), mutual trust (Ha et al., 2011), 
and information technology and sharing (Mason-Jones and Towill, 1998; Lummus and 
Vokurka, 1999), are crucial for successful collaboration. 
2.5 Supply Chain Collaboration of Chinese Manufacturers 
Since China’s adoption of economy reform and open-door policy, Chinese 
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manufacturers have convinced the world of their prominent competency in production. 
However, their SCM capability is comparatively weak in comparison to Western firms 
(Pyke et al., 2000). The global manufacturing sector has evolved towards a focus on 
process innovation and unprecedented collaboration across the SC (Zhu, 2012). To be 
successful in the global marketplace, Chinese manufacturers must engage in cross-
border collaboration to keep abreast of their leading global peers, without delay. 
Multiple obstacles to substantial improvement of logistics efficiency and SC capability 
of Chinese manufacturers do exist, and many firms do not realize the importance of 
SCC (Huang et al., 2012). Nevertheless, some Chinese manufacturers have 
demonstrated growing interest in SCC with up- and down-stream partners. The level of 
adoption of SCC practices by Chinese manufacturers can be gauged from aspects of 
information sharing, customer relationship management (CRM) and supplier 
relationship management (SRM), synchronized demand forecasting, and supply 
planning.  
In China, indigenous suppliers are often reluctant to provide detailed information about 
their operations (Carbone, 2004). Huettner and Song (2007b) estimate that only 12 per 
cent of local Chinese companies electronically share demand information and inventory 
data in real time with SC partners, compared to 50 per cent in India. China is short of 
accurate information and tracking systems, which shortage is largely caused by the 
lack of standardization in data collection and the sharing of information (MacDonald, 
2004; Daly and Cui, 2003). Wang et al. (2013) report that only very few large Chinese 
retailers have the ability to build information platforms to support CPFR for real-time 
and interactive collaboration. 
Chinese manufacturers are not sophisticated in CRM. This can be reflected in poor 
communication between sales groups and their end customers, and low customer 
satisfaction rate. CRM practices such as customer focus groups and automated cross-
selling are not widely implemented in China to enhance customer satisfaction (Huettner 
and Song, 2007a). Chinese manufacturers are also incompetent in tracking and 
controlling key customer order management performance metrics, hence overall 
customer satisfaction remains at a low level.  
The interaction between Chinese manufacturers and suppliers remains at transactional 
relationship stage (Handfield and McCormak, 2005). Liu et al. (2008) contend that most 
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manufacturers do not have a supplier evaluation system and have no ability to identify 
valuable suppliers as long-term partners. Low price is the only criterion for supplier 
selection in China. Only a very few firms realize the importance of building up strategic 
collaborative relationship with suppliers. However, long-term close cooperation 
between or among small- to medium-size enterprises has emerged as a recent trend 
(Wang and Shi, 2007). This type of network collaboration allocates the industrial-related 
manufacturing process into a few geographically-clustered companies through 
subcontracting, strategic alliances and service contracts. Some Chinese manufacturers 
even provide financial and technology support to enhance a supplier’s capability in 
aspects of quality control, production procedure, and assembly line improvement.  
Chinese manufacturers are in an adolescent phase in terms of collaborative demand 
forecasting and supply planning. Not many Chinese companies have formal forecasting, 
demand management, or a market intelligence unit for capacity and inventory planning 
(Handfield and McCormak, 2005; Wang et al., 2013). Huettner and Song (2007b) point 
out that only 17 per cent of the manufacturers surveyed in their study deployed 
synchronization of supply and demand practices in China, and that wide application of 
this initiative is restricted by deficiency in the use of advanced technologies.  
In sum, compounded with insufficient implementation of information and 
communication technologies such as EDI, ERP systems and the CPFR model, SCC 
practices in China are not diffused broadly, being only confined to limited leading 
enterprises and regions. In the aim to integrate with customers and suppliers for 
collaborative SC planning, improved real-time information visibility, enhanced 
responsiveness to market demand, and reduced cost, a large-scale collaborative effort 
involving Chinese manufacturers, logistics firms and the Chinese government is 
necessary.  
2.6 Building the Framework for Supply Chain Collaboration in 
China 
Following the above overview of the current status of SCC in China and an 
understanding of the importance of a high level of collaboration among the various 
parties in the SC to benefit the manufacturing industry of China, a tentative conceptual 
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framework for SCC based on the work of Simatupang and Sridharan (2005a) and 
customized for the unique economic, political and cultural situation in China is proposed 
(see Figure 2.2). At this stage, it is merely a framework to start with and shows only the 
key elements of SCC involved and the institutional obstacles identified in the literature. 
Detailed relationships among these elements and obstacles have yet to be determined. 
Upon investigation of the current status and the views of practitioners, it is hoped that 
the proposed framework can be refined by revising some of the elements and barriers 
or incorporating new ones that have not been identified in the literature. It is also 
anticipated that the inter-relationship between key elements and barriers can be 
revealed. Consequently, a more extensive and meaningful framework will be developed 
upon analysis of the findings from the case studies of this research.  
Five key elements for SCC of the CMFs are proposed in the framework. These 
elements comprise, objective alignment, information sharing, SC partnership, process 
integration, and collaborative synchronization. These are believed to be critical in 
enhancing both the efficiency and responsiveness of the entire SC. There are also six 
institutional obstacles to SCC of the manufacturing industry in China, taking into 
account its distinctive economic, political and cultural environment. These comprise, 
lack of awareness of SCC, lack of trust, weak information sharing capability, 
transactional relationship, insufficient government effort and innovation, and guanxi. It 
is believed that these obstacles can significantly impact on the success of SCC. Proper 
improvement measures and strategies in response to those obstacles can then be 
formulated in the long run to facilitate SCC, and hence leverage SCC competency as 
a new source of competitive advantage. 
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Figure 2.2 A proposed framework of SCC in China 
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2.5.1 Key Elements of Supply Chain Collaboration in China 
2.5.1.1 Supply Chain Objective Alignment (SCOA)   
Supply Chain Objective Alignment is the extent to which firms perceive the possibility 
of realizing compatible objectives that are mutually beneficial (Eliashberg and Michie, 
1984). It is the achievement of mutuality of interests between parties where they have 
common aims, values, and expectations (Jap, 2001). More specifically, with aligned SC 
objectives, both parties are intrinsically inspired to engage in cooperative actions, such 
as constructive communication, mutual adaptation, and high commitment, so that 
exchange outcomes can be enhanced (Jap and Anderson, 2003). Basically, aligned SC 
objectives provide direction for both parties while they participate in frequent 
communication of objectives and bargaining of the division of profits, obligations and 
risks.  
By developing aligned SC objectives between the parties, the incentive for opportunism 
can be restrained, which therefore promotes collaboration (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Each 
party is less likely to behave opportunistically but more likely to behave supportively if 
it understands that fulfilling the other party’s requests won’t undermine its own benefits. 
This is because a perception is developed that what is favourable for the counterpart 
will also be beneficial for the party. Thus, SC objective alignment enables less 
incentives to perform opportunistically, and prevents the occurrence of suspicion within 
both parties. As a result, appropriately designed incentive mechanisms are essential to 
alleviate concerns and encourage cooperativeness. In the absence of any common 
goals, firms will have no incentive to participate in collaborative actions (Samaddar et 
al., 2006).  
As Lambert et al. (1999) suggest, SC partners should agree on a shared vision for SCM 
as well as appropriate business operations underpinning the vision, thereby bonding 
firms through fairly distributed revenues. Evidently, greater objective alignment is a 
more effective mechanism to maintain close cooperation on track for realization of 
strategic expectations, and to facilitate long-term future collaboration (Jap and 
Anderson, 2003). 
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2.5.1.2 SC Partnering    
Driving by intensified market pressure caused by shortening product life cycle, 
technology sophistication, and volatile consumer demand, there is strong recognition 
among both researchers and practitioners that the traditional adversarial manufacturer-
supplier relationship needs to be turned towards a more cooperative partnership 
paradigm. Supplier partnering development is perceived as a source of competitive 
edge owing to it providing an opportunity to leverage suppliers’ critical resources and 
innovativeness through knowledge transfer (Dyer and Hatch, 2004), and possibly to 
lock-out competitors (Lambert et al., 1996). In particular, the long-term perspective of 
supplier partnering effectively inspires the suppliers to focus on mutual benefits instead 
of acting opportunistically (Williamson, 1998). As a result, it is able to create relational 
rents, which cannot be generated by a firm in isolation and can only be engendered 
through the joint activities (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Evidently, there has been a clear 
trend of shifting from a transactional arm’s-length relationship to a closer partnership 
among manufacturers and suppliers in the globalization era.   
Various definitions of partnership are available in the existing literature. For example, 
Ellram and Cooper (1990) state that a partnership is a type of inter-firm relationship 
that is positioned in the middle of a continuum ranged from a discrete arm’s-length 
relationship to vertical integration. Lambert et al., (1996, p. 2) define a partnership as 
‘a tailored business relationship based on mutual trust, openness, shared risk and 
shared rewards that results in business performance greater than would be achieved 
by the two firms working together in the absence of partnership’. Similarly, Ellram and 
Hendrick (1995, p. 41) contend that ‘partnership is an on-going relationship between 
two firms which involves a commitment over an extended period of time, the mutual 
sharing of information, as well as the risks and rewards of the relationships’.  
It is difficult to offer a one-size-fits-all definition for partnership relationships in that 
definitions are context dependent (Johnstone et al., 2009). However, all definitions 
share some common characteristics such as sharing information, coordination of efforts, 
investment in dedicated assets, a joint decision-making process, allocation of risks and 
benefits, a long-term orientation, mutual trust and commitment, and a bilateral problem-
solving attitude (Tuten and Urban, 2001; Sako et al. 1994; Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
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In light of previous research, successful supplier partnerships have been shown to have 
a positive effect on operational efficiencies and business performance. This includes 
enhancements in NPD, improvement of quality, cost reduction, lower inventory, 
shortened time-to-market, and better process technology adoption and innovation 
(Hartley and Choi, 1996; Johnston and Linton, 2000; Manohar and Narakesari, 1995). 
Consequently, through synergy of resources, supplier partnerships contribute 
significantly to business performance, thereby engendering competitive advantage.  
Nevertheless, establishing a collaborative partnership with key SC partners is often 
difficult (Kim, 2006). Critical issues need to be carefully considered in the 
implementation of partnerships. Firstly, substantial resources, time and effort are 
required to be allocated for the development of partnerships (Simpson and Mayo, 1997). 
Secondly, radical changes in organizational strategies, norms, infrastructures, and 
operational processes have to be taken by both parties (Maheshwari et al., 2006). In 
addition, relationship capital such as mutual trust and commitment is an essential 
ingredient for the success of partnerships (Cullen et al., 2000). During the processes 
of the forming, nurturing and managing of partnerships, it is vital to administer all these 
issues judiciously.  
2.5.1.3 Information Sharing 
Information sharing refers to the extent to which critical and proprietary information is 
communicated to one’s SC partner. It is defined as the way in which SC members build 
up highly developed communication systems that are compatible with each other, to 
facilitate real-time and dynamic inter-firm forecasting and planning (Sanders and 
Premus, 2005). It also means the extent to which information flow across the SC occurs, 
how frequently information updates, and how accurate information is maintained (Teo 
and King, 1997; Lee and Whang, 2000; Wiengarten et al., 2010). In general, information 
sharing is to exchange essential information between SC partners to achieve real-time 
transmission and processing of data required for SC decision making. 
The information to be shared usually includes ‘the availability of resources (capacity, 
inventory, funds and capability), the status of performance (time, quality, costs and 
flexibility), the status of process (forecasting, ordering, delivering, replenishing, and 
servicing), and the status of contract’ (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002, p. 24).  
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Information technology provides a linkage amongst SC partners to allow seamless 
interaction at relatively lower cost. It serves as a systematized common platform 
enabling various firms along the SC to exchange information and synchronize activities 
for effective demand forecasting and planning (Sanders and Premus, 2005; Steckel, 
2004). It enhances chain-wide transparency, thereby making more efficient operations 
and resource allocation possible.  
SCI and SCC largely rely on the availability of an efficient and effective inter-firm IT 
(Richey et al., 2007; Sebastian and Lambert, 2003), and require more proactive sharing 
of real-time information by SC partners. Without a sufficient inter-firm information 
system, the transmission and processing of real-time and dynamic data cannot be 
realized for collaborative decision making (Kent and Mentzer, 2003).  
While the availability of sophisticated and advanced inter-organizational IT is important, 
it is the quality, frequency and quantity of information that makes cross-organizational 
collaboration really meaningful (Sanders et al., 2011; Prajogo and Olhager, 2012). The 
quality of information is usually assessed across several dimensions, including 
accuracy, timeliness, completeness, accessibility and compatibility (Li and Lin, 2006). 
Provided with accurate and timely demand and performance information, a 
manufacturer is able to shorten NPD cycles, reduce production scheduling time, and 
decrease inventory obsolescence, resulting in greater responsiveness to customer 
needs (Ye and Wang, 2013). The real-time and detailed information exchange enables 
members within the collaborative network to diminish demand uncertainty and tackle 
decision-making difficulties (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). To enable the power of 
information sharing to be evident, the high quality information must be embedded in 
the business strategies, structures, processes and competencies (Sambamurthy et al., 
2003), and be aligned with organizational incentives, objectives and decisions (Lee et 
al., 1997). In addition, providing high quality of information is likely to encourage 
partners’ willingness to release more proprietary information as a return (Whipple et al., 
2002). Overall, only when advanced and sensitive information is made available by 
firms proactively, can performance differentials and collaboration of the entire SC be 
promoted.  
The benefits of information sharing are widely cited by researchers and practitioners. 
As Johannessen et al. (2001) state, the practices of information acquisition, absorption, 
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and transformation have come to be perceived as a key enabler of competitive 
advantage of SC partners. This advantage is in that the release of confidential 
information can exert positive impact on SC performances such as improvement of SC 
efficiencies and customer satisfaction, removal of SC uncertainties, enhancement of 
SC responsiveness, and creation of new products with better values (Lee et al., 2010; 
Cachon and Fisher, 2000; Lee et al., 1997; Griffin and Hauser, 1996; Hung et al., 2011; 
Kim and Lee, 2010). More specifically, real-time information sharing makes it possible 
to streamline production arrangements and logistics activities, resulting in shorter order 
cycles and delivery flexibility and reliability (Cachon and Fisher, 2000). Furthermore, 
appropriate and competitive inter-organisational information sharing enables quick 
responses to changing customer demands and expectations (Hsu et al., 2008). In 
particular, the positive impact of information sharing on the elimination of the bullwhip 
effect could be demonstrated through real-time monitoring of consumer behaviour and 
detection of environmental changes (Lee et al., 1997). In addition, information on 
design, production capacity and capability, and customer requests, has to be shared 
between all departments and functions involved in NPD initiatives, so that a 
commercially successful product can be innovated (Griffin and Hauser, 1996). 
Consequently, the significance of information sharing to business success makes it one 
of the main precursors to the realization of SCC.  
2.5.1.4 Process Integration 
Process integration is defined as a continuous restructuring effort to connect business 
processes smoothly, and to simplify SC operations by eliminating redundant or 
unnecessary activities within and across organizations (Chen et al., 2009a; Stank et al., 
2001; Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; Stank et al., 2002; Shi and Liao, 2013). 
Consequently, a cohesive and high-performing business model can be developed 
(CSCMP Glossary of Terms, 2013). Process integration requires streamlining all 
fundamental business activities such as manufacturing, information sharing, cross-
organizational logistics, and other major routines, into continuous sequences of daily 
business operations (Ray et al., 2004; Cannon and Perreault, 1999; Rodrigues et al., 
2004). As a result, the operational linkages throughout the value stream are 
orchestrated to remove replication and redundancy, and to shorten lead time 
(Rodrigues et al., 2004; Stock et al., 2000), thus improving operation efficiency. 
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Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) point out that process integration helps resolve role 
conflict among SC members through assuming specific tasks and assigning certain 
responsibilities to each member. In other words, process integration is to facilitate 
internal and external organizations to work together harmoniously and coordinate 
tightly (Barki and Pinsonneault, 2005). 
Chen et al. (2009b) proposes that connectivity and simplification are the two essential 
dimensions of process integration. Connectivity is needed to ensure that materials and 
information flow seamlessly throughout the chain and that organizations are closely 
interconnected at multiple levels (Lambert et al., 2005). Simplification refers to inter-
functional unification and process standardization (Bowersox et al., 2003), which can 
be realized through establishment of common operational policies and procedures, to 
coordinate inter-organizational routines efficiently and effectively (Bowersox et al., 
1999).  
The objective of process integration is to triumph over competitors in price, speed, 
convenience and reliability; in this sense, the SC employs a strategy of total cost 
minimization and lean operations (Treacy and Wiersema, 1993). Corporations 
engaging in process excellence continuously exert great effort in optimal order 
fulfilment and best time-based performance, through minimizing operation costs, 
eliminating intermediate production steps, and standardizing practices and services.  
The movement towards excellent SCM can be depicted in different stages of process 
integration (Stevens, 1989; Spekman et al., 1998). The initial stage of integration 
features cost minimization, frequent price negotiation, arm’s-length relationships, 
discrete functions, and fragmented SC. The medium stage of integration is features the 
signing of long-term contracts with a limited number of vendors, exchanging basic 
amounts of information, and coordinating specified workflow and information, which is 
usually accompanied by successful implementation of EDI or JIT systems (Germain et 
al., 1996) and application of time-phased planning to the manufacturing management. 
There is also a poor visibility of real consumer demand that needs to be aggregated 
(Stevens, 1989). The mature stage of integrationeatures shared common vision, inter-
organizational integration, well-managed master schedules, and joint decision making, 
underpinned by high level of mutual trust and commitment. 
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A large body of research has revealed a positive link between operation integration and 
performance improvement, in terms of cost reduction, higher flexibility, delivery speed, 
better quality, operation efficiency, faster new-product development, and customer 
satisfaction (Droge et al., 2012, Droge et al., 2004; Kim, 2013; Frohlich and Westbrook, 
2001; Wong et al., 2011; Narasimhan and Kim, 2002; Swink et al., 2007; Flynn et al., 
2010; Kim, 2006; Danese, 2013; Danese and Romano, 2011; Prajogo and Olhager, 
2012). While manufacturing firms’ desire to make improvements, and various 
environmental drivers such as fast changing market demand, mass customization, 
shortening product life cycle and escalating competition, facilitate the wide adoption of 
operation integration (Richey Jr. et al., 2009), various barriers also exist to make 
internal and external integration difficult to implement and succeed (Richey Jr. et al., 
2009). This difficulty is in that process integration requires new way of thinking or 
making radical changes to organizational structures and routines. Moreover, it is a 
dynamic process that involves continuous effort by the company (Chen et al., 2009a). 
If being unable to realize positive outcomes in a short period, the motivation for carrying 
on with drastic changes gradually diminishes (Richey Jr. et al., 2010). There are many 
other possible obstacles to successful process integration, including conflicting goals, 
lack of communication, lack of support of senior management, focus on short term as 
opposed to long term benefits, lack of SC visibility, and SC complexity issues (Ellinger 
et al., 2006; Barratt, 2004; Moberg et al., 2003; Pagell, 2004). 
2.5.1.5 Collaborative Synchronization   
Collaborative synchronization plays a central role in SCC activities across 
organizations. Usually, decision-making processes of chain members are not 
coordinated and are conflicting, thereby rarely coming to optimum solutions for the 
whole chain (Lee et al., 1997). In the aim to eliminate sub-optimized decisions, chain 
members need to orchestrate their SC activities in a collaborative manner. 
Collaborative synchronization is defined as the collective actions taken by chain 
members to align critical decisions at planning and execution levels, for optimizing 
overall SC performance and profitability (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005a). 
Collaborative synchronization promotes SC members aggressively working together to 
manage inventories more efficiently and cost-effectively, thereby increasing customer 
satisfaction and business profitability by leveraging IT (Stank et al., 1999). 
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Collaborative synchronization, typically under the banner of CPFR, involves the 
purposive interchange of timely, specific, and accurate data between organizations, to 
formulate a single synchronized prediction of demand (McCarthy and Golicic, 2002; 
Petersen et al., 2005; Ramanathan and Gunasekaran, 2014; Daugherty et al., 2006; 
Nakano, 2009). More specifically, it requires sharing of promotion schedules, point-of-
sales (POS) data, and inventory data, which enables shorter lead-times and integration 
between forecasting and replenishment processes. Subsequently, the improved 
forecasting accuracy promotes the better matching of supply to demand, thus avoiding 
overstock or out-of-stock situations.  
Consistent, systematic and proper forecasting and planning initiatives impact on 
performance dramatically. The firms involved in CPFR initiatives report that they have 
increased sales, better fill rates (Cooke, 1998), and improved product availability, while 
achieving minimum inventory obsolescence, reduced out-of-stock occurrences and 
shorter cycle times (VICS, 2004), enhanced flexibility (Hadaya and Cassivi, 2007) and 
responsiveness (Petersen et al., 2005), minimum variance of any unexpected events 
such as forecasting errors and delays that disrupt chain performance (Lambert et al., 
1998). Through inter-organisational streamlining and alignment, both SC visibility 
(Barratt and Oliveira, 2001) and the accuracy of demand forecasting are improved, if 
demand information is shared among SC partners (Lee et al., 2000). The promotional 
sales and introduction of new products is more likely to be successful if the decision is 
made collaboratively by retailers and suppliers (Ramanathan and Muyldermans, 2010; 
Ramanathan, 2012). In essence, collaborative synchronization improves firm 
performance significantly and provides them with great competitive advantages. 
Collaborative synchronization is the ultimate goal of various collaborative initiatives.    
2.5.2 Institutional Obstacles to the Supply Chain Collaboration of 
Chinese Manufacturers  
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the issue of enhancing SCM efficiencies 
in China cannot be resolved by simply transplanting SCC ideas that stem from 
successful Western market economies. The unique and extremely complex institutional 
environment in China needs to be fully considered before adopting any of the Western 
managerial initiatives. Based on the literature, six major obstacles, which are lack of 
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awareness of SCC, lack of trust, weak information-sharing capability, transactional 
relationship, insufficient government effort and innovation, and guanxi, were identified 
as the critical issues that have to be factored into the SCC equation.   
2.5.2.1 Lack of Awareness of SCC  
The concept of SCC remains new to the majority of Chinese manufacturers. Handfield 
and McCormac (2005) report that marketing and sales are the main focus of Chinese 
executives, while limited attention has been paid to collaborative initiatives such as SC 
planning. Daly and Cui (2003) also point out that various SCC arrangements are not 
widely adopted or even acknowledged by a large proportion of Chinese firms. Thus, 
SCC is not broadly recognized by Chinese companies, which would be expected to 
inhibit the implementation of SCC.  
2.5.2.2 Lack of Trust  
Trust refers to a firm’s belief that its SC partner will operate and make decisions 
generating positive outcomes for the firm, and therefore can be relied upon to fulfil 
obligations (Anderson and Narus, 1990). It will also choose to behave fairly when the 
possibility of exploitation emerges. Entrusted partner firms have faith in each other and 
would act in a predictable and mutually acceptable manner with an expectation of 
maintaining repetitive exchanges and a long-term relationship (Dodgson, 1993). A high 
level of trust can be perceived as a relational governance mechanism to foil 
opportunism in a collaborative relationship (Gulati, 1995). This is because trust can be 
viewed as a self-enforcing contract that mitigates the potential vulnerability between 
partners (Cavusgil et al., 2004). Trust can be perceived as a cornerstone of the strategic 
partnership (Spekman, 1988).  
Sako (1997) categorizes trust into three types: contractual, competence, and goodwill 
trust. Contractual trust facilitates a mutual understanding between partners to adhere 
to a stipulated arrangement. Competence trust refers to the confidence that a SC 
partner is managerially and technically capable of completing a given set of tasks. 
Goodwill trust emerges when SC partners volunteer to behave in ways better than are 
specified in contractual agreements.   
A lack of trust can be a significant barrier to the success of SCC initiatives. Distrusted 
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SC partners tend to increase protectiveness as a result of intensified fear of 
opportunism. In order to prevent potential opportunistic behaviour, the transaction costs 
of business activities escalate substantially, in that every transaction has to be 
scrutinized. Subsequently, the transaction costs, related to drafting very specific 
contract terms, time consuming negotiations and bargaining, complicated certification 
procedures, meticulous monitoring of performances, and frequent inspection of the 
quality of products, mount significantly (Stump and Heide, 1996). For instance, a 
manufacturer has to enforce and verify suppliers’ compliance with contract conditions 
owing to delays or defects in parts deliveries, resulting in production disruptions 
(Noordewier et al., 1990). The SCC practices that are employed to improve efficiency, 
effectiveness and productivity, such as VMI, cross-docking, and CPFR, eventually 
become ineffective. Moreover, a lack of trust is very likely to discourage information 
sharing (Zand, 1972; Liao et al., 2011) and knowledge transfer (Inkpen, 2000) between 
trading partners, because of concern about proprietary information and valuable 
knowledge that might be used opportunistically. Trust is an essential facilitator to make 
a partnership feasible and successful (Wong et al., 2005); and, vice versa, a lack of 
trust is a destructive factor that may disperse a partner relationship (Liu et al., 2010). 
2.5.2.3 Weak Information-Sharing Capability 
In the present study, information-sharing capability is defined as IT connectivity and 
willingness to share information. IT connectivity refers to an automated information 
system that enables information communication across organizational borders (Cash 
and Konsynski, 1985). It represents a company’s ability to use IT to collect, analyse 
and disseminate information, enabling rich information exchange, quick and reliable 
availability of data, and easy information access for SC members (Mukhopadhyay et 
al., 1995). IT provides the technological feasibility for application of modern SCI 
philosophies (Humphreys et al., 2001; Cao, 2007; Silveira and Cagliano, 2006). 
Insufficient IT connectivity of companies is one of the major barriers to realizing real-
time and dynamic collaboration. Inadequate and fragmented IT makes it difficult for 
companies to exploit knowledge of shared information from their partners (Siau and 
Tian, 2004). Without the support of reliable inter-organizational IT, inaccurate 
information transmitted from end to end can result in enormous inefficiencies, such as 
excessive inventory, poorly arranged production schedules, misguided capacity plans, 
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poor customer service, and lost revenues (Lee et al., 1997). Lack of integrated IT can 
inhibit companies’ participation in information-sharing partnerships (Stefansson, 2002). 
Firms’ failure to utilize and integrate their IT with their strategic partners may lead to 
limited returns for their substantial investment on IT (Kim and Lee, 2010).   
Moreover, the advantages brought by enormous investments in connectivity 
technologies can be offset simply by an unwillingness to share information. A 
company’s unwillingness to share information refers to a refusal to provide sensitive 
and valuable information frequently and genuinely to SC partners (Lee et al., 2000; 
Mendelson, 2000). Usually, companies tend to perceive information as a proprietary 
resource and are reluctant to release critical information (Williamson, 1988). When 
critical information regarding sales, inventory, forecasts, marketing, and strategic 
objectives is withheld, firms’ capabilities in decision making, coordination and 
performance tend to be significantly compromised (Fawcett et at., 2011; Fawcett et at., 
2008b). Subsequently, companies may be unable to replicate the excellent 
performance outcomes reaped by SC exemplars, in that their IT is not adequately 
supported by an information-sharing culture (Fawcett and Magnan, 2001). An 
organization’s technological connectivity has to be coupled with its cultural willingness 
to enable effective information sharing, thereby outperforming competitors (Hult et al., 
2002; Stoica et al., 2004). 
2.5.2.4 Transactional Relationship 
A transactional relationship is frequently referred to as an arm’s-length or adversarial 
relationship. It has been the predominant type of relationship between buyers and 
suppliers (Lambert et al., 1996; Handfield and McCormack, 2005), although closer 
partnerships are reported to be prevalent in multiple disciplines. In general, this type of 
relationship is characterized by price-driven, short-term oriented (Humphreys et al., 
2001), and minimal information sharing, or poor communication (Sako et al., 1997), 
with limited or no specific assets investment (Hoyt and Huq, 2000), and lack of trust 
and commitment (Johnston et al., 2004). More specifically, in these relationships, each 
manufacturer purchases among many suppliers in order to generate price competition 
among the suppliers (Lambert et al., 1996; Humphreys et al., 2001). In other words, it 
is aimed to minimize the purchase cost instead of developing a relationship with 
suppliers (Jap, 2007). On the other hand, a supplier provides regular products/services 
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to a wide array of customers with very limited relational consideration (Lambert et al., 
1996). The relationship terminates when the exchanges end. In general, in a 
transactional exchange, substantial effort is exerted in creating revenue and volume 
while minimal attention is paid to long-term interaction or a close relationship. 
2.5.2.5 Insufficient Government Effort and Innovation 
Government effort and innovation to promote a high level of SCC between 
manufacturing firms is believed to be insufficient in China. For example, in order to 
rectify disorder in the currently chaotic logistics industry in China, there has been a call 
for a greater effort by the Chinese government. It is considered that incentives and 
innovative policies have to be formulated by the Chinese government so as to remove 
institutional obstacles such as vicious market competition, inconsistency in the legal 
system, lack of intellectual property protection, and multiple jurisdictions (Zhang, 2006). 
A favourable institutional effort has to be made to nurture healthy competition, to 
encourage continuous improvement, standardize logistics operational practices across 
the nation, and facilitate collaboration in the industry, to achieve global optimisation. 
Peng and Vellenga (1993) propose that the Chinese government needs to enhance its 
role in the improvement of logistics services, ranging from management structural 
reform, privatization and foreign investment, and transportation infrastructure, to 
education and research. Fu et al. (2011) report that the future logistics improvement 
initiatives of the Chinese government are necessary to focus on tax preference, land 
policy support, road traffic improvement, business environment improvement, resource 
integration, technology innovation and application, government investment, and bank 
credit support. Clearly, substantial effort by the Chinese government in SCC has to be 
leveraged to promote collaboration of the manufacturing industry in China.  
In the meantime, the management system innovation of the Chinese government is 
also critical. Unlike in Western countries, the Chinese government, especially local 
government, generally exerts influential control over business activities and is deeply 
involved in the decision-making processes of companies (Luk et al., 2008). The 
Chinese government can be a form of social capital of business, while they act as 
planners and supporters of local businesses through providing business-friendly 
policies, offering financial support and facilitating coordination between corporations. 
However, the governmental interventions in operations can also cause institutional 
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uncertainty, through policy ambiguity, extra financial burdens through maintaining close 
relationships, and political hazards to businesses (Zhang, 2006). Therefore, 
institutional innovation of the Chinese government, through building up a limited 
government and providing a stable, legal and standardized institutional environment for 
SCC among the Chinese manufacturing industry, is crucial. 
2.5.2.6 Guanxi 
Guanxi refers to a Chinese term used to describe interpersonal relationships or 
connections, which often involve a continuous mutual exchange of favours (Luo, 2007; 
Park and Luo, 2001). Guanxi is recognized as complementary and parallel mechanisms 
for directing economic interactions in the Chinese context. It is believed to play a 
decisive role in business success or failure in Chinese society. It could facilitate or 
hinder the implementation of SCC, as it is closely associated with business activities 
and decisions. Persons and companies in a guanxi network can acquire inside 
information about changing regulations, rules and incentives from government officials, 
and the latest movements of new product attributes, advanced technologies, up-to-the-
minute market trends and activities of competitors, through managers of other 
companies (Luk et al., 2008). It is an unwritten rule that companies operating in China 
have to allocate resources to build up a collaborative guanxi network with government 
and other business partners, although it generates extra cost (Schramm and Taube, 
2003). As a result, the company can benefit from preferential treatment, insider 
information, reduced intervention, and lower transaction costs. Chinese firms usually 
only share information with someone they have a close relationship with (Wank, 2005). 
They tend to choose suppliers and collaboration partners by evaluating closeness of 
guanxi between them. Guanxi is the prerequisite for entering into any form of 
collaborative activity with other businesses in China, therefore affecting the formation 
of SCC among manufacturing firms. Li and Lin (2006) contend that, as a prioritized 
coordination mechanism, guanxi could disturb formal manufacturing planning, 
information sharing and flexibility. Therefore, guanxi could be a major barrier to 
extensive SCC among CMFs.  
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2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed four underpinning theoretical paradigms, namely AT, SET, 
ERBV and Institutional Theory, which, when leveraged together, could better account 
for the phenomenon of SCC in China. Then, a literature review of three notions, SCM, 
SCI and SCC, was conducted to highlight the close relationships among them. 
Furthermore, existing literature on SCC of CMFs was reviewed to reflect the current 
state of SCC in China and to identify the SCC elements and barriers as revealed by 
previous studies. After that, a tentative conceptual framework of SCC linking all the 
elements and barriers was proposed. Finally, five key elements of and six barriers to 
SCC were discussed in detail. The next chapter will discuss the methodology employed 
by the present research.  
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
The primary purpose of this inductive case study is to explore how effectively SCC is 
being implemented by the Chinese E & E manufacturers. Multiple-case study 
methodology is employed in this research to reveal the complex phenomenon of 
collaboration between the manufacturers and their SC partners under investigation. 
The research design of this study, including case selection, data collection, data 
analysis and quality, complies with procedures suggested by Yin (2009).  
3.1 Multiple-Case Study Method 
The case study method is a research approach putting emphasis on understanding a 
dynamic event within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989b). It is commonly regarded as 
an appropriate research technique when “how” or “why” questions are asked, and to 
examine contemporary events in a descriptive mode (Yin, 2009). It is especially useful 
for the elucidation of the assumed causal relations in real-life settings that are too 
intricate for survey or experimental strategies. It can also be used to enlighten those 
circumstances in which the phenomenon being investigated has no clear, single set of 
outcome. The case study method makes it possible for investigators to maintain the 
holistic and meaningful distinctiveness of real-life events. Easton (2010) also advocates 
that case studies offer the key opportunity to disentangle the complexity of a 
phenomenon and comprehend it in depth and comprehensively. The superiority of case 
research is in the establishment of convergence on one meaning through using multiple 
sources of evidence and triangulation processes (Johnston et al., 1999). Case study 
research can be used for description and theory building through providing evidence 
for hypothesis generation and for exploration of fields where existing knowledge is 
insufficient (Cavaye, 1996).  
Case study method is appropriate for this research in that the SCC practice of Chinese 
E & E manufacturing firms is a contemporary initiative of practitioners in the field, the 
relations between key elements of SCC practices and various barriers are reticular, and 
the relevant behaviour cannot be manipulated. While the successful experiences of 
implementing SCC by leading corporations can offer valuable enlightenment on 
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enhancement of the competitive edge of the whole manufacturing industry in China, 
the existing systematic evaluation of the key elements of the contemporary SCC 
practices of Chinese E & E manufacturers is lacking. 
Multiple-case study method is employed in this study to leverage the replication logic 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). The findings or evidence from multiple cases are often regarded 
as more compelling, so that the robustness of the study can be enhanced. Multiple-
case study method has been widely employed by many academic researchers to 
investigate SCC activities (Frankel et al., 2002; Fawcett et al., 2008a; Whipple and 
Russell, 2007; Holweg and Pil, 2008; Ramanathan et al., 2011).    
3.2 Case Selection 
Case selection is a vital step in building theory from case studies (Voss et al., 2002). 
According to Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), the theoretical sampling approach is 
appropriate for case research. The major rationale for selection of cases is proper 
illumination and extension of relationships and logic among constructs. Each sample 
should complement the others by literal and theoretical replication of the results under 
various conditions, or by addressing different facets of the overall theory (Yin, 2009; 
Stuart et al., 2002). The aim of selecting the cases is not representativeness, but 
exemplification (Stuart et al., 2002). 
In order to investigate the key elements of SCC and identify the major obstacles, four 
cases from leading CMFs in E & E industry were selected. These firms are publicly 
recognized as the leaders of the industry for their famous brand reputation, market 
share, and annual sales. These four cases consist of two focal manufacturing firms and 
two Tier 1 suppliers, to facilitate an in-depth understanding of collaborative behaviour 
from both manufacturer and supplier perspectives. Those manufacturing firms 
collaborate with a variety of customers including top domestic retailers, franchisees and 
focal manufacturers, world-class international retailers, and Fortune 500 manufacturing 
firms worldwide. The use of four cases falls into the recommended range of four to ten 
cases suggested by Eisenhardt (1989b) in using the case study methodology.  
While the four cases of this research serve as examplars of leading manufacturing firms 
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in E & E industry in the Pearl River Delta area, the results of this study can be 
generalized to the SC sector within this domain. Table 3.1 gives an overview of the 
firms that were included in this study. 
Table 3.1 Company Profiles 
Company Company A Company B Company C Company D 
1. Organization 
structure 
3 manufacturing 
bases in China 
Listed in Shenzhen 
stock exchange 
1 manufacturing 
base in China 
Listed in Shenzhen 
stock exchange 
5 manufacturing 
bases in China 
Listed in Shenzhen 
stock exchange 
4 manufacturing 
bases in China 
Private company 
2. Annual sales 
(USD) 
>0.16 Billion 0.4 Billion 0.96 Billion >0.24 Billion 
3. Main 
product 
Micro motor 
Household 
appliance 
Gas appliance 
Printed Circuit Board 
(PCB) 
4. Number of 
employees 
>6000 >3000 >3000 >3000 
5. Major 
markets 
Global Domestic International Domestic 
3.3 Data Collection  
The research protocol (see Appendix A) was designed and guided by extant theoretical 
underpinnings, including AT (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989a), SET (e.g., Griffith et al., 2006), 
ERBV (e.g. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996), and Institutional Theory (e.g., North, 
1997). It was developed to guide the data collection process, therefore increasing the 
reliability of the case study research. A set of substantive questions were included in 
the protocol to reflect the actual line of inquiry and to serve as prompts in asking 
questions during the case study interviews. The protocol consisted of four main 
sections: (a) Introduction to the case study; (b) Data collection procedures; (c) Case 
study questions; and (d) Company information.  
Multiple sources of evidence were used for this research. They include semi-structured, 
in-depth interviews, documentation, and archival records. Using multiple sources of 
evidence provides the most imperative advantage for case study research. It involves 
the development of converging lines of inquiry, in a process of triangulation and 
corroboration (Yin, 2009). Consequently, case study findings or conclusions generated 
from several, different sources of evidence are believed to be more convincing and 
accurate.  
The semi-structured, in-depth interview is designed to focus on SCC of Chinese 
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manufacturers, but at the same time to remain flexible so that rich data and additional 
insights could be accessed (Crowther and Lancaster, 2009). Semi-structured, in-depth 
interview is a method of data collection in which the interviewer asks about a set of 
topics by listing some predetermined questions, but the order of topics and questions 
may vary. Moreover, the interviewer may determine to skip some topics and questions 
and ask additional questions as appropriate (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). In some 
circumstances, the interviewees may be asked to give their own opinions on certain 
phenomena, and such propositions can be used as roots for further exploration (Yin, 
2009). Therefore, extension of an interview may be needed, instead of just a single 
session.  
When interviews were conducted at the four selected manufacturing firms, the design 
of the semi-structured in-depth interviews allowed changes in the order of questions 
according to the context of conversation and the availability of different managers. 
Some questions were skipped as they were not applicable for some manufacturing 
firms or suppliers. Some new questions were raised based on the responses of 
managers to some queries, so as to seek more detailed explanation and clarification of 
their collaboration activities.      
To identify the major obstacles causing logistics inefficiency and hindering SCC of the 
CMFs, a set of predetermined questions were asked during the in-depth interviews. 
Interview participants were chosen because of their direct involvement in SCC 
practices. In total, 20 departmental and senior SC managers of the four manufacturing 
companies, such as Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Vice President (VP), purchasing 
manager, supplier relationship manager, and warehouse manager, were interviewed. 
These managers were also encouraged to give their own opinions so that all the 
important factors affecting SCC were discussed. In addition, they were encouraged to 
introduce other managers who engage in SCC activities to participate in the project, to 
provide complementary views.  
The entire interview conversations were conducted in Mandarin, and recorded with the 
permission of the interviewees so that an accurate rendition of all interviews could be 
provided (Yin, 2009). Each interview lasted no more than two hours. Handwritten field 
notes were taken. If any questions were later found to have been not answered clearly 
or properly during the interviews, follow-up interviews through telephone calls and 
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emails were carried out for clarification and further discussion. To improve internal 
consistency, site visits were conducted after all interviews were completed to get in-
depth understanding of the business operations. All audio-taped interview 
conversations were transcribed and translated into written documents. Organized field 
notes of all interviews were sent to the interviewees via e-mail to assess the validity of 
the description and interpretation. A summary of managers interviewed and length of 
each interview is outlined in Table 3.2. The VP of Company A was the only person 
interviewed since she worked in different departments for a long time. As one of the 
leaders of the company, her opinions can be representative to managers in other 
departments.    
Table 3.2 Interview Records 
Company 
Studied 
Position of Interviewee / 
Department of the 
Manager Interviewed 
Duration of 
Interview 
A 1. VP of Operation 1h24min 
B 
1. IT 27min 
2. Customer Service 50min 
3. Warehouse  1h16min 
4. Purchasing 1h5min 
5. Production 38min 
6. Lean Production 1h3min 
7. Supplier Relationship 1h17min 
8. Sales 1h11min 
C 
1. Purchasing A 1h16min 
2. VP 1h45min 
3. Purchasing B 
4. Sales 
5. IT 
2h18min 
D 
1. Warehouse 20min 
2. IT 12min 
3. CEO 1h12min 
4. Production 13min 
5. Purchasing 1h14min 
6. Sales 24min 
 
A pilot case study was launched to refine the data collection plan with respect to both 
the content of the data and the procedures to be followed (Yin, 2009). It helped improve 
the design of the interview questions and ensure that the questions asked were exactly 
relevant to the information being sought. It also helped improve the wording of the 
interview questions to avoid any misunderstanding that might lead to a wrong 
conclusion. The participant in the pilot case study was also asked to comment on the 
interview questions in terms of readability, to minimize ambiguity. For example, some 
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questions in the main study would be asked in slightly different ways when addressed 
to different interviewees, such as manufacturer and supplier, so that they could be more 
meaningful to the respondents. Some questions in the main study would be put forward 
in a way that was more appropriate for different products, operations and organizational 
structures.   
The pilot case study involved one industry participant. Upon completion, the company 
participating in the pilot case study was excluded from the multiple case studies to avoid 
possible bias. The main case study commenced after the interview questions had been 
duly refined to serve the purpose of the study.  
3.4 Data Analysis 
Data analysis was conducted simultaneously and incrementally with the data collection 
of this research (Barratt et al., 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989b). In this manner, the 
researchers were able to capture the real SCC activities of the manufacturing firms 
from the data gathered. Constructs of the proposed collaboration framework and the 
relationships between elements of SCC and major barriers were adjusted based on the 
data analysis outcomes. 
3.4.1 Content Analysis  
Content analysis was used to analyse the data collected through semi-structured 
interviews. Content analysis is widely employed to analyse qualitative data (Guthrie et 
al., 2004; Spens and Kovács, 2006). It is a tool for the objective, systematic, 
quantitative and reliable study of publications (Ellinger et al., 2003). It attempts to 
quantify qualitative data by noting frequencies of occurrence of keywords, events, 
actions and so forth (Crowther and Lancaster, 2009). Upon completion of each 
interview, the voice recordings were transcribed into a text format and then translated 
from Mandarin to English, resulting in 147 pages of textual material. The data was then 
imported into the qualitative data analysis tool “QSR NVivo 8.0”. Free nodes and tree 
nodes were developed cumulatively to classify responses from individual SC managers 
into a classification of themes or patterns, to subsequently facilitate within-case analysis 
and cross-case comparison for this study. Key codes and phrase frequencies of 
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collected data were indicated as methods for determining the relative importance of 
elements of and barriers to SCC. 
3.4.2 Within-case Analysis and Cross-case Comparison 
Within-case analysis and cross-case comparison were conducted to examine the state-
of-art of SCC practices collected from the interviewed manufacturers. The investigation 
was to determine whether there were similarities and differences in collaboration 
between manufacturers and SC partners in the findings. Within-case analysis was used 
to study the interviewed companies individually, focusing on their views on the key 
elements of and major obstacles to SCC. Cross-case comparison looked across all 
firms under study to identify common themes about the SCC of different manufacturing 
firms and SC partners. Through the within-case analysis and the cross-case 
comparison, the feasibility of enhancing industry-wide SCC in the manufacturing 
industry of China, through cross-organizational collaboration and institutional effort, 
could be explored in detail.  
3.5 Validity and Reliability  
According to Yin (2009), four tests are usually used to ascertain the quality of any 
empirical social research, including case studies. They are construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity and reliability. These tests were applied throughout the whole 
process of each case study of this research. Yin (2009) also identified more detailed 
case study tactics for operating these tests (Table 3.2).  
3.5.1 Construct validity  
Construct validity referes to the identification of accurate operational variables for the 
phenomenon to be investigated (Yin, 2009). It also refers to the extent to which a 
research procedure satisfies the criteria of a critical observation of reality (Gibbert & 
Ruigrok, 2010). To ensure construct validity, convergence of multiple sources of 
evidence for each of the important elements of and obstacles to SCC in the proposed 
framework was sought. This evidence was gathered through semi-structured interviews, 
field notes, company documents review, and site observations. All data were 
documented and tracked to maintain a verifiable chain of evidence. To ensure the 
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validity of the constructs, the draft case study reports upon the investigation of each 
manufacturing firm were reviewed by key informants.     
Table 3.2 Implementation of Case Study Tactic 
Tests Case Study Tactic Implementation in This Research 
Construct validity - Use multiple sources of evidence 
 
 
- Establish chain of evidence 
 
 
- Let key informants review draft 
case study report 
- Triangulation of different sources of 
data such as multiple in-depth 
interviews, field notes, company 
documents and site observations. 
- All data were documented and 
tracked to maintain a verifiable chain 
of evidence. 
- Draft case study reports upon the 
investigation of each manufacturer 
were reviewed by key informants. 
Internal validity - Do pattern matching 
 
 
- Do explanation building 
- Address rival explanations 
- Use logic models 
- Explored meaningful patterns of 
SCC between manufacturers and 
suppliers in terms of SC OA, IS, SC 
partnering, process integration and 
collaborative synchronization. 
- Similarities and differences were 
closely examined with extant 
literature. 
External Validity - Use theory in single-case study 
 
 
 
- Use replication logic in multiple-
case studies 
- Selected four manufacturing firms 
collaborating with different SC 
partners in domestic and 
international markets. 
- Used interview protocol with the 
same template for all interviewed 
firms. 
Reliability - Use case study protocol 
 
 
 
- Develop case study database 
- Selected four manufacturing firms 
collaborating with different SC 
partners in domestic and 
international markets. 
- Used interview protocol with 
consistant format for all participants. 
Source: Yin (2009, p. 43) 
3.5.2 Internal validity  
Internal validity refers to the establishment of causal situations between variables and 
results (Yin, 2009; Farquhar, 2012). The purpose of internal validity is to convince the 
reader that the research outcome is generated through rigorous examination of data 
(Farquhar, 2012). Pattern matching is one of the most desirable tactics suggested by 
literature to address internal validity (Yin, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009). Pattern 
matching generally requires the development of a proposed conceptual framework, 
employs existing theory, and then tests the validity of the framework as an approach to 
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explaining empirical outcomes (Saunders et al., 2009). In other words, researchers 
usually compare an empirically observed pattern with a predicted one. If the patterns 
coincide, internal validity can be confirmed. Eisenhardt (1989b) also claims that 
researchers can argue for internal validity by close examination of emerging concepts 
and theory with existing literature. 
This study explored patterns of SCC between manufacturers and SC partners by 
proposing a preliminary framework of SCC based on the work of Simatupang and 
Sridharan (2005a). The empirically based pattern was subsequently compared with the 
preliminary one to strengthen internal validity. Similarities and diffierences of 
collaboration between different SC partners were identified and validated with 
evidences from extant literature.  
3.5.3 External validity 
External validity, also refers to generalizability, which deals with the belief that theories 
must be proven to readers for phenomena not only in the environment in which they 
are investigated but also in other environments (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). Case study 
research is frequently criticized for lack of generalizability since observation is not 
based on population. Therefore, its contribution is often not accepted. However, Yin 
(2009) argues that, as multiple experiments, the mode of generalization of multiple case 
studies is analytic generalization rather than statistical generalization. Hence, the aim 
of case studies is not to generalize the findings statistically to a population (Cavaye, 
1996). The key elements of and major barriers to SCC are validated by the subjects of 
the research who are operating in an SC and logistics context. In an effort to support 
external validity of this research, appropriate forms of interview protocol with the same 
template were used for all firms under investigation. Multiple cases and relevant 
literature were used as data sources for replication of findings.   
3.5.4 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the demonstration that the same outcome can be reached if the 
procedure of a case study is repeated (Yin, 2009; Farquhar, 2012). Transparency and 
replication are key issues related to reliability (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). To enhance 
reliability, a case study protocol was designed as a direction for the investigator to 
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collect data from each manufacturing firm. It specifies clearly scheduled data collection 
tasks and detailed procedures, as well as a set of essential questions reflecting the 
actual line of inquiry. Case study notes as a result of interviews and analysis of 
documents were stored in a manner that other persons can retrieve them efficiently 
later. A formal, presentable database was created to enable other investigators to 
assess the evidence directly and not be constrained to the written case study reports. 
A chain of evidence was maintained to facilitate the trace of any evidence from initial 
research questions to ultimate case study conclusions, for readers of the case studies. 
Triangulation was adopted to ensure research reliability, in obtaining the same piece of 
information from different sources (McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993). For example, 
same questions regarding particular issues were asked a few times to different 
managers of the same company so that the information could be verified, to ensure 
research reliability.   
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has justified the research methodology employed for the present study. A 
detailed explanation of the multiple-case study approach has been provided. The 
design of semi-structured interview questions, the selection of cases, and the data 
collection process have been described. The procedure of data analysis has also been 
depicted. The next chapter will present the empirical findings collected from the 
interviews.    
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CHAPTER 4 Within-Case Analysis 
This chapter reports the findings of the analysis within the four cases investigated in 
this study. To ensure consistency, a template was used for all cases in the analysis 
looking at the company profile, objective alignment, information sharing, SC partnering, 
process integration, collaborative synchronization and barriers to SCC.  
4.1 Case A 
4.1.1 Overview 
Company A is one of the leading manufacturers specializing in development and 
production of small and special electrical motors in China. Its products are exported 
globally to world-class E & E manufacturing corporations. This company is a Tier 1 
supplier that collaborates with both downstream international as well as domestic 
customers and upstream Tier 2 suppliers. The position of Company A in the SC is 
shown in Figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1 The Supply Chain Position of Company A 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Supply Chain Objective Alignment 
Common objectives were only set up with strategic international customers and 
suppliers (see Table 4.1), but not with domestic customers or other non-strategic SC 
partners. Common objectives were unachievable where some suppliers were 
speculative, signing the agreement for the purpose of maintaining business share 
rather than sincerely committing to the initiative. These suppliers were concerned that 
if they refused to sign the collaborative agreement they might lose their existing 
business to competitors who accepted the offer. Later on, however, these suppliers 
Distributors 
supplier 
Distributors 
Tier 2 
suppliers 
Company A 
(Tier 1 supplier) 
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breached the bilateral agreement readily to seek more benefits. Therefore, the aligned 
SC objectives could not be attained due to the opportunistic behaviour of these 
suppliers.  
4.1.2.1 Executive Sponsorship 
The CEO of Company A was open-minded and involved proactively in various SCC 
initiatives (see Table 4.1). He had very strong motivation to learn the best SCM 
practices from those world-first-class customers. In an effort to improve on-time delivery, 
the CEO set concrete performance targets for hourly delivery of raw materials to 
assembly lines. He also encouraged employees to make continuous improvement by 
providing funds to award those who made creative enhancements. In particular, in order 
to develop collaborative relationships with a supplier and guarantee the quality and 
continuity of supply, he made specific asset investments on facilities, and authorized 
astrategic suppliers to be responsible for the management of those facilities. As a result, 
a collaborative relationship with high level of mutual trust was cultivated with that 
supplier. With regard to the trade-off in making or buying, he believed that it would be 
wise to focus on core capabilities and outsource component parts from suppliers. As 
the Vice President of the company stated: 
“The CEO of our company decided to make asset specific investment 
on facilities and tools but let suppliers be in charge of the 
management of those facilities to reap benefits. This is very 
uncommon in China. He believed that, instead of trying to produce 
everything, it would be better to let those suppliers concentrate on 
what they are specialized in.” D-1-1 1 
Overall, the proactive engagement of the CEO positively propelled the implementation 
of SCC initiatives in Company A.  
4.1.2.2 Incentive Alignment 
Incentives were partly aligned between company A and its strategic SC partners (see 
Table 4.3). International customers rewarded Company A frequently for their superior 
performance while domestic customers usually did not share costs and risks with 
Page 74 / 220 
 
Company A, even though they were asked to do so for better collaborative decision 
making.  
On the supply side, incentive alignment agreements were signed with strategic 
suppliers for strategic or bottleneck items. Company A promised to reward suppliers 
with increased business share, while they were obliged to return some profit back to 
Company A if the purchasing quantity exceeded the promised amount. Sometimes, if 
part of inventory was not used because of order cancellation by customers, Company 
A negotiated with suppliers to share the costs. Basically, costs and benefits were 
distributed between Company A and its strategic SC partners as agreed. 
By comparison, it was very hard to ask non-strategic SC partners to share costs and 
risks. During peak seasons, inventory shortages might occur not only at Company A 
but also at the supplier side. In order to satisfy the changing demand, Company A 
attempted to maintain some inventory of critical components. It informed its customers 
that an extra buffer inventory was kept in its warehouses and asked if they could share 
part of the losses if excessive inventory was accumulated as a result of the significant 
change in demand. However, the majority of customers were unwilling to share the 
burden. Subsequently, Company A had to make its own evaluation to cope with the 
variation in demand. Meanwhile, Company A needed to ask its suppliers to prepare 
some inventory as well. Otherwise, the peak demand could not be satisfied if suppliers 
failed to maintain enough inventory of ‘items’ with a long lead time. Subsequently, 
Company A had to make promises to help suppliers to digest the excess inventory if 
the demand was lower than the forecast. Overall, the Vice President believed: 
“Although incentive alignment contracts were signed, nobody really 
wanted to share costs and risks but tried to push them to upstream 
suppliers. This was not only true for domestic customers but also 
international customers. Unfortunately, this kind of situation would last for 
very long time.” D-1-9  
Therefore, further improvement on incentive alignment between Company A and its SC 
partners is necessary.  
______________________________________________ 
1. D – The sequence of the companies interviewed, 1- The number of interviews, 1- Page number of the transcript   
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Table 4.1 Summary of SCOA Practices 
Key Elements International Customer Domestic Customer Tier 2 Supplier 
SCOA Limited to a few strategic customers.  No. 
Limited to a few strategic 
suppliers. 
Executive Sponsorship The CEO took various SCC initiatives and proactively engaged in them. 
Incentive Alignment 
Some customers offered reward 
for continuous price cutting, while 
some breached agreement.  
Unwilling to share cost 
and risk. 
Agreement was signed 
with strategic suppliers to 
guarantee placement of big 
orders to suppliers in return 
for kickbacks upon meeting 
annual total order quantity. 
 
4.1.3 Information Sharing   
A wide array of information was shared between Company A and its SC partners (see 
Table 4.2). Tactical information, such as planning and forecasting, and operational 
information, such as order and delivery, were shared through IOSs with customers and 
suppliers. Face-to-face communication was regularly organized to further facilitate 
information sharing with SC partners. Personnel were assigned to stay on customers’ 
sites to improve accuracy and timeliness of information sharing. For instance, customer 
service staff were allocated at both international and domestic customers’ sites to 
ensure high quality information sharing. They were required to record time of goods 
delivered to customers’ plants and report any quality problems of products their 
customers encountered, on a daily basis. These operations suggest that information 
sharing between Company A and its SC partners was extensive. 
4.1.3.1 Information Connectivity  
A number of IOSs were established by Company A to support the frequent information 
sharing and extensive SCC with its SC partners (see Table 4.2). All important 
information could be shared internally and externally through those IOSs included SAP, 
SRM, CRM and others. The SAP system was the core operation platform for the 
execution of planning, order fulfilment, cost calculation, and finance activities of the 
company. SRM and Secure Network Communication (SNC) were specialized for JIT 
initiatives. It can be seen that information connectivity between Company A and its SC 
partners has been built to facilitate information exchange. 
However, some small suppliers resisted using the online platform for information 
exchange and instead preferred to use fax, due to a lack of IT knowledge. Many were 
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family-run factories, which might not have adequate computer knowledge to utilize 
advanced IT. By adhering to old technology, no extra investment and cost was involved. 
To improve the situation, Company A organized training sessions on several occasions 
to make sure those suppliers understood the importance of IOS and acquired the 
necessary computer skills.  
4.1.3.2 Information Quality  
International customers shared high quality information frequently with Company A (see 
Table 4.2). By working closely with retail channels, international customers, especially 
those in North America, were able to provide very accurate weekly rolling plans, for 
Company A to make its own plans. By contrast, domestic leading customers usually 
shared very inaccurate information less frequently. As the Vice President of Company 
A put it: 
“The information provided by our North American customers is usually 
accurate and clear. The planning and forecast information is very useful 
for us to produce our own production plans and forecasts. However, the 
information provided by domestic customers is generally inaccurate and 
cannot be used for the arrangement of actual production. This is because 
domestic customers have no real intention to collaborate but employ SCC 
initiatives to push suppliers to make early production. They intend to reap 
more benefits for themselves by disadvantaging suppliers under the 
banner of collaboration.” D-1-1 
As a result of huge pressure exerted by suppliers like Company A and a gradual 
increase in SCM knowledge, some domestic customers realized the importance of 
collaboration with suppliers and started to improve their performance. The risks of 
having excessive inventory at Company A had as a result been lowered significantly.  
4.1.3.3 Willingness to Share  
Company A and international customers shared useful information willingly with each 
other (see Table 4.2). Generally, international customers were more willing to share 
information because they had a clear understanding about the importance of 
information sharing with their suppliers. By contrast, domestic customers were unwilling 
to share information with Company A. They tended to manipulate important information 
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so as to take advantage of suppliers opportunistically for own interests. As such, 
domestic customers needed to improve their willingness to share more accurate 
information with their suppliers.      
Table 4.2 Summary of Information Sharing Practices 
Key Elements International Customer Domestic Customer Tier 2 Supplier 
Information 
Sharing 
Tactical information sharing and 
assignment of staff on customers’ 
sites. 
Same arrangement as that for 
international customers. 
Tactical information 
sharing with suppliers. 
Information 
Connectivity 
Multiple information systems 
were rolled out to establish 
information connectivity. 
Same arrangement as that for 
international customers. 
Electronical connection was 
built 
Information 
Quality 
Accurate and detailed 
information was shared frequently. 
Inaccurate information was 
shared due to lack of real intention 
to collaborate. 
Accurate information was 
shared with suppliers on 
weekly basis. 
Willingness to 
Share 
High willingness to share 
information. 
Sharing inaccurate information 
for prompting early production.   
Updating information for 
VMI operation on daily basis. 
 
4.1.4 SC Partnering 
Company A formed long-term partnering relationships with its major customers (see 
Table 4.3). Company A promised to make continuous cost reduction while its customers 
would reward its excellent performance in return with increased share of business 
orders. For example, one of its leading international customers continuously increased 
the proportion of purchasing from Company A owing to its reliable quality and 
reasonable price. Subsequently, Company A became the sole source of supply of 
micro-motors for that customer. Some of customers’ staff were assigned to provide on-
site assistance permanently. Evidently, the collaboration between Company A and this 
customer was very successful. On the other hand, the collaboration with domestic 
customers remained adversarial in that those customers had no real intention to 
collaborate.  
Different collaborative policies were adopted by Company A to manage different 
categories of suppliers. Long-term agreements were usually signed with strategic 
suppliers, therefore guaranteeing for them a certain quota of business share. Extensive 
communication with those suppliers was maintained by the top management of 
Company A. Relatively less effort was spent on critical suppliers who usually possessed 
a large amount of production capacity and financial capital. In an aim to strengthen the 
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collaborative relationship with strategic and bottleneck suppliers, favoured conditions 
were usually offered to them.  
4.1.4.1 Supplier Development 
Supplier development initiatives were employed by international customers and 
Company A to make continuous improvement in their suppliers’ performance (see Table 
4.3). For instance, international customers frequently sent experts to Company A to 
promote lean manufacturing practice through special supervision or delivery of lectures. 
Customer’s feedback on the quality of products also helped Company A make 
continuous enhancement. On the other hand, instead of assisting their suppliers, 
domestic customers preferred to internalize production rather than develop Company 
A’s capability. They built their own motor plants and only purchased from Company A 
during peak seasons to meet surging demand. 
To improve the performance of its suppliers, Company A assisted them in terms of 
technology, financial, quality, and problem-solving capabilities. Usually, engineers were 
sent to suppliers’ plants to supervise them for quality improvement. If quality issues 
occurred and suppliers sought help, Company A would offer supervision whenever it 
was necessary. Some of the suppliers were very cooperative and responded 
immediately to make improvement according to those suggestions put forward by 
Company A.  
Company A offered assistance to those suppliers who were critical but had insufficient 
capital. Even though the existing business between the two parties was not sizeable, 
as long as the suppliers had a strong intention to build up a long-term relationship with 
Company A and there was a high possibility that the business could grow significantly 
in the near future, Company A would consider offering financial support to them. A good 
example was given by the Vice President: 
“Some suppliers were very strong in technology and had loyalty to 
collaborate with us but were lacking funds. We purchased the facilities and 
moulds they needed, then leased the equipment to them to manage the 
assets. These were the most successful examples of close collaboration 
with our suppliers. However, our effort on supplier development is still 
insufficient.” D-1-7  
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4.1.4.2 Low Mutual Trust  
There was high level of trust between strategic international customers and Company 
A (see Table 4.3). This was mirrored through the fact that 100 per cent of orders from 
a strategic international customer was placed with Company A. The customer even 
treated Company A as one of its own departments. More importantly, international 
customers took responsibility for the idle raw materials procured by Company A due to 
their forecasting errors, and therefore could be trusted. In contrast, domestic customers 
never took responsibility for those costs and risks caused by their poor forecasting of 
their actual demand, and hence could not be trusted.  
A high level of mutual trust was established between Company A and a small number 
of strategic suppliers, who trusted Company A for a few reasons. Firstly, if Company A 
asked suppliers to prepare some stock of raw materials that became excess inventory 
later as a result of demand variation, the company would pay for those inventories. 
Secondly, if suppliers encountered difficulties, Company A would offer assistance. 
Lastly, Company A did not take advantages of its suppliers by borrowing Western SCC 
initiatives. High level of trust was progressively developed between Company A and 
key suppliers through proper adoption of collaborative practices.  
On the other hand, trust between Company A and most of the non-strategic suppliers 
was very low. If suppliers were required to provide a breakdown or cost analysis of their 
products, they always held back the full information. It was impossible to know how 
much profit they actually earned. Owing to the fact that those suppliers could not be 
trusted, it was impossible for Company A to rationalize its supply base and rely on a 
sole source of supply, in the way international customers usually managed their supply 
bases. If Company A only had a sole supplier for a component, there was reasonable 
chance that the supplier might threaten Company A for more benefit. The VP explained: 
“We all understand the importance of SCC. Therefore, strategic 
partners are identified for collaborative effort. However, the 
collaborative relationship lacks the most important ingredient – a high 
level of mutual trust. In China, partnership is mainly superficial and 
not much better than a pure transactional relationship.” D-1-8 
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The level of commitment of some of the suppliers was especially low as well. Normally, 
if a long-term agreement was signed with a supplier, preferential policies such as large 
order quantity but not the highest profit was assured. If the supplier was totally price 
oriented, it would strongly feel that the guaranteed margin was too low and therefore 
seek ways to seek more business from other customers for better profit return. As a 
result, the long-term collaborative relationship would be ruined. Some suppliers simply 
refused to believe that preference policies would actually be offered to them. Some 
suppliers would appreciate Company A when they received assistance but behaved 
very differently after the difficulties were overcome. Generally, the level of commitment 
of suppliers was very low.      
Table 4.3 Summary of SC Partnering Practices 
Key 
Elements 
International Customer Domestic Customer Tier 2 Supplier 
SC 
Partnering 
Partner relationships with a few 
leading international customers. 
Adversarial collaboration 
Partner relationships with a few 
strategic suppliers. 
Supplier 
Development 
Extensive supplier development 
practices were employed by leading 
customers.  
Prefer internalization 
production and only 
purchase during peak 
season. 
Wide range of supplier 
development practices was 
adopted.  
Mutual Trust  
High level of trust between a few 
leading customers and Company A.  
Superficial partnership 
with low level of trust. 
High level of trust was nurtured 
with a few key suppliers. 
 
4.1.5 Process Integration 
The findings reveal that both internal and external SC processes of Company A would 
need to be integrated (see Table 4.4). The overall inventory level was high, and last-
minute changes occurred frequently. Coordination between different departments 
would also need to be streamlined and optimized.  
4.1.5.1 Mature Just-In-Time Initiative 
JIT approach at Company A was considered very mature already since it was adopted 
in 1990s (see Table 4.4). Company A provided JIT delivery service to international 
customers in one or two hours and to domestic customers on a daily basis. In order to 
facilitate normal JIT delivery, suppliers of Company A were also required to make JIT 
delivery of component parts on the same day of actual assembly. Basically, the JIT 
Page 81 / 220 
 
approach operated smoothly between Company A and its SC partners.  
4.1.5.2 Developing Lean Manufacturing  
Company A started to implement the lean manufacturing initiative from 2006 on a 
relatively small scale (see Table 4.4). Currently, the level of lean initiative was believed 
to be far behind that of the international customers but comparatively better than other 
domestic peers in China. The lean efforts were exerted in various areas such as layout, 
logistics, safety inventory, and production flow directions. Many production lines were 
designed and set up by teams in workshops. Participation by workers was encouraged 
as well. An organizational culture of making continuous improvement had been 
cultivated within this company. Everybody was required to engage in lean initiatives 
and make continuous effort. Specific targets were set by different departments to make 
creative improvements. A universal steering lean gallery was set to display the 
achievements of lean manufacturing. As a result, production efficiency had been 
improved from 50 per cent to 70 per cent after the adoption of the lean approach.  
4.1.5.3 Less Than Mature Sales and Operations Planning Process  
Being unable to match supply with demand, the S&OP process of Company A was less 
than mature (see Table 4.4). Owing to the fact that both downstream and upstream SC 
partners were unwilling to make collaborative decisions to manage demand velocity, 
supply shortages occurred regularly during peak seasons.    
In addition, Company A was not strong in forecasting its demand. Forecasting was 
mainly based on historical data, qualitative estimation, and customers’ replenishment 
plan. Normally, Company A generated forecasts based on the aggregated market 
demand that was offered by various departments including sales, purchasing, and 
technology, and then combined with historical data.  
Sophisticated forecasting tools were unavailable. Currently, spreadsheets were used 
to compute forecasts. Although all data were available in the information system, they 
had to be exported to Excel to enable further analysis. After the computation of 
forecasts, all data had to be imported back into the information system. While some 
data could be produced automatically, information on raw materials had to be entered 
into the system manually. After forecasts were calculated and production plans were 
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generated, Company A would share their production schedules with suppliers through 
their online platform. 
Both international and domestic customers provided their annual forecasts to Company 
A to work out an annual forecast for arrangement of facilities, purchasing and workers. 
Rolling forecasting was also provided on a weekly basis by international customers and 
on a monthly basis by domestic customers.  
Planning difficulties were encountered by Company A since ad hoc changes were 
frequently made to the master plans, which had caused enormous inefficiencies and 
inaccuracies. For example, while data on the availability of raw materials in information 
systems indicated that it was ready for production, it would turn out at the last minute 
that one item was still missing. As a result, the plan for mass production had to be 
altered. In the meantime, the change of plan and production had to be relayed to other 
departments such as warehousing and logistics so that subsequent plans and 
arrangements had to be adjusted accordingly. The low quality of information and poor 
functional coordination were some of the significant challenges that Company A was 
facing and had to surmount. Timely and accurate information was the key determinant 
for improvement. Therefore, the significant gap between planning and execution was 
one of major challenges for Company A. 
4.1.5.4 Widely Adopted Vendor Managed Inventory   
VMI was widely adopted by Company A and its SC partners (see Table 4.4). The 
majority of leading international and domestic customers required Company A to build 
warehouses close to their plants to facilitate VMI operation. VMI operation between 
Company A and its suppliers was very different, since goods were required to be 
delivered to Company A’s warehouse and managed by Company A. However, the 
inventory still belonged to the suppliers until they were used by Company A. Information 
about the status of the inventory was updated every day and could be checked by 
suppliers through Company A’s Web-based information system.  
Before the implementation of VMI, Company A spent a large amount of capital for 
holding inventory. After that, 60 per cent of the inventory was with the suppliers. Only a 
small amount of capital was needed for maintaining the inventory of electronic raw 
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materials. Evidently, Company A had saved huge costs through the adoption of the VMI 
approach.  
The VMI approach in China was quite different from that in Western countries. With the 
implementation of VMI, international customers would hold some safety inventory to 
ensure that six weeks of normal production could be maintained if the lead time was 
four weeks. If demand changed, there would be enough time for suppliers to replenish 
the inventory. Frequent communication with overseas customers was unnecessary as 
long as safety inventory was available. All Company A needed to do was to replenish 
inventory whenever it was needed. However, the mode of VMI in China was different. 
It was an approach employed by domestic manufacturing firms to prompt suppliers to 
produce in advance rather than have more effective use of safety inventory. If the 
inventory produced was not used by the deadline, domestic customers were required 
by Company A to take the responsibility and make payment for that. As the Vice 
President explained: 
“The rule of the game is totally different between Chinese supply chain 
partners. VMI is an approach adopted by domestic downstream customers 
to transfer costs and risks to upstream suppliers. They generally require 
suppliers to prepare raw materials but do not take any responsibility. In this 
case, we suffer great losses because we are in the middle of the supply 
chain. If customers cannot assure the accuracy of plans, it would be very 
hard for us to make promises to suppliers. Otherwise, we may need to 
take responsibility for both ends. As a result, a vicious circle is created. 
However, they are making improvement since domestic customers have 
started to consider suppliers’ requirements.” D-1-1 
 
4.1.5.5 Distribution Process  
Distribution network design, modelling and optimization of Company A had not been 
explored (see Table 4.4). Distribution and management of external warehouses for VMI 
operation were simply outsourced to 3PLs to reduce cost. In fact, Company A had done 
some research on building a centralized warehouse of its own for improved inventory 
management and distribution performance. Some calculations based on quotations 
offered by 3PLs had been done. However, significant increase in cost was found to be 
the major problem. It was also considered too complex to work out a solution in a short 
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period. 
Table 4.4 Summary of Process Integration Practices 
Key 
Elements 
International Customer Domestic Customer Tier 2 Supplier 
Process 
Integration 
Internal and external processes needed to be integrated and optimized.  
JIT Hourly JIT delivery. Daily JIT delivery. Daily JIT delivery. 
Lean 
Manufacturing 
The level of lean manufacturing was far behind that of the international customers but comparatively better 
than that of other domestic manufacturing firms. 
S&OP Less than mature 
VMI Standard VMI operations 
Distribution 
Process 
Distribution network design, modeling and optimization remain blank. 
 
4.1.6 Collaborative Synchronization 
Collaborative synchronization was not observed between Company A and its SC 
partners. 
4.1.6.1 SC Visibility 
The SC visibility of Company A was very low (see Table 4.5). Basic tracing and tracking 
of orders and processes was not accomplished, which had caused significant SC 
inefficiencies. Many last minute changes had to be made due to low visibility of the flow 
of materials. Improvement of SC visibility was critical for Company A to diminish the 
gap between planning and execution.  
4.1.6.2 No Synergistic Planning and Forecasting  
Synergistic planning and forecasting between Company A and its SC partners was not 
observed (see Table 4.5). Although rolling forecast and planning information was 
shared by major customers, Company A would not make arrangements for actual 
production unless purchasing orders were received from customers. If Company A had 
to commence production before an order was actually received, an agreement would 
be signed with customers to make sure that costs and risks would be shared if 
uncertainties occurred.  
Page 85 / 220 
 
At this stage, Company A tried to create a single demand forecast with inputs from 
multiple roles within the company. However, other higher level demand planning 
capabilities, such as demand segmentation, incorporation of promotion and other 
demand-shaping activities were not observed. More advanced demand planning 
capabilities, such as ability to respond to unplanned events in a timely manner, scenario 
planning, and demand sensing, were basically non-existent. 
4.1.6.3 No Inventory Optimization 
The current inventory level of Company A was high (see Table 4.5). Although the CEO 
took the lead to reduce inventory of finished product, inventory in external warehouses 
remained high. Strict rules were set for ahead-of-schedule production, and only a 
limited number of days were allowed for finished products to be moved to warehouses. 
However, inventory was accumulated at multiple points due to demand variations and 
inaccurate forecasts and planning information. The adoption of inventory optimization 
was crucial for Company A to lower inventory.    
4.1.6.4 Collaborative Innovation  
The importance of collaborative innovation had been recognized by Company A and its 
SC partners (see Table 4.5). If there was a plan to launch a new product, the technology 
department of Company A would take responsibility to communicate with customers 
first, since information provided by the customer for new product design was crucial to 
success. Suppliers were also consulted when it came to the selection of component 
parts, as this was critical for cost reduction. Overall, both customers and suppliers were 
involved into the new product design process.  
4.1.7 Barriers to SCC 
The most significant barrier to SCC initiatives of Company A was that no one really 
wanted to share risks and costs, but attempted to transfer risks to the upstream 
suppliers. The non-strategic partner relationship was mainly transactional.  
Secondly, low trust was another vital barrier, since it emphasized minimum trust of other 
people. Company A believed it was very risky to trust and rely on a single supplier. At 
least two to three suppliers had to be available for each item to avoid being threatened 
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by a single supplier. As a result, it was very hard for Company A to rationalize the supply 
base as their international partners did.  
Table 4.5 Summary of Collaborative Synchronization 
Thirdly, implementation of inter-organizational information system was very difficult. 
Company A had exerted great effort in rolling out the Web-based platform for 
collaboration with its SC partners. Even though a few sessions of training were provided 
to suppliers, they still preferred to receive faxes instead of logging onto the online 
system, due to various problems such as the low speed of Internet or the poor interface 
of the systems, giving the user extra work. Some suppliers were small family 
businesses but critical to Company A because of their great flexibility and core 
technology. Not only were they lacking the capability to use the information system, 
they also did not have confidence in the future of the manufacturing industry and were 
unwilling to make further investment and expansion.  
Interestingly, even though Guanxi was prevalent in China, the Vice President regarded 
it as unimportant for the SCC initiative of Company A. In fact, she would consider it 
harmful to the healthy development of business. Company A did not show favour to 
suppliers who had Guanxi with someone who worked in the company.  
An overall summary of the SCC initiative of Company A based on the within-case 
analysis is shown in Table 4.6. A cause-effect analysis of major problems with SCC 
between Company A and SC partners is displayed in Figure 4.2.  
Key Elements International Customer Domestic Customer Tier 2 Supplier 
Collaborative 
Synchronization  
Not observed Not observed Not observed 
 SC Visibility Very low 
SPF Not observed Not observed Not observed 
IO Not observed 
Collaborative 
Innovation 
Involved Involved Involved 
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Table 4.6 Summary of SCC Initiative of Company A 
Key 
Elements 
International Customer Domestic 
Customer 
Tier 2 Supplier 
Strategic Non-strategic Strategic Non-strategic Strategic Non-strategic 
SCOA Yes No No Yes No 
Executive 
Sponsorship 
Proactive involvement 
Information 
Sharing 
Extensive Limited Limited Extensive Limited 
Information 
Connectivity 
Well 
connected 
Well connected Well connected 
Well 
connected 
Well connected 
Information 
Quality 
High Low Low High Low 
Willingness to 
Share 
High Low Low High Low 
SC 
Partnering 
Collaborative 
Adversarial 
collaboration 
Adversarial collaboration Collaborative 
Adversarial 
collaboration 
Incentive 
Alignment 
Properly 
shared 
No risk sharing No risk sharing 
Properly 
shared 
No risk sharing 
Supplier 
Development 
Direct Indirect Internalization Direct Indirect 
Mutual Trust High Low Low High Low 
Power 
Asymmetry 
Low Low Low Low Low 
Process 
Integration 
Require further integration 
JIT Mature 
Lean Better than domestic firms but far behind Best-in-Class 
Distribution 
Process 
Not designed. 
S&OP 
Process 
Less than demand/supply maturity. 
Collaborative 
Synchronization 
No No No No No 
SC Visibility Low 
SPF No No No No No 
IO No 
VMI Yes Yes Partial imitation Yes Yes 
Collaborative 
Innovation 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Major 
Barriers 
- Unwillingness to share costs and risks.  
- Transactional relationship.  
- Low level of trust. 
- Implementation of Web-based information system on supplier side was difficult. 
- Suppliers were concerned about the risks associated with unstable economic policies. 
- Guanxi was revealed to be non-critical to building up collaborative relationship. 
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Figure 4.2 Cause-Effect Analysis of Major Problems with SCC between Company A and SC Partners 
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4.2 Case B 
4.2.1 Overview 
Company B is one of the most famous manufacturers producing E & E house 
appliances in China. Their products are sold in the domestic market through multiple 
levels of franchisees and major retailers. This company is a focal manufacturer that 
collaborates with domestic franchisees, major retailers and suppliers. The position of 
Company B in the SC can be illustrated as in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 The Supply Chain Position of Company B 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Supply Chain Objective Alignment  
SC objectives between Company B and its SC partners were partly aligned through 
agreement (see Table 4.7). Common goals with strategic suppliers were identified and 
established. However, some of the suppliers were speculative, signing the agreements 
out of concern that they might lose the business if they refused to do so. They believed 
that those agreements were employed by Company B to take advantage of them rather 
than to truly take care of their benefits. Thus, the convergent interest effect of objective 
alignment was largely undermined. Inevitably, a large amount of time had to be spent 
on further discussion and negotiation with those suppliers when a certain divergence 
occurred, so that their speculative attitude and behaviour could be rectified. The 
Production Manager of Company B stated that:     
“When it came to SCOA, the first issue that had to be resolved was to 
set common ground on the corporate culture and the value 
proposition with suppliers. It was easy for suppliers to say it, but very 
hard for them to agree with it from the bottom of their hearts. Although 
agreement was signed by both parties, conflicts and divergences 
arose when certain issues were encountered. When I went to 
Franchisees 
Company B 
(Focal manufacturer) 
Tier 2 
suppliers 
Tier 1 
suppliers 
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suppliers’ sites to expedite supply of parts, the first thing was to 
discuss the common value proposition with them. Whether it could be 
agreed by both parties or not was the pre-requisite to continue the 
discussion about supply planning at the strategic level. Normally, most 
of the top management of suppliers agreed with me. However, when 
it came to specific issues, conflict still existed. It could be very painful 
when resource allocation and money issues were involved. As a result, 
I had to ask suppliers to look backward to see if their market position 
and business share had grown as a result of their collaboration with 
us. If suppliers anticipate a long-term business relationship with us, 
their short-term benefits must comply with the long-term common 
goals. Functional objectives must espouse strategic aims.” 
Production Manager, A-5-1 
 
Thus, common objectives between Company B and its SC partners had to be further 
aligned properly.   
4.2.2.1 Executive Sponsorship 
Executive sponsorship was critical to the implementation of SCC initiatives in Company 
B (see Table 4.7). Although the CEO was uncertain whether the advertised benefits of 
SCC, such as substantial cost reduction, performance improvement, and profit 
increase, could be realized, he chose to be open-minded and supportive. Senior 
managers also claimed repeatedly that the involvement of the CEO was essential for 
the roll-out of the initiative. Some tasks would be impossible to be executed if other 
departments or functional areas resisted, unless the CEO took charge of the situation. 
The executive sponsorship on the supplier side was also critical for tackling issues and 
prompting collaboration between two parties. If any problems occurred on the supplier 
side, the only way to solve them was to communicate with the CEO directly. Thus, 
executive sponsorship was fundamental to the implementation of SCC between 
Company B and its SC partners. 
4.2.2.2 Incentive Alignment 
While JIT Purchasing (JIT-P) was implemented by Company B, they started to consider 
sharing the extra cost that was caused by smaller order quantities and more frequent 
deliveries on the supplier side (See Table 4.9). Some suppliers refused to provide JIT 
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delivery on the condition that the cost of delivery increased while the purchasing price 
remained same. If Company B wanted suppliers to cooperate to realize JIT-P, they had 
to share part of the extra cost with suppliers. Company B promised to take responsibility 
and compensate for all excess inventories:   
“It is unnecessary to let suppliers be burdened with all costs. In order 
to make some improvement, it is quite necessary to share the extra 
costs fairly between two parties.” Warehouse Manager, A-3-4  
Given that the prices of raw materials had rocketed sharply, Company B worked 
together with suppliers to avert risks. The price adjusting agreement for copper, plastics 
and other parts was signed between Company B and those suppliers. In an effort to 
ensure that the profits of Company B and suppliers were not affected by price 
fluctuation, the prices of components were adjusted monthly according to the prices of 
raw materials. An equation was designed by Company B to guarantee the comparative 
rationality and visibility of the prices. If unexpected market pressure emerged and 
forced Company B to give up some profit, suppliers also needed to share the risks and 
surrender part of the profit. Therefore, some of the costs and the risks were shared 
between Company B and its SC partners.  
Table 4.7 Summary of SCOA Practices 
Key Elements Franchiser Tier 1 Supplier 
SCOA Partly aligned with franchisers. 
Suppliers’ agreement with common goals 
was speculative.   
Executive 
Sponsorship 
The involvement of the CEO was critical to the implementation of SCC practices.   
Incentive Alignment 
Incentives were provided to 
encourage more accurate forecasts 
and meeting sales goals.   
Extra costs caused by smaller order 
quantities and more frequent deliveries 
associated with JIT initiatives were to be shared.   
 
4.2.3 Information Sharing 
Part of tactical information was shared between Company B and its SC partners (see 
Table 4.8). One of the major problems of information sharing with franchisees was the 
enormous difficulty in collecting information from them. Consequently, Company B had 
no access to actual demand information about their products:  
Page 92 / 220 
 
“It might be possible for us to collect data from the first-level 
franchisees that are interacted directly. However, it was incredibly 
difficult to collect all information from the second-level, the third-level, 
down to each terminal. Franchisees were very speculative and did not 
share right information or resisted sharing information with us at all.” 
Customer Service Manager, A-2-2 
A Web-based platform was available to share information with suppliers. Most of 
information shared by Company B was limited to announcement of purchasing plan to 
facilitate suppliers’ daily operations. Company B did not share any inventory information 
with suppliers. Nevertheless, suppliers were required to upload their inventory 
information through the Web-based information system. Basically, accurate demand 
and supply information from both franchiser and supplier side couldn’t be collected. 
Realization of information sharing with its SC partners was set as one of the main goals 
of Company B for the next three years.  
4.2.3.1 Information Connectivity 
Information connectivity within Company B and with its SC partners was not yet realized 
(see Table 4.8). Although a few information systems were implemented within Company 
B, different departments remained unable to share information with each other. 
Interfaces were needed to integrate various information system so that isolated 
information islands within the organization could be removed:  
“All departments such as marketing, purchasing, production and sales 
need to be linked and integrated through information system. Large 
amounts of data have to be aggregated and shared between different 
functions.” Customer Service Manager, A-2-2  
Before the CRM system was implemented, two information systems had been deployed 
by Company B for better customer service. But there was no communication between 
points of sale, marketing department, and after-sales service department. Hence, the 
CRM system was under building in an aim to facilitate the collection of accurate 
demand information and enhance its demand management capability.  
Although a simple Web-based platform was available for suppliers to share their 
purchasing plan and inventory information, fax was the main tool to send weekly plans 
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to suppliers. A more comprehensive SRM system was under development for sharing 
more information with suppliers and entering of original data. With the completion of 
SRM, each supplier would have to send real-time data to Company B, reporting which 
products were on their production lines, and where the bottlenecks of processes and 
the quality control points were. This system was planned to be rolled out among 
strategic suppliers first.   
4.2.3.2 Information Quality 
Owing to the lack of information system, the majority of information communications 
between Company B and SC partners were done manually (see Table 4.8). Valuable 
sales information could not be effectively collected and used for forecasting and 
planning, since it was recorded manually based on the ID of the products. Many manual 
mistakes resulted in poor decision making on the supplier side. Inaccurate forecasting 
and planning information had caused serious problems, such as being out of stock and 
overfull warehouse.  
Normally, information provided by the suppliers was timely and accurate. However, out 
of self-protection, some important information could be withheld by the suppliers if any 
issues occurred. Concerned that Company B could place orders to other suppliers or 
to avoid severe punishment, the suppliers tended to cover a fact and would only report 
a problem as a last resort.  
Company B paid great attention to improving the accuracy of information as it 
understood that accuracy was of the essence. Strict policy was used to ensure that 
franchisees place new orders and make adjustments in a timely manner. Incentives 
and punishment were also applied to prompt franchisees to guarantee the accuracy of 
order quantity. For instance, if the quantity of new orders were accurate and on-time, 
franchisers would have the priority to pick up finished goods. If inaccurate or late orders 
were placed, franchisees might not get the products unless there was any stock 
available. Suppliers were also required to ensure the accuracy of information. The 
supplier management department went to suppliers’ sites to verify the accuracy of 
information and make sure appropriate processes were executed and no inferior 
materials were used.  
Page 94 / 220 
 
4.2.3.3 Willingness to Share 
Company B and its SC partners were unwilling to share information with each other 
(see Table 4.8). Firstly, Company B was the focal manufacturer, and therefore had more 
power to control franchisees and suppliers. Company B requested SC partners to 
provide information but tended to screen and retain as much information as possible:  
“Suppliers are not allowed to see our information except those 
closely related to their operations. Instead of sharing inventory 
information with suppliers, we prefer to make sure suppliers’ 
inventory information is visible to us. Similarly, franchisees are not 
allowed to see our information as well since some of them are very 
cunning.” IT Manager, A-1-1 
While Company B engaged in building up more integrated information systems such 
as SRM and CRM, managers were concerned about the unwillingness of multi-level 
franchisees to enter information into the system. Although plenty of information was 
available, franchisees did not cooperate and simply did not think it was their 
responsibility to enter information into the system, largely because they were unaware 
of the importance of information sharing to business success. As a result, Company B 
had to adopt management mechanisms to restrain franchisees to guarantee that 
important information would be shared. Win-win approaches were also under design to 
encourage franchisees to enter information into the system by rewarding them with 
more information about new products or promotions.  
Table 4.8 Summary of Information Sharing Practices 
Key 
Elements 
Domestic Franchisee Tier 1 Supplier 
Information 
Sharing 
Tactical and operational information was partly 
shared with franchisees but very hard to collect 
information from franchisees. 
Limited information was shared with suppliers 
but required them to share information. 
Information 
Connectivity 
Multiple information systems were rolled out but 
incompatibility resulted in prominent information 
isolation islands. 
A simple Web-based platform was available to 
connect with suppliers. 
Information 
Quality 
Too much information but inaccurate or insufficient 
information was available. 
Sometimes important information was 
withheld by suppliers out of self-protection. 
Willingness to 
Share 
Franchisees were unwilling to share information 
and unaware of the importance of information sharing. 
Unwilling to share valuable information with 
each other. 
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4.2.4 SC Partnering 
Acknowledging that future competition would be the competition between SCs, 
Company B started to identify some strategic vendors and develop its own strategic 
supply base to facilitate joint development (see Table 4.9). Since key components and 
spare parts were vital to Company B’s competitive advantage in the market, those 
suppliers were treated as the most important SC partners. Company B communicated 
frequently with suppliers and listened to their voices rather than playing the bully as 
had other focal manufacturers. 
While Company B was trying to build up partner relationships with suppliers, conflicts 
with suppliers still existed. In particular, it was very difficult to calculate cost or persuade 
suppliers to give up part of profits to launch promotions. After all, each SC member still 
focused on its own interests and attempted to maximize local benefits.    
4.2.4.1 Supplier Development 
Company B engaged in the development of a strategic supplier base and was moving 
towards a quality- and technical-oriented stage instead of cost minimization (See Table 
4.9). While it was prevalent for most of focal manufacturing firms to source from the 
cheapest suppliers, Company B started to share suppliers’ cost in lieu of demanding 
endless price squeezing. Therefore, Company B’s supplies were relatively stable owing 
to the fact that the reasonable profit of suppliers was assured and the organizational 
culture was acceptable for the suppliers. 
Company B paid more attention to the interests of those qualified suppliers and adopted 
preference purchasing strategies. Those qualified suppliers were usually awarded with 
larger order proportions. During a certain period, the profit of a particular item could 
decrease but suppliers’ annual profit could be guaranteed. Company B spent efforts in 
maximizing suppliers’ production capacity so that extra management cost could be 
avoided and lowest production cost could be accomplished. If an order was placed to 
suppliers, Company B took full responsibility, even if the ordered parts might have 
become obsolete. In general, suppliers were relatively more satisfied with Company B 
than its competitors. 
Some training was provided by Company B to suppliers so that they could understand 
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the importance of SCC initiatives. Despite JIT delivery being employed, suppliers did 
not understand that this initiative could improve their efficiency and capability. They 
cared only about the extra cost incurred and the part of profits they lost. They could not 
understand that their business portion would be increased if they could provide JIT 
delivery smoothly. In order to change suppliers’ mindset and have better supply rhythm, 
suppliers were invited to participate in various trainings for implementation of SCM 
initiatives such as JIT and lean manufacturing. As a result, suppliers made significant 
improvements.       
Although no direct investment was made by Company B in suppliers, some assistance 
and support was provided. In comparison with other firms, Company B offered fair 
payment terms instead of requiring unreasonable payment conditions. Engineers were 
sent to suppliers’ sites to assist them to improve logistics, technology and product 
quality. Annual supplier meetings were held to obtain suppliers’ feedback and 
suggestions. Company B also headhunted for some suppliers to fill major positions. As 
a result of Company B’s great efforts in supplier relationship management, the current 
relationship with strategic suppliers was better than the pure traditional, transactional 
relationship:  
“We are the common interest community of the same supply chain. 
We choose to work together, bearing the same goal to serve 
customers. The only difference is the division of labour. Our major 
competitive advantage is the whole assembly, channel and marketing. 
We need our suppliers’ support in terms of manufacturing, technology 
competitiveness, process improvement and quality control. By relying 
on transactional relationships, we won’t be able to obtain their latest 
innovation for key bottleneck material or component parts.” 
Production Manager, A-4-1 
However, some suppliers were satisfied with their current business scale and had no 
intention to make further development. They were reluctant to expand investment, 
fearing potential risks, since they had little confidence in the future of the manufacturing 
industry in China. As long as they did not lose money for manufacturing, they preferred 
to invest money in the booming real estate industry instead.  
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4.2.4.2 Low Mutual Trust  
The level of trust and commitment between Company B and its SC partners was low 
(see Table 4.9). Company B did not trust its SC partners because they believed both 
franchisees and suppliers were very speculative. For example, franchisees tended to 
report unreal sales information to earn more rebates. Similarly, some suppliers 
frequently acted opportunistically. Some suppliers worried that Company B might find 
other suppliers to replace them. They were also concerned that other suppliers might 
outbid them by providing lower prices; vice versa, Company B suspected that suppliers 
might have other better customers and put them as the first priority. It also suspected 
whether the prices quoted by suppliers were absolutely transparent and whether 
inferior raw materials were used by suppliers. Overall, Company B and its SC partners 
did not trust each other. 
4.2.4.3 Power Asymmetry  
Power asymmetry between Company B and SC partners was prominent (see Table 
4.9). In order to shift inventory downstream, some franchisees were forced to pick up 
finished goods as soon as they were produced. Some discounts were offered to attract 
franchisees to hold more inventory. Subsequently, inventory accumulated in 
franchisees’ warehouses instead of being in the focal manufacturers’ possession. Thus, 
power asymmetry existed between Company B and its SC partners. However, 
Company B realized the negative impact of coercive power on supplier relationships.   
Table 4.9 Summary of SC Partnering Practices 
Key 
Elements 
Domestic Franchisee Tier 1 Supplier 
SC 
Partnering 
Franchisees were under Company B’s control. 
Some strategic vendors were identified in an effort 
to build up a strategic supply base. 
Supplier 
Development 
More attention was paid to the interests of those qualified suppliers and indirect supplier development 
practices were adopted to assist suppliers. 
Mutual 
Trust  
Lack of mutual trust. 
Low level of trust but slightly higher than other focal 
manufacturers. 
Power 
Asymmetry 
Reward power was used to attract franchisees to 
take more inventory. 
Realized the negative effect of coercive power on 
supplier relationships.  
However, Company B realized the importance of fair collaboration with its SC partners. 
It believed that bullying weak partners was inappropriate. Traditionally, focal 
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manufacturers were arrogant and held as much information as they could from their 
suppliers. Currently, Company B understands the strategic importance of suppliers to 
them and inclines to share more information with them. For instance, if only weekly 
supply planning was provided, suppliers would have no idea about monthly and annual 
plans, how peak and off-peak season was distributed and how yearly production 
capacity was planned. Therefore, it was very hard for suppliers to make accurate 
analysis and take joint action. If all important information, such as yearly production 
capacity and promotion plans, was released to suppliers, they could collaborate more 
closely. If any problems occurred on the supplier side, Company B would manage to 
communicate with them thoroughly rather than playing a bullying role.  
4.2.5 Process Integration 
The end-to-end SC process of Company B needed to be substantially integrated and 
streamlined to improve efficiency and reduce inventories (see Table 4.10). Evaluation 
of the whole operation process was essential, since some processes were very 
cumbersome and required optimization. Although standardization of process was 
acknowledged by all managers, it was never truly implemented. Many problems 
occurred as a result of its weak process management capability. For instance, some 
low-level mistakes were made which caused serious quality problems. In order to 
prevent this kind of mistake, the production department had to redesign the whole 
manufacturing process from scratch as meticulously as they could. At this stage, 
numerous aspects had to be improved significantly.  
Better process coordination between Company B and its suppliers enabled higher 
efficiency and lower cost. For example, purchasing volume was aggregated to facilitate 
continuous production for suppliers. Some parts outsourced from two vendors were 
centralized and produced by one of them so that minimization of cost could be achieved. 
Consequently, efficiency was also enhanced, since the number of items was reduced 
and order quantity was enlarged. Moreover, Company B did not just take away one 
supplier’s quota and give it to the other. Instead, they compensated the supplier with 
other products, therefore facilitating integration of production scale. Early plans were 
provided to suppliers so that lead time could be long enough for better preparation of 
raw materials and adjustment of production capacity for lower production costs. More 
synchronized production could be achieved by Company B with a few strategic 
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suppliers.  
4.2.5.1 Developing Just-In-Time Initiative 
JIT-P was adopted by Company B a few years ago (see Table 4.10). So far, more than 
70 per cent of spare parts were delivered by suppliers within half an hour to two hours, 
so that excessive inventory could be minimised. Some key valuable components were 
supplied on time and delivered directly to the production line in 4 to 8 batches every 
day. As a result, no inventory of this type of component was stocked. Company B 
anticipated implementing the JIT-P initiative to more suppliers, but had to overcome 
some major obstacles such as cost sharing and quality problems.  
Standardization of packaging was crucial for the improvement of efficiency. Before 
standardized packaging was adopted by Company B, anything, such as newspaper or 
carton, could be used by suppliers to pack component parts. When the components 
arrived at Company B, they had to be repacked, which caused too much waste and 
also was not environmentally responsible. In order to realize JIT-P, Company B tried to 
find a one-off solution to avoid duplicated work, by setting the standard for packaging 
based on the production rhythm, production capacity, and the character of spare parts. 
As a result, standardized packaging in different sizes were sent to the suppliers to 
facilitate efficient hourly JIT-P in small batches. Upon this change, Company B could 
put the component parts onto the production line straight away instead of opening every 
box to double-check the quantity and quality. All packaging materials could be sent 
back to the suppliers for reuse. Thus, considerable effort had been made in the 
standardization of packagings by Company B. 
4.2.5.2 Early Lean Manufacturing  
Lean manufacturing was rolled out in a small scale in Company B from 2009 (see Table 
4.10). Managers were sent to Japan to learn from the best practices. Some specialists 
on lean manufacturing were also invited over to provide training and consultancy 
service. Currently, the lean initiative was applied to the whole company rather than to 
any particular function. As a result, significant improvement with the inventory level was 
realized and the quality of products was slightly enhanced. Since the assembly process 
was simple, only minor changes, such as streamlining the whole process including 
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pressing, welding and polishing through the change of layout, could be made. 
Participation of all workers had yet to be achieved, since improvement of workers’ 
qualifications took time, and payment was calculated based on quantity rather than 
quality of parts finished. Overall, lean manufacturing of Company B was at a very early 
stage.  
4.2.5.3 Immature Sales and Operations Planning Process  
The S&OP process of Company B was deemed to be immature (see Table 4.10). No 
sophisticated forecasting tools were adopted to manage demand volatility. Forecasting 
of Company B was mainly based on historical data and qualitative estimation. 
According to previous sales, franchisees from more than 10,000 points of sale 
computed their approximate sales for the next month and sent the forecasts to 
Company B on the 10th of every month. A slight adjustment was allowed to be made 
within a limited scope after promotion information and other demand-shaping activities 
were announced.  
Based on the sales plan, a weekly and monthly purchasing plan was generated 
accordingly. A rolling 3+3 forecast for the next six days was made every day. The plan 
could not be changed for the first 3 days but could be adjusted slightly for the next 3 
days. Therefore, the production cycle of this type of item was limited to 6 days. If any 
production cycle was more than 6 days, the 3+3 rolling plan could not be applied. As a 
result, suppliers with production cycles longer than 6 days had to adjust their production 
cycle through splitting processes, changing layout or replacing facilities. 
Company B sent the aggregate demand forecasts to inform suppliers the delivery 
requirements of materials for the next three days and the next six days. As a result, 
suppliers acknowledged the customer’s production plan for the next week. Meanwhile, 
suppliers shared a copy of their master production plan and current inventory level with 
Company B. Finally, components were delivered to Company B as requested. Overall, 
the S&OP process of Company B was under improvement, and a formalized S&OP 
process had to be established.   
4.2.5.4 Distribution Process 
Traditionally, franchisees and suppliers took the responsibility to arrange 3PLs to pick 
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up or deliver goods (see Table 4.10). In this way, all transportation costs and risks were 
passed onto them. However, Company B realized that the distribution and logistics 
processes throughout the country had to be systematically redesigned and integrated 
for lower cost. The distribution network within the Pearl River Area was already under 
design. Three to four distribution centres were also considered to be set up around the 
country to improve responsiveness and reduce logistics costs.    
A Warehouse Management System (WMS) had been rolled out for five months and 
was being re-examined thoroughly. The whole warehouse operation process had to be 
optimized to enable high accuracy and efficiency. The quality inspection procedure had 
to be moved forward to suppliers’ production lines or removed to facilitate JIT delivery. 
A small portion of spare parts were delivered to the production line directly and able to 
match the production rhythm. The new WMS was expected to lower inventories 
immensely. 
The unloading operation at the warehouse for finished goods was reorganized. Usually, 
every supplier had to send a few workers together with components to unload and 
move goods into Company B’s warehouse, which caused chaos and significant waste. 
For the time being, a third party was employed to be responsible for the unloading tasks, 
which lowered both costs and management risks of suppliers and improved efficiency.     
Table 4.10 Summary of Process Integration Practices 
Key Elements Domestic Franchisee Tier 1 Supplier 
Process 
Integration 
Process efficiency was low, therefore substantial end to end integration was required.  
JIT 
More than 70 per cent of spare parts were delivered by suppliers within every half-hour to two-
hour. 
Lean Manufacturing 
Only minor improvement can be made such as streamlining the whole manufacturing process. 
Participation of all workers cannot be achieved yet. 
Distribution Process The distribution process needed to be redesigned systematically. 
S&OP S&OP process was under improvement.  
 
4.2.6 Collaborative Synchronization 
Collaborative synchronization between Company B and its SC partners was not 
observed.  
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4.2.6.1 SC Visibility 
SC visibility of Company B was extremely low due to the existence of information 
isolation islands (see Table 4.11). Since franchisees did not share accurate data with 
Company B, it was impossible to know how many products had actually been 
purchased by consumers and how many products were still sitting in the warehouses 
of multiple levels of franchisees. Company B strived to improve SC visibility so that the 
puzzle of how much idle inventory existed throughout the whole SC could be resolved. 
In the hope of improving SC visibility and collecting all valuable information, a CRM 
information system was employed by the company.    
4.2.6.2 No Synergistic Planning and Forecasting    
Synergistic planning and forecasting between Company B and SC partners was not 
observed (see Table 4.11). Although 3+3 rolling forecast and planning was 
implemented, the demand planning process of Company B remained unsynchronized. 
Despite input from multiple roles, such as sales and marketing, being used to forecast 
demand, forecast accuracy was low. Demand segmentation by products was also 
considered when new promotions were launched. As the Omni-channel fulfilment 
demands increased and Business-to-business (B2B) business models continued to 
converge with Business-to-consumer (B2C) direct-to-customer business, 
synchronization of demand planning processes had become critical for Company B to 
manage demand variation and increased SC complexity, and to lower inventory level 
across the pipeline. 
4.2.6.3 No Inventory Optimization   
The inventory turnover of Company B was about ten days (see Table 4.11). The finished 
goods were normally kept in the warehouse for a maximum of three days. Most of them 
were delivered on the day they were produced. With the application of JIT-P and lean 
manufacturing, the inventory level was lowered by nearly 30 per cent.  
However, with the extremely low SC visibility, it was impossible for Company B to know 
how much inventory had accumulated at various stages of the SC. It became urgent 
for Company B to adopt IO solutions to reduce inventory obsolescence and lower 
inventory carrying cost, and make informed and intelligent stocking decisions.  
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4.2.6.4 Collaborative Innovation  
The importance of collaborative innovation was acknowledged by Company B and its 
SC partners (see Table 4.11). If a new product was to be developed, the R&D 
department communicated with the suppliers so that they were involved throughout the 
whole NPD process. Suppliers were consulted for the design of outline, structure, 
selection of components and so forth, as they were the experts in making the different 
components. It could be seen that Company B started to leverage collaborative 
innovation to enhance its competitive advantage. 
Table 4.11 Summary of Collaborative Synchronization 
Key Elements Domestic Franchisee Tier 1 Supplier 
Collaborative 
Synchronization  
Not observed Not observed 
SC Visibility Extremely low SC visibility 
SPF Although 3+3 forecast and planning was adopted, SPF remained unsynchronized. 
IO 
Adoption of IO was necessary to gain insight into inventories accumulated at multiple 
points.  
Collaborative Innovation Suppliers were involved throughout the NPD process. 
 
4.2.7 Barriers to SCC 
The implementation of SCC was hindered by various barriers. Firstly, lack of IOS was 
one of the major problems. The ERP system was not useful, since too many 
individualized applications were required. The information system was internally 
isolated and unintegrated with upstream and downstream SC partners. Lack of funds, 
complex organization structure, information insecurity, and multiple hidden rules were 
parts of the hindrance.  
Secondly, SC partners were unwilling to share information with Company B, out of 
protection of own interests or simply because they did not have computer hardware or 
skills. Thirdly, low level of trust among SC partners was a critical factor hampering the 
adoption of SCC. Some suppliers did not trust Company B and were deeply suspicious 
about the possibility of long-term cooperation between each other. Fourthly, there was 
strong resistance from employees of different functions to change their old working 
habits. Rolling out SCC was almost impossible unless the CEO was in charge of the 
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project himself. Fifthly, SCM demanded a huge workload and continuous effort. The 
outstanding performances and benefits could not be achieved in a short period. Lastly, 
most of the suppliers had no intention to improve SCM capabilities due to lack of 
knowledge of SCM and pessimism about future business. While they were facing cut-
throat competition and could hardly maintain any profit margin, suppliers had no 
motivation to make further investment in the manufacturing industry, but preferred to 
invest in the booming real estate industry.   
Guanxi was used by some suppliers to build up business relationships with Company 
B. However, they still needed to compete fairly with other suppliers by providing the 
most competitive price, service, quality, and supply capability. Otherwise, other 
suppliers with no Guanxi would win business. In other words, Guanxi provided an 
opportunity to certain suppliers to make quotations but had no impact on Company B’s 
sourcing decisions. 
A summary of SCC initiatives of Company B is shown in Table 4.12. A cause-effect 
analysis of major problems with SCC between Company A and SC partners is displayed 
in Figure 4.4. 
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Table 4.12 Summary of SCC Initiative of Company B 
Key Elements Domestic Franchisee 
Tier 1 Supplier 
Strategic Non-strategic 
SCOA No Yes No 
Executive Sponsorship Proactively involved 
Information Sharing Tactical  Tactical  Tactical  
Information Connectivity Unconnected Unconnected Unconnected 
Information Quality Low Low Low 
Willingness to Share Low Low Low 
SC Partnering Adversarial collaboration Better than adversarial Adversarial 
Incentive Alignment No risk sharing Started to share No risk sharing 
Supplier Development N/A Indirect Indirect 
Mutual Trust Low Low Low 
Power Asymmetry  Reward power  Coercive power  
Process Integration Require substantial integration 
JIT Early implementation 
Lean Early stage 
Distribution Process Not designed 
S&OP Process Immature 
Collaborative 
Synchronization 
Not observed Not observed Not observed 
SC Visibility Extremely low 
Synchronized DP Not observed Not observed Not observed 
IO Lack of visibility of inventories 
VMI N/A 
Collaborative Innovation Yes Yes Yes 
Major Barriers 
 - Lack of inter-organizational information system.  
- Unwillingness to share information between SC partners.  
- Lack of sufficient information to make accurate forecasting. 
- Complex organization structure is a major obstacle to collecting sales information. 
- Strong resistance among different functions and difficulties in changing inertia.  
- Low level of mutual trust hampered the adoption of SCC practice.  
- SCM demands massive amount of workload and continuous effort.  
- Most suppliers have no intention to improve SCC capabilities because they lack 
confidence. 
- Guanxi was revealed to be non-critical to building up strategic relationships. 
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Figure 4.4 Cause-effect analysis of major problems with SCC between Company B and SC partners          
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4.3 Case C 
4.3.1 Overview 
Company C is a leading manufacturer producing gas appliances in China. Their 
products are exported to major retailers around the world. Thus, this company is a focal 
manufacturer that collaborates with international customers. The position of Company 
C in the SC can be illustrated as in Figure 4.5.  
Figure 4.5 The Supply Chain Position of Company C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Supply Chain Objective Alignment  
There was no SCOA between Company C and its SC partners.  
4.3.2.1 Executive Sponsorship 
The CEO of Company C preferred to be conservative out of self-protection, especially 
for new products, new technologies and new facilities (see Table 4.13). This was mainly 
because many employees who previously worked for the company learned the 
knowledge and technologies and then quitted. They later started their own businesses 
in the same industry to become Company C’s competitors.  
4.3.2.2 Incentive Alignment 
International customers shared risks with Company C if the exchange rate fluctuated 
dramatically (see Table 4.15). Some good customers paid more attention to the quality 
of service and the healthy development of their suppliers’ business instead of lowest 
purchasing price. Company C worked together with customers to reduce costs through 
collaborative effort on design, production, optimization of structure and processes.  
Tier 2 supplier Tier 1 supplier 
International 
customer 
Company C 
(Focal manufacturer) 
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Company C held a sharp, clear principle on risk sharing with suppliers. Bids were 
invited to lock the sourcing prices. Once the contract was signed, no matter how the 
prices of raw materials fluctuated, suppliers had to fulfil their commitment. If the price 
of raw materials surged, suppliers had to cope with the situation by themselves. If the 
price of raw material dropped, suppliers did not have to share the saving with Company 
C as well. Apparently, there was no cost and risk sharing between Company C and its 
suppliers.  
Table 4.13 Summary of SCOA Practices 
Key Elements International Customer Tier 1 Supplier 
SCOA No objective alignment. No objective alignment. 
Executive Sponsorship The CEO was conservative. 
Incentive Alignment 
International customers shared 
risks caused by drastic exchange 
rate fluctuation. 
No risk sharing with 
suppliers. 
 
4.3.3 Information Sharing  
A few major international customers shared valuable information with Company C 
through a Web-based platform (see Table 4.14). To meet customers’ requirements, 
Company C uploaded information on finished orders, inspection and delivery onto the 
customers’ Web-based information platform.   
In contrast, Company C shared as less information as possible with suppliers, through 
fax, email and telephone. The purchasing department was the only department 
communicating with suppliers. With regard to information sharing, the Purchasing 
Manager held a very conservative perspective, as shown below: 
“Using an IT platform to share information may reduce manual mistakes but 
can also cause problems to ourselves. Instead of sharing our information 
with suppliers, we prefer to learn more about our suppliers’ inventory. It is 
unnecessary to share our inventory information with them. They can make 
estimation based on the new orders we placed.” B-3-6  
Therefore, very limited information was shared with suppliers by Company C.  
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4.3.3.1 Information Connectivity 
Company C was internally connected through the ERP system, which included major 
functions such as sales, purchasing, production, quality control, warehouse, customer 
service, and R&D (see Table 4.14). Big customers like Wal-Mart had RetailLink, which 
incorporated the whole process from quotation to order fulfilment and delivery. Other 
medium and small customers used email for communication.    
Suppliers were in short supply of information system. Some of them did not even use 
email. If those suppliers could not upgrade their information systems in tandem with 
Company C, it would be difficult to share information between the two companies. If 
new suppliers were to be introduced, those who were capable of sharing information 
with other leading manufacturers would be preferred.  
4.3.3.2 Information Quality 
Although Company C was internally connected through the ERP system, information 
was not shared in a timely manner due to failure of staff to enter information into the 
information system immediately (see Table 4.14). Feedback on the quality of spare 
parts was not put into the information system to enable prompt communication between 
the purchasing department and the suppliers. Information about defective products or 
return orders was not updated in the information system instantly, only because 
warehouse staff forgot to do so. Overall, the quality of information shared by Company 
C with SC partners was low.   
4.3.3.3 Willingness to Share  
Out of concern for information insecurity, Company C was very sensitive about 
information sharing (see Table 4.14). If any electronic devices, such as portable disk or 
memory stick, had to be taken out of the office, they had to be examined to make sure 
no important information or documents was stored in these devices. Company C 
preferred to obtain suppliers’ information rather than sharing its own information with 
them. The reason why Company C was so concerned about information insecurity was 
explained by the IT Manager: 
“Our company is like the Huangpu Military Academy. Many employees 
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worked here before then left and started their own business in the same 
industry. It means that we created many competitors. Therefore, our CEO 
chooses to be very conservative as far as information sharing and security 
is concerned.” B-3-6 
 
Table 4.14 Summary of Information Sharing Practices 
Key 
Elements 
International Customer Tier 1 Supplier 
Information 
Sharing 
Shared clear forecasting and planning 
information, also required Company C to 
upload information. 
Shared as less information as 
possible with suppliers. 
Information 
Connectivity 
Well-connected information systems. 
Shortage of inter-organizational 
systems.  
Information 
Quality 
Accurate and timely information sharing. 
Very limited information sharing with 
suppliers. 
Willingness to 
Share 
Willing to share required information with 
customers. 
Preferred to know more about 
suppliers’ information rather than share 
own information with them. 
 
4.3.4 SC Partnering 
Company C expected to build up strategic partner relationships with customers to 
achieve a win-win outcome (see Table 4.15). The current relationship with customers 
ranged from transactional to collaborative, varying across different types of customers.   
Cost minimization was the most prevalent strategy employed by the majority of 
customers. Some of them demanded Company C offer the lowest prices. In turn, 
Company C would demand its suppliers quote the most competitive prices. If it was 
unable to match the target price of a customer, Company C would negotiate for lower 
specifications of the product. Some customers even requested 15 per cent of cost 
reduction straight away. Clearly, price squeezing was a prevalent outsourcing strategy 
of customers.   
Based on previous performance of the suppliers, Company C categorized them from 
strategic to back-up suppliers. The share of business for each supplier was determined 
by their performance in terms of quality of products, on-time delivery, cooperative 
attitude, and amount of investment.     
Payment term was a critical factor for Company C to evaluate the performance of 
suppliers. Owing to the long cash cycle time pertaining to export business, Company 
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C needed a certain period to receive the payment from international customers after 
the goods were produced, inspected, delivered and received by the customers. 
Consequently, it was impossible for Company C to process the payment in a short time. 
About 90 per cent of the suppliers were able to meet the payment term of three months. 
Company C started to integrate the supplier base and had reduced 100 of them. 
Company C’s sourcing strategy is reflected in the following explanation made by the 
Purchasing Manager: 
“We don’t want to cooperate with very small suppliers with annual sales 
less than RMB100,000. We need to find those suppliers with a solid 
foundation. They are preferred if they supply to leading manufacturers in 
the same industry, which means that they have experience of managing 
inter-organizational information system and mass production capability.” 
B-2-1  
4.3.4.1 Supplier Development 
Indirect supplier development initiatives were provided by Company C to assist 
suppliers in quality improvement, production efficiency, technology, cost reduction, and 
capital (see Table 4.15). A special department was set up to help suppliers to make 
improvements. For example, Company C would help suppliers to streamline their 
production process to improve efficiency so that less investment had to be made. If the 
quality of components did not meet the standard, the R&D department would send staff 
to the suppliers’ plants to optimize the structure of the component. Technology 
supervision and enhancement was also offered by Company C to lift B-level suppliers 
to A-level. If the target cost of a component was one dollar, Company C would help the 
supplier to reduce the cost from five dollars to one dollar.  
Occasional financial support was provided by Company C to suppliers. If suppliers 
asked for payment in advance to stock more inventories when prices of raw materials 
were comparatively low, Company C usually considered comprehensively and weighed 
the pros and cons carefully. As the Purchasing Manager put it:  
“Although it is called strategic relationship, if money is the issue, we have 
to be very careful and clear.” B-3-3 
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If any training was organized at Company C, the top management, technical staff and 
production managers of the suppliers were invited to participate in those activities. Both 
parties would sit together to discuss how new products could be improved, what kind 
of new parts could be used, and how the performance of products would be affected 
by new parts. Systematic training in terms of ISO9000, production and planning were 
arranged for twenty to thirty suppliers every year.    
4.3.4.2 Low Mutual Trust  
The level of trust between Company C and its suppliers was low (see Table 4.15). Since 
Company C normally demanded 90 days of payment term or even longer, some 
suppliers asked for cash payment and would not deliver goods unless cash payment 
was processed. As a result, Company C was not satisfied with the suppliers, and the 
relationships between them became purely transactional.  
Owing to the fact that suppliers had a low level of commitment, Company C adopted 
sharp, clear principles. Once the contract with meticulously designed terms was signed, 
no matter how the prices of raw materials fluctuated, suppliers had to take full 
responsibility and fulfil their commitment. Nothing could be negotiated. Otherwise, 
suppliers could make various excuses to delay or decline the supply and ask Company 
C to find other suppliers.  
4.3.4.3 Power Asymmetry  
Being a focal manufacturing firm, Company C had more power than its suppliers (see 
Table 4.15). The significant coercive power used by Company C could be seen from its 
price-cutting practices, information sharing attitudes and order fulfilment policies.    
Table 4.15 Summary of SC Partnering Practices 
Key 
Elements 
International Customer Tier 1 Supplier 
SC 
Partnering 
Anticipating building up partner 
relationship with customers. 
Adversarial relationship. 
Supplier 
Development 
Customers required Company C to 
comply with various standards.   
Indirect supplier development. 
Mutual 
Trust  
Contractual trust on quality and 
performance. 
Low level of trust.  
Power 
Asymmetry 
Coercive power was used by customers 
for price cutting.  
Coercive power was passed to suppliers. 
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4.3.5 Process Integration 
The internal processes of Company C had to be significantly integrated and streamlined 
to improve efficiency (see Table 4.16). During the past couple of years, when many new 
products were launched simultaneously, the problem of poor internal collaboration 
became apparent. The peak season would drive a hectic pace at Company C when all 
customers wanted to catch up with the new season and launch new products 
simultaneously. The Vice President described the situation as below:  
“A few years ago, we launched a few high-end products which were the 
best even in the whole industry. While the production was completed and 
the delivery was about to arranged, the customer required to make 
changes to the products. It really made us hectic. If only a few new models, 
we were able to handle the situation. If a dozen of new models were 
involved, we would be in trouble. B-2-1       
4.3.5.1 No Just-In-Time Initiative 
The Purchasing Manager believed that JIT was inappropriate for Company C, since 
most of their production was in small batches and had to comply with various 
specifications (see Table 4.16). Company C required suppliers to deliver component 
parts one day prior to mass production.  
4.3.5.2 Improving Lean Manufacturing  
A lean approach had been adopted by Company C for more than five years (see Table 
4.16). The best consultant company in China was employed to provide on-site 
supervision. Most improvements concentrated on cost reduction, lead time shortening, 
and quality and efficiency enhancement. Continuous effort had been made and more 
than 300 improvements had been achieved since then. Lead time was shortened 
through the change of processes, structures and materials. As a result, efficiency was 
improved considerately and the profit increased by 3 to 4 per cent in 2013. 
The efficiency of the production of some products cannot be improved by changing 
processes only, but would require the modification of the structure as well. This kind of 
situation was encountered by Company C. If order quantity was 5000pcs, they were 
able to manage to complete it. If order quantity increased to 50000pcs, production 
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capacity would not be able to match the demand. After a detailed analysis, Company 
C realized that the design of the product structure was too complicated, and the 
processes involved, such as welding and grinding, had to be simplified or changed. 
The production mode of Company C was unsuitable for lean operation, which requires 
even production with infrequent setup so that high efficiency could be achieved. If only 
a few products were to be produced, the production lines would be stable and improved 
easily. However, the production of Company C was uneven and the items to be 
produced were switched frequently. Consequently, it was hard for Company C to 
achieve a higher level of lean operation.  
In comparison with the international leading manufacturers, Company C recognized 
that there was a big scope for them to improve lean operation capability. As the Vice 
President pointed out:  
“I visited many foreign invested manufacturing firms to learn from their lean 
operation. It can be seen clearly that lots of waste exists in production 
processes of CMFs. If only the layout of those firms were to be improved, 
enormous costs could be saved already. We need to make significant 
improvement not only on processes, but also layout and many other 
aspects.” B-2-3 
4.3.5.3 Early Sales and Operation Planning Process  
The S&OP process of Company C was at a very early stage (see Table 4.16). It was 
limited to major international customers sharing forecasts with Company C only. These 
international customers shared accurate forecasts with Company C for the next three 
months or half year. The differences between the forecast and the actual order quantity 
was about 10 per cent, based on which Company C could make plans for production 
capacity. The Vice President of Company C thought that the rolling forecasts from 
customers was critical for the exporting business and if that kind of information could 
be shared with suppliers, more successful collaboration and higher efficiency could be 
achieved. As he put it:  
“It would be really convenient that we operate like one of our customer’s 
plants while suppliers operate like one of our plants, uploading all 
information of production, inventory and delivery on the Web-based 
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platform. With tight labour supply and high labour costs, providing future 
forecasts is particularly important for us to balance capacity, human 
resource and production.” B-2-1   
Although Company C had an annual sales plan, it did not provide accurate figures to 
its suppliers, who could only refer to historical data to predict possible increases of 
order quantity. 
4.3.5.4 Distribution Process 
Company C paid limited attention to distribution cost, and the whole distribution process 
was not properly designed (see Table 4.16). The company mainly employed 3PLs for 
transportation of goods from warehouse to ports. However, the significant impact of 
logistics on overall cost had been recognized.   
Table 4.16 Summary of Process Integration Practices 
Key Elements International Customer Tier 1 Supplier 
Process 
Integration 
Significant process integration is essential.  
JIT 
JIT was inappropriate since the production was in many small batches and the 
products had to comply with different specifications. 
Lean 
Manufacturing 
Lean manufacturing had been implemented to realize cost reduction, lead time 
shortening, and quality and efficiency enhancement.  
Distribution 
Process 
Distribution process was not properly designed. 
S&OP Process S&OP process was at very early stage. 
 
The warehouse of Company C was managed in a traditional way. Company C stocked 
finished goods in the warehouse for four to seven days, which was largely determined 
by shipping schedules. Sometimes, the production of a few small orders was combined 
for production efficiency, but the finished goods could stay in the warehouse for more 
than ten days or even one month. The inventory of big components was usually held 
for two days. Small and cheap parts stayed in the warehouse for four to five days. 
Goods were piled up in the way to facilitate first-in-first-out movement. Idle inventory 
was examined in a fixed period. The distribution and warehouse management 
approach of Company C needed to be largely upgraded.  
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4.3.6 Collaborative Synchronization 
Collaborative synchronization was not observed.  
4.3.6.1 SC Visibility 
The concept of SC visibility was unknown for senior managers of Company C. 
4.3.6.2 No Synergistic Planning and Forecasting     
Synergistic planning and forecasting was not observed at Company C. 
4.3.6.3 No Inventory Optimization  
The concept of IO was unknown to senior managers of Company C. 
4.3.6.4 Collaborative Innovation  
The importance of collaborative innovation was acknowledged by Company C (see 
Table 4.17). It worked closely with SC partners on product innovation. Continuous 
improvement had been made to both existing and new products. Both customers and 
suppliers were consulted for evaluation or suggestions. If a new product was to be 
launched, Company C would inform customers first, owing to the fact that customers 
had a better understanding about the demand in their markets. R&D staff also went 
overseas together with sales associates to learn cutting-edge technology and design 
from the international customers.  
Table 4.17 Summary of Collaborative Synchronization Practices 
Key Elements International Customer Tier 1 Supplier 
Collaborative 
Synchronization 
Not observed Not observed 
SC Visibility Unknown 
SPF Not observed. 
IO Unknown 
Collaborative Innovation 
Customers were consulted for 
evaluation or suggestions. 
Suppliers were involved in the 
NPD processes. 
Suppliers were also involved in the NPD processes. They were invited to Company C 
to offer recommendations for the improvement of design and structure, cost reduction 
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and higher performance. Both Company C and suppliers paid great attention to this 
kind of interaction and cooperation.  
4.3.7 Barriers to SCC 
Multiple barriers to SCC were revealed by the managers of Company C. All interviewed 
middle-level managers had no idea about the concept of SCC or the positive linkage 
between SCC and business success. Although they were moving towards this direction 
as a result of the strong promotions made by consultancy companies, the importance 
of SCC had not been well understood.  
Application of SCC was also restrained by the business mode and the characteristics 
of the product. Since Company C exported its products globally and adopted a make-
to-order strategy, it was very hard for the company to forecast sales unless international 
customers shared their purchasing information in advance. What Company C could do 
was try its best to meet the demand by producing the exact quantity ordered by the 
customers.    
Unwillingness to share information was another major barrier. In an effort to make self-
protection, Company C believed that valuable information should not be shared with 
SC partners. Otherwise, they might hurt themselves. Manufacturing firms such as 
Company C taking extreme caution about information security was out of a sense of 
having no choice. Vicious competition in the domestic market and the lack of effective 
legal protection were the major reasons. Company C chose to be conservative and did 
not trust others. As the Purchasing Manager explained: 
“The domestic business environment is not as fair as that in those 
developed countries. Given that an environment for healthy competition is 
not nurtured by the government and the intellectual property law is not 
working, fierce competition has worsened the domestic business 
environment. Under this situation, our boss chooses not to be open. If we 
don’t protect ourselves, nobody will.” B-3-5 
Guanxi played a minor role in the business relationship between Company C and its 
suppliers. Those suppliers who had Guanxi with the boss only had advantages if all the 
same supply conditions as those of other suppliers were met. Guanxi was used by 
some suppliers to open the door for building up business relationships but did not affect 
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the final sourcing decision of Company C. New suppliers had to be evaluated by three 
different departments. Price comparison had to be made between three different 
suppliers. A special team was formed to collect information and conduct price 
comparison, then work out an information sheet for the top management to make the 
final decision. 
A summary of SCC initiatives of Company B is shown in Table 4.18. A cause-effect 
analysis of major problems with SCC between Company C and SC partners is 
displayed in Figure 4.6. 
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Table 4.18 Summary of SCC Initiatives of Company C 
Key Elements International Customer Tier 1 Supplier 
SCOA No No 
Executive Sponsorship Conservative 
Information Sharing Tactical Very limited 
Information Connectivity Well connected  Unconnected 
Information Quality High Low 
Willingness to Share High Low 
SC Partnering Adversarial collaboration Transactional 
Incentive Alignment Limited risk sharing No risk sharing 
Supplier Development Indirect Indirect 
Mutual Trust Low Very Low 
Power Asymmetry High High 
Process Integration Require further integration 
JIT Unsuitable 
Lean Require continuous effort  
Distribution Process Not designed 
S&OP Process Lack of capability 
Collaborative 
Synchronization 
Not observed Not observed 
SC Visibility Lack of knowledge 
Synchronized DP Not observed Not observed 
IO Not observed Not observed 
VMI  Not observed  Not observed 
Collaborative Innovation Yes Yes 
Major Barriers 
- Lack of inter-organizational information systems.  
- Lack of awareness of SCC.  
- Application of SCC was restrained by the business mode and the characteristics of 
products.  
- Unwillingness to share information.  
- Lack of intellectual property protection. 
- Lack of legal regulation of vicious competition. 
- Those suppliers who had Guanxi with the boss only had advantages if all conditions were 
met. 
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Figure 4.6 Cause-effect analysis of major problems with SCC between Company C and SC partners 
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4.4 Case D 
4.4.1 Overview 
Company D is a well-known manufacturer specializing in the production of PCB in 
China. Their products are supplied to domestic leading E & E manufacturing 
corporations. This company is a Tier 1 supplier that collaborates with domestic 
manufacturers and upstream sub-tier suppliers. The position of Company D in the SC 
can be illustrated as in Figure 4.7.  
Figure 4.7 The Supply Chain Position of Company D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Supply Chain Objective Alignment  
There was no SCOA between Company D and its SC partners.  
4.4.2.1 Executive Sponsorship 
The top management of Company D had no idea about the concept of SCC (see Table 
4.19). Upon understanding of what SCC was, the boss was concerned that, even if his 
company preferred to collaborate with SC partners, there was no guarantee that all SC 
partners would truly want to collaborate as well. However, he believed that it was a 
viable way to collaborate with SC partners to compete with rivals.  
4.4.2.2 Incentive Alignment 
There was no incentive alignment between Company D and its SC partners (see Table 
4.21). Customers rarely cared about Company D’s interests. All that Company D could 
do was try its best to meet customers’ requirements. Company D discontinued business 
with one of the leading customers because of their unreasonable requests. While the 
Franchisees Tier 2 
suppliers 
Domestic 
manufacturers 
Company D 
(Tier 1 supplier)  
 
Page 122 / 220 
 
labour cost boosted and the price of raw material hiked, not only did the customer 
ignore those increased costs, but it also forced Company D lower a few per cent of 
price every three months. As a result, Company D had no choice but to cheat on raw 
materials. As the CEO put it: 
“Customers only care about their own interests. The reason why our 
business still can survive is that we satisfy all unreasonable requirements 
raised by customers; up to a certain point when no profit can be made at all, 
we will not care about this kind of unreasonable customer anymore.” C-3-1 
On the other hand, the business relationship between Company D and another 
customer was stable. This was because this customer put great effort into NPD, and 
therefore a better margin was assured.    
Table 4.19 Summary of SCOA Practices 
Key Elements Domestic Customer Tier 2 Supplier 
SCOA Not observed Not observed 
Executive Sponsorship The top management were unaware of the concept of SCC. 
Incentive Alignment 
Customers forced Company D 
to bear all costs and risks.   
Company D tried to reduce suppliers’ 
losses.  
 
4.4.3 Information Sharing  
There were an increased number of customers setting up Web-based platforms to 
share information with Company D (see Table 4.20). At the same time, they required 
Company D to upload order-related information to their platforms. Company D sent 
employees to stay near the customers’ plants, providing immediate service. Suppliers 
also allocated staff to stay near Company D to provide support. However, very limited 
information was shared with suppliers.  
4.4.3.1 Information Connectivity 
Very limited investment was made in information systems by Company D (see Table 
4.20). Telephone communication was the main approach to sharing inventory 
information with suppliers. ERP was the only information system available for 
production management; but it was incomplete and had many problems. A large 
amount of manual work was required for verifying the accuracy of the information of 
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finished goods. In addition, some detailed information cannot be displayed. For 
example, if the quantity of the goods received was 1000 pcs in total, only the aggregate 
quantity can be displayed. More detailed information, such as the number of boxes and 
the date of production, cannot be displayed. The packaging requirement varied 
according to different customers. Some customers needed 6 pcs PCB for each whole 
board, while other customers needed 1pc PCB. It was acceptable to some customers 
that one of the six pieces PCB was defective, while other customers might accept two. 
All that information had to be displayed on the carton, which demanded large amount 
of manual work.  
With an escalating purchasing quantity, Company D was trying to build a purchasing 
platform so that e-auction could be adopted to drastically cut purchasing costs. The 
Purchasing Manager stated that an increased amount of investment had to be made 
for a better information system: 
“Our company develops very fast. The existing purchasing strategies and 
approaches cannot match the scale of operation. The information system 
needs to be improved for more effective purchasing and customer 
relationship management. E-auction should be applied to cut purchasing 
costs.” C-5-5 
4.4.3.2 Information Quality 
The quality of information was very low (see Table 4.20). Much time was spent in 
counting the stock to see if they matched with the data entered into the ERP system.  
4.4.3.3 Willingness to Share  
There was no need for Company D to share inventory information with customers (see 
Table 4.20). As it was a buyer’s market, customers only asked if the goods for a new 
order could be prepared within the next three days. If Company D was unable to meet 
the demand, customers would just switch the order to other suppliers. In other words, 
customers had many sources of supply and did not care about sharing inventory 
information with Company D at all.  
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Table 4.20 Summary of Information Sharing Practices 
Key 
Elements 
Domestic Customer Tier 2 Supplier 
Information 
Sharing 
No need to know information. 
Limited operational information 
sharing. 
Information 
Connectivity 
Communicate through customers’ online 
platform. 
No information system was available. 
Information 
Quality 
Very low information quality. Very low information quality. 
Willingness to 
Share 
Unwilling to share information. 
Without information shared by 
customers, it was impossible to share 
information with suppliers.  
 
4.4.4 SC Partnering 
There was no strategic relationship between Company D and its SC partners (see Table 
4.21). Due to the fact that existing technology to manufacture PCB products was very 
mature, a large number of high quality PCB manufacturing firms were available for a 
few big customers to choose. Customers usually had at least three suppliers for PCB, 
and never needed to worry about the source supply. If they wanted to develop a new 
product, their R&D departments would communicate with Company D’s supplier first 
before informing Company D. Company D was in the middle of the link and their 
responsiblity was confined to manufacturing. All that Company D needed to do was to 
add a wiring diagram onto the board; and this wiring diagram was designed by 
customers and relied on the performance of the board. Therefore, Company D did not 
own core technology and could be replaced anytime. However, it was impossible for 
Company D to switch their suppliers since they were appointed by the customers. 
Subsequently, it was very hard for Company D coordinate the relationship. Since this 
type of supplier provided nearly 60 per cent of Company D’s purchasing, a close 
relationship with them had to be built by visiting them more frequently. Usually, the CEO 
communicated with them in person.   
4.4.4.1 Supplier Development 
Most of the PCBs produced by Company D were ultimately supplied to Fortune 500 
companies, although they were first purchased by the focal manufacturing firms in 
China and then assembled inside the E & E products (see Table 4.21). Usually, these 
customers provided training to Company D to meet their standards. Similarly, some 
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domestic customers offered assistance to Company D to improve the quality of their 
products.  
Some of the raw material and facility suppliers were leaders of the industry. They 
accounted for 80 per cent of the purchasing amount of Company D. The manufacturing 
capability of Company D was far behind this type of supplier therefore their supervision 
is important for Company D to make improvement. Very strong supervision team were 
formed by those suppliers to provide training to Company D in how to maintain the best 
working condition of their facilities, make best use of those facilities, and set the best 
parameters for operation. Company D followed those suppliers’ advice and leveraged 
their expertise to enhance its own capability.  
Realizing the importance of the development of suppliers’ capabilities to their own 
products, Company D sent technological staff to assist those suppliers who were weak 
in technology, and invited them to participate in all training courses. If any problems 
occurred with suppliers in production, Company D would provide all necessary help. If 
the problems could not be resolved within the limited time scope, Company D had to 
substitute the supplier because it could not afford to halt its own production while 
waiting for the supplier to fix the problem. If any problem happened to the production 
of critical raw materials and the supplier could not find a solution within 24 hours, a new 
supplier would take over immediately.   
While the production capacity increasd considerably, Company D shifted from small 
suppliers to big ones. They provided assistance and support for existing suppliers to 
upgrade their capacity to match the expanded demand. Feedback on suppliers’ 
products were offered to them to make improvements. However, some suppliers were 
comfortable with their current scale and were concerned about the risks associated 
with further expansion. As a result, Company D had to replace those suppliers.  
4.4.4.2 Low Mutual Trust  
The level of trust between Company D and its SC partners was very low (see Table 
4.21). The CEO believed that it would be very hard to collaborate with the entire SC 
since all parties in the SC had to bear the same thinking and goals in mind and move 
towards the same direction. Nevertheless, the CEO believed that, with escalating 
competition, the loyalty of suppliers had grown steadily and the willingness to cooperate 
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intensified.  
In order to ensure the quality of the products, the customers of Company D appointed 
Tier 2 suppliers when they were developing new products. All those suppliers were 
foreign-invested companies leading the industry. When asked why Company D did not 
source from Chinese suppliers, the Purchasing Manager explained: 
“The Chinese suppliers are very smart and able to produce everything. 
However, it is very hard to ensure consistency in quality. If we lower the 
purchasing price, they will use materials of lower grade to maintain profit 
margin. Even if we maintain the same purchasing price, it is still very 
possible that they try to cheat on processes and materials in order to obtain 
a higher profit.” C-5-6   
Apparently, the commitment of Chinese suppliers was very low. Consequently, the level 
of trust in those suppliers was extremely low as well.  
4.4.4.3 Power Asymmetry  
Power asymmetry was prominent between Company D and its SC partners (see Table 
4.21). Owing to the fact that the PCB industry was very mature and plenty of alternative 
sources of supply were available, the focal E & E manufacturing firms rarely cared 
about suppliers’ interests. They placed new orders without any consideration of 
suppliers’ production plan, and simply demanded the delivery of goods in a very short 
lead time. If suppliers were unable to finish the production on time, they switched the 
order to other suppliers without hesitation. Although the customer would take those 
goods later, Company D had to keep the inventory until next month. Under this situation, 
it was very hard for Company D to manage production capacity and smooth production 
flow for higher efficiency and lower cost.  
The extreme situation is that one of the leading focal manufacturing firms demanded 
Company D to make price reduction every month. Worse still, no negotiation was 
allowed. After the goods were delivered to the customer’s warehouse, no payment was 
processed until the goods were actually used. If those goods were never to be used, 
the customer would only pay for the cost of the goods. As a result, the business with 
this customer was terminated. As the General Manager contended:  
Page 127 / 220 
 
“This is a typical example of bullying and is not sustainable. This kind of 
customers treat every supplier in this way and will be in trouble one day. 
Customers take advantage of the power they have and only care for their 
own benefits.” C-3-1   
 
Table 4.21 Summary of SC Partnering Practices 
Key 
Elements 
Domestic Customer Tier 2 Supplier 
SC 
Partnering 
Adversarial relationship Adversarial relationship 
Supplier 
Development 
Some offered assistance to improve the 
quality of products. 
Company D took leading suppliers’ 
expertise to enhance own capability. 
Mutual 
Trust  
Very low level of trust. Very low level of trust.  
Power 
Asymmetry 
Coercive power was abused by 
customers. 
Coercive power was passed to suppliers. 
 
4.4.5 Process Integration 
While some leading customers started to put less emphasis on cost reduction and pay 
more attention to the stability of product quality and on-time delivery, streamlining of 
production process became more important (see Table 4.22). Accordingly, Company D 
had adjusted the purchasing strategies by putting more weight on quality. The target of 
Company D was to make every piece of PCB up to standard. Hence, it started to focus 
on integration and rationalization of the production processes to facilitate better 
utilization of facilities, lower labour costs, and reduction of water and electricity usage. 
This would result in higher efficiency and less customer complaints.  
4.4.5.1 Providing Just-In-Time Delivery 
Company D offered JIT delivery service to customers. This company built own 
warehouses close to customers’ sites. Products were delivered to customers according 
to instructions.  
4.4.5.2 Low Level of Lean Manufacturing  
Lean manufacturing had been adopted by Company D from six years ago (see Table 
4.22). Owing to the fact that the function of the PCB board was designed by customers 
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and could not be changed, all that Company D could do was the simplification of the 
manufacturing processes so that the cost could be reduced. A special department was 
set up by Company D to improve the standardization of production processes, realize 
better utilization of facilities, and maximize production capacity.  
The complicated production processes were optimized continuously for higher quality. 
For example, a new environmentally friendly process was introduced to replace the 
process of electroless plating copper, for higher efficiency. The activities of each worker 
were videotaped and examined to remove redundancy. The new introduced materials 
were evaluated in terms of the level of popularity, improvement with the stability of 
quality, and enhancement of the performance of the final products. To deal with 
increasing labour costs, Company D made more investment in automated facilities to 
improve efficiency and to link up the whole production line.  
It was very hard to encourage the participation of workers. The quality control was 
mainly executed by middle-level managers and technicians who were experts in both 
management and technology. Workers only cared about how much money they could 
earn and did not pay attention to quality control. The situation was worst during the 
Spring Festival, because Company D was lacking in workforce at the end the year and 
had to recruit lots of new workers after the Spring Festival. As a result, Company D had 
to separate the operation process into the simplest actions so that new workers could 
be trained within half an hour. Under this situation, workers could not be relied on for 
quality control. 
4.4.5.3 No Sales and Operation Planning Process  
Company D had no S&OP process capability (see Table 4.22). Since most customers 
did not provide accurate plans, it was almost impossible for Company D to do 
forecasting and planning for production. The situation is reflected in what the General 
Manager said: 
“The planning capability of the Chinese domestic manufacturing firms is 
very weak. Although they claim that they have plans, when it comes to 
suppliers, there is no plan at all. Customers only permit a lead time of less 
than one week in a buyers’ market. Sometimes, all orders come together; 
sometimes, we have no order, resulting in big waste and under-utilization 
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of facilities. Upon dealing with international customers, we started to 
realize that these customers have reasonable plans, which provides us 
certain times to make preparation and adjustment for production.” C-3-2 
4.4.5.4 Victim of VMI  
VMI was widely adopted by Company D’s customers (see Table 4.22). However, 
Company D believed that they were the victims of VMI because all customers adopted 
VMI to push inventory and costs to upstream suppliers such as Company D. Some 
customers requested Company D to deliver goods to their warehouse but did not 
process the payment until the goods were actually used. As a result, sometimes 
Company D was not able to receive any payment one year after the goods were 
dispatched. One extreme situation was that Company D was not allowed to count its 
own inventory stocked in one customer’s warehouse and was only informed how much 
of the goods had been used by the customer. As such, Company D suffered from 
various VMI policies of their customers. As the Sales Manager indicated: 
“Suppliers like us need to manage VMI carefully. VMI is absolutely 
favourable for customers owing to the fact that much lower or even zero 
inventory is held by customers but more inventory and higher risk is 
pushed towards suppliers like us. Consequently, our cost increased 
considerably. The positive aspect is that customers provide better plans 
for delivery which enable us to reduce the purchasing cost slightly. 
Frequent communication with customers is crucial for us to check if the 
existing models have been changed so that we can lower the inventory of 
that model as much as possible.” C-6-1 
The General Manager also added: 
“Those customers tried to learn SCM from the Western companies but 
imitated it partially. Instead of seeking for common interests of the whole 
SC, they adopted VMI to benefit themselves but disadvantage suppliers. 
They may obtain short-term benefits but are not wise enough to take long- 
term benefits into consideration.” C-3-1 
 
4.4.5.5 Distribution Processes 
The warehouse of Company D was mainly managed through ERP and manual 
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verification (see Table 4.22). All data entered into the ERP system had to be checked 
manually to ensure the accuracy of information. The ERP system needed to be 
improved substantially, since much detailed information was not able to be recorded 
and displayed.    
The inventory level of finished goods was very high. The general requirement for 
inventory management was to keep inventory in the warehouse for no longer than a 
month. According to the different requirements of different customers, some PCBs 
moved in and out on the same day while some stayed in the warehouse for one month 
if the goods were for big orders and had to be delivered until the whole order was 
finished.  
Company D had to hold some inventory of raw materials because the industry was 
somewhat monopolised or semi-monopolised by a few leading suppliers. To take the 
base plate as an example, 60 per cent of market share was monopolised by one 
supplier, who was powerful enough to set the market price by itself. While customers 
of Company D appointed this raw material supplier because of the best quality and 
large production capacity, Company D had no choice but to hold inventory for this type 
of raw material. As the Purchasing Manager explained:  
“We may hold enough inventory of this raw material to ensure the normal 
production of the next three months. We also do some simple forecasting 
based on the pattern of historical price fluctuations. For example, normally, 
May to July belongs to off-peak season and the price is the lowest. Two 
months later, the price would rise sharply. Therefore, we purchase around 
10 million RMB of raw materials during the off-peak season and store them 
in the warehouse.” C-5-3    
 
In an effort to avoid shortage of raw materials, sometimes Company D had to reserve 
some raw materials for customers if the possibility of winning the order was high. 
Customers only assisted them to digest a small portion of the inventory if it turned out 
that Company D failed to win the order. The inventory of those raw materials was 
accumulated for more than three months to three years.   
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Table 4.22 Summary of Process Integration Practices 
Key Elements Domestic Customer Tier 2 Supplier 
Process 
Integration 
Processes need to be streamlined and integrated for better quality. 
JIT 
Provided JIT delivery for focal 
manufacturing firms. 
N/A 
Lean Manufacturing 
All that Company D could do was confined to the simplification of the 
manufacturing process. 
S&OP Process Impossible to do forecast and planning. 
VMI 
Victim of partially imitated VMI 
practices of customers.  
Limited to metal products 
Distribution 
Process 
Very high level of inventory was held in warehouse. 
 
4.4.6 Collaborative Synchronization 
Collaborative synchronization between Company D and its SC partners was not 
observed.  
4.4.6.1 SC Visibility 
Without information systems, SC visibility could not be realized.  
4.4.6.2 No Synergistic Planning and Forecasting   
Synergistic planning and forecasting was not observed. 
4.4.6.3 No Inventory Optimization  
The concept of IO was unknown for senior managers of Company D. 
4.4.6.4 Collaborative Innovation  
Since the design of PCB was tailored for customers’ products, Company D usually tried 
to communicate with customers and engaged in their design activities, making some 
suggestions to the design so that the manufacturing processes of Company D were 
able to be simplified for lower costs (see Table 4.23). Most of the changes were made 
because the design was too complicated and the wire could be circulated in a different 
way. This could make the manufacturing of the PCB much less complicated.  
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4.4.7 Barriers to SCC 
SCC was a new concept for all senior managers of Company D. It would take some 
time for the company to get familiar with the notion and acknowledge the importance 
of it. In order to reap more benefit, the focal manufacturing firms tended to transplant  
Table 4.23 Summary of Collaborative Synchronization 
Key Elements Domestic Customer Tier 2 Supplier 
Collaborative 
Synchronization 
Not observed Not observed 
SC Visibility Not observed Not observed 
SPF Not observed. Not observed. 
IO Not observed Not observed 
Collaborative Innovation 
Engaged in customers’ design 
activities for simplification of 
manufacturing processes. 
Suppliers involved. 
 
SCM initiatives that have emerged in Western developed countries without deep 
consideration of the institutional environment. Even worse, they inclined to take a wrong 
perspective on the SCM paradigm, which might inhibit the achievement of common 
goals. Trust was a major hurdle to the adoption of SCC. Since the interests of multiple 
parties were involved, it was very hard for them to trust each other and work towards 
the same goal. As with other companies investigated, Guanxi was revealed to be 
unimportant for SCC in this case. 
A summary of SCC initiatives of Company D is shown in Table 4.24. A cause-effect 
analysis of major problems with SCC between Company D and its SC partners is 
displayed in Figure 4.8. 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has focused on the within-case analysis of the collaborative initiatives of 
the four manufacturing firms with their SC partners. Using the same template, the 
various key elements of SCC and the major barriers encountered by the case 
companies were systematically presented. The next chapter will provide a cross-case 
analysis of SCC for the four manufacturing firms. 
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Table 4.24 Summary of SCC Initiative of Company D 
Key Elements Domestic Customer Tier 2 Supplier 
SCOA No No 
Executive Sponsorship No 
Information Sharing Very limited Very limited 
Information Connectivity Unconnected Unconnected 
Information Quality Very low Very Low 
Willingness to Share Low  Low 
SC Partnering Adversarial relationship Adversarial relationship 
Incentive Alignment Push risks and cost No risk sharing 
Supplier Development Indirect Indirect 
Mutual Trust Very low Very Low 
Power Asymmetry Coercive power Coercive power 
Process Integration Require further integration 
JIT JIT delivery 
Lean Need further improvement 
Distribution Process Not designed 
S&OP Process  Lack of knowledge 
Collaborative 
Synchronization 
Not observed Not observed 
SC Visibility Not observed 
Synchronized DP Not observed Not observed 
IO Not observed Not observed 
VMI Partial imitation Not observed 
Collaborative Innovation Yes Yes 
Major Barriers 
- Lack of inter-organizational information system.  
- Lack of awareness about SCC.  
- Partial imitation of SCC practices of focal manufacturing firms for maximization of own 
interests.  
- Abuse of coercive power.  
- Lack of trust. 
- Inconsistency of government policies.  
- Most suppliers have no intention to improve SCC capabilities because they lack of 
confidence. 
- Guanxi was revealed to be non-critical to building up strategic relationships. 
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Figure 4.8 Cause-effect analysis of major problems with SCC between Company D and SCC partners 
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CHAPTER 5 Cross-Case Comparison 
A within-case analysis was presented in the preceding chapter. In this chapter, a cross-
case comparison is made to complement the insights of the within-case analysis by 
identifying common themes in the data. 
5.1 Cross-Case Analysis 
The four cases revealed that SCC was being adopted by only a small portion of leading 
manufacturing firms in China. Both Companies A and B took the lead within their 
respective lines in this aspect. The level of collaboration between Company A and its 
SC partners was the highest among the four firms under investigation. SC objectives 
were aligned, a large amount of information was shared, and a partner relationship was 
formed, SC processes were somewhat integrated, and weekly forecasts and planning 
were shared with its SC partners. Company B was at the early stage of SCC and 
relatively unsophisticated, owing to the fact that information isolation islands were 
prominent, partner relationships needed to be nurtured, and operation processes 
required substantial integration.  
In contrast, SCC was not acknowledged by Companies C and D. Although internal 
information sharing was realized and lean operation was employed by Company C, all 
senior managers had no idea about SCC. The business was managed in a very 
traditional way, by focusing on cost minimization and maintaining arm’s-length 
relationships with business partners. All managers of Company D were unaware of 
SCC, although many of their customers had adopted this approach. Very limited 
collaborative operations, such as JIT delivery and VMI, were observed. The 
relationships between Company D and its SC partners were mainly adversarial. 
5.1.1 SC Objective Alignment 
Common SC objectives were not widely established by manufacturers to guide and 
encourage cooperation with SC partners (see Table 5.1). As the cases revealed, only 
Companies A and B set congruent goals with their strategic SC partners. Company A 
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signed detailed agreements specifying business goals, including annual sales, annual 
aggregated order quantity, and the percentage of cost reduction, with both upstream 
and downstream strategic SC partners. All strategic SC members spent great efforts to 
achieve those goals so that mutual interests could be realized. In comparison, the 
common goals set by Company B and its SC partners were much less specific and 
mainly focused on annual sales. Moreover, the establishment of common goals 
between Company B and its SC partners was more formalistic. Instead of being built 
to prevent opportunistic behaviour and promote collaboration, common goals became 
a burden for suppliers, who were obliged to sign the agreement simply for maintaining 
their business share. They were being speculative and exhibited very low commitment 
afterwards. Strictly speaking, the common goal between Company B and SC partners 
was just an annual sales target. Hence, Company A was the only one that had 
established real common objectives with its strategic SC partners.  
5.1.1.1 Executive Sponsorship 
The involvement of executive sponsorship is essential to the successful implementation 
of SCC initiatives (see Table 5.1). In the four companies investigated, SCC was 
relatively more successfully applied by Company A. It was largely determined by the 
recognition of the CEO, who championed various SCM initiatives himself. He was also 
passionate about learning the most advanced management skills and technologies 
from the world-class international business partners. In the case of Company B, the 
senior management team had a clear SCC vision and made detailed plans for the 
implementation of SCC in the next five to ten years. The CEO was open-minded to the 
best SCC practices, although he was suspicious about the possible impact of SCC on 
business performance.  
By contrast, the CEO of Company C held a much more conservative attitude towards 
SCC. The CEO was especially sensitive about sharing information, as many of his 
former employees learned from the company and then left and became its competitors. 
In order to prevent the leaking of information to competitors, Company C set very strict 
rules about taking electronic storage devices out of the company by its staff. In an effort 
to foil possible low commitment of its suppliers, Company C also laid down hard policies 
to ensure suppliers would fulfil signed contracts, and forbade any risk and cost sharing. 
Consequently, collaboration between Company C and its SC partners was very limited. 
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Similarly, the CEO of Company D had never heard of SCC and doubted deeply if SC 
partners would truly want to collaborate. Table 5.1 summarizes the cross-case 
comparison in this aspect. 
5.1.1.2 Incentive Alignment 
Incentives were often misaligned for local interests at the expense of other parties (see 
Table 5.3). Instead of formulating policies maximizing the overall SC profits, Company 
B used large-order discounts to push excess inventory downstream since it had the 
power advantage to offer discounts and set promotion policies. In order to obtain a 
higher profit return for a certain annual sale amount or take advantage of big discounts, 
franchisees placed large orders and piled up inventory in their warehouses. Although 
such moves eased Company B’s inventory pressure in its own warehouse, the massive 
inventory accumulated across the SC created another issue. As information 
transparency of the entire chain was very low, it was impossible for Company B to work 
out how much inventory had been stocked. This made it more difficult for Company B 
to forecast its real demand. A vicious cycle was generated, which might threaten the 
survival of Company B in the long run. 
While manufacturing firms had begun to realize the importance of incentive alignment 
with SC partners, pushing costs and risks to other parties was common practice, and 
genuine cost and risk sharing was rare. In the case of Company A, incentives were 
relatively better aligned with SC partners. However, the VP revealed that, in practice, 
both international and domestic customers pushed costs and risks to upstream 
suppliers, and nobody truly wanted to share costs and risks with them. Company B was 
in a stronger position than both downstream franchisees and upstream suppliers, and 
was therefore inclined to push costs and risks towards both ends. Company C held a 
clear position that they would not share any costs and risks with suppliers. Without a 
firm stance, it was very likely that suppliers might behave opportunistically and seek 
excuses to shift responsibility back to Company C. As a Tier 1 supplier, Company D 
suffered all costs and risks transferred from customers. Apparently, incentive 
misalignment exists extensively in the manufacturing industry in China.  
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Table 5.1 Cross-case Comparison of SCOA Practices 
Key 
Elements 
Company A Company B Company C Company D 
SCOA Part Part No No 
Executive 
Sponsorship 
Championed various 
SCM initiatives.  
Open-minded and 
supportive. 
Conservative attitude 
towards SCC. 
Unaware of SCC. 
Incentive 
Alignment 
Costs and risks were 
shared with leading 
international customers. 
Began cost and risk 
sharing to encourage 
close cooperation. 
No cost and risk sharing. 
Burdened with all costs 
and risks.  
 
5.1.2 Information Sharing 
Information sharing capabilities of the four manufacturing firms were largely 
constrained by the unavailability of IOS and the unwillingness to share information (see 
Table 5.2). The problem of information sharing was prominent in Companies B, C and 
D. Information was not shared internally between different functions in Company B. A 
few information systems were built for various purposes, but not integrated. The 
isolated information islands prohibited information sharing throughout the organization. 
In the meantime, information was not disseminated externally as well. Valuable 
information such as point-of-sales data could not be shared in a timely and accurate 
manner.  
In comparison, the information system of Company C was better internally integrated. 
Total information was shared across the company through its SAP system. A few 
subsidiary systems were also built to enable better internal operations. With its CRM 
system, communication and information sharing with international customers was also 
fluent. Order or product information was uploaded to customers’ Web-based platform 
as requested. However, external information sharing with suppliers was significantly 
less than desirable. Currently, communication with suppliers was mainly through fax, 
telephone and email. The purchasing department was the only contact point authorized 
to interact with suppliers. There was no plan for setting up a SRM system to enhance 
information sharing with suppliers.  
In comparison to Companies B and C, the information system of Company D was even 
less developed. An ERP was the only information system used by the company. It was 
incomplete, so that lots of information could not be entered and displayed. Moreover, 
much manual verification was required to ensure the accuracy of information in the 
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system. Therefore, a considerable amount of investment had to be made to improve 
the information system of Company D.    
Unwillingness to share information with SC partners was commonly found in 
Companies B, C and D. While rolling forecasts, plans and operational data of JIT 
delivery were shared with suppliers, Company B tried to retain as much information as 
possible from its business partners. Instead of sharing information with its SC partners, 
the IT department of this company managed to let its SC partners share more 
information.  
Information sharing with franchisees had become a major challenge, and would even 
threaten the survival of Company B in the near future. Franchisees were unwilling to 
share information with Company B, in an effort to protect their interests. If the real sales 
information were reported to Company B, the franchisees might lose profit based on 
their actual lower total sales. As a result, Company B had no idea how many items were 
actually sold to consumers and how many were still lying in the franchisee’s warehouse. 
While Company B kept pushing more inventory to different levels of franchisees by 
offering discounts or rebates, it would be dangerous when inventory throughout the 
channel was accumulating without being acknowledged. At the other end of the SC, 
suppliers were also reluctant to share information with Company B. They intended to 
hide important information if major problems were encountered that might lead to 
penalties. As such, building up CRM and SRM information systems and improving SC 
visibility were the most urgent issues for this company.     
Similarly, Company C was also disinclined to share information with suppliers. Fearing 
the development of potential competitors, Company C set strict rules regarding 
information sharing and order fulfilment. Suppliers were required to adhere closely to 
the contracts signed between both parties. As with the IT manager in Company B, the 
purchasing manager of Company C also had a preference for suppliers to share more 
information.  
The situation of information sharing in Company D was even more extreme. As a Tier 
1 supplier, the IT manager rationalized that customers did not need their information at 
all, since what they did was just to place an order with a lead time of three to five days. 
If Company D could not meet the required deadline, they just redirected the order to 
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other backup suppliers. The IT manager also stressed the sharing of as less information 
as possible with the suppliers. Table 5.2 summarizes the cross-case comparison in this 
regard. 
Table 5.2 Cross-case Comparison of Information Sharing Practices 
Key Elements Company A Company B Company C Company D 
Information 
Sharing 
Tactical information 
was shared internally 
and externally.  
Significant problem with 
internal information sharing 
and tactical information 
sharing with suppliers.  
Tactical information 
sharing with customers 
but very limited 
information sharing with 
suppliers. 
Operational 
information sharing 
with customers.  
Information 
Connectivity 
Number of 
information systems 
were employed. 
SAP system is 
implemented but not 
mature enough to facilitate 
both internal and external 
integration. 
SAP system was 
implemented to enable 
internal information 
sharing. 
ERP system was the 
only information 
system available but 
incomplete.  
Willingness to 
Share 
Information 
Shared wide variety 
of information 
Shared as less information 
as they could. 
Unwilling to share 
information  
Unwilling to share 
information  
 
5.1.3 SC Partnering 
Discrete arm’s length relationships were dominant in all companies under investigation 
(see Table 5.3). While collaborative partnerships were developed with a few strategic 
customers and suppliers, relationships between Company A and most of its SC 
partners were adversarial in nature. The Vice President revealed that, although the 
relationship was still labelled as partnership, it was essentially transactional. In other 
words, there was a trend of superficial partnerships with SC partners.  
Taking domestic customers as an example, some of them always tried to incorporate 
suppliers’ businesses into their own. Originally, they specialized in production of E & E 
products while their suppliers specialized in component parts. However, they started to 
produce motors or other component parts by themselves to save purchasing cost or for 
other purposes. Under such a situation, it was very difficult to form a collaborative 
relationship between two parties given that the customers became the competitors of 
their suppliers. Moreover, domestic customers managed to push all costs and risks to 
upstream suppliers such as Company A. As such, it can be argued that the relationships 
between Company A and the majority of its SC partners were transactional.  
The relationships between Company B and its franchisees were gaming relationships. 
In an effort to achieve more sales or push more inventory to downstream sales 
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terminals, Company B tried to develop various promotional policies to encourage 
franchisees to make more purchases. On the other hand, multiple levels of franchisees 
sought earnestly to take advantage of those policies for their own benefit. Therefore, 
more than one manager of Company B mentioned that franchisees were cunning, and 
that therefore it was better to let them have as less information as possible.  
Currently, relationships between Company B and its strategic suppliers were turning 
from the traditional transactional towards a superficial type of partnership. Realizing the 
vital importance of suppliers to its own success, Company B started to nurture strategic 
partner relationships with its suppliers. While both parties negotiated for their own 
benefits, Company B shared part of the costs with suppliers rather than demanding 
endless price squeezing. The company understood that bullying would be harmful to 
both parties, resulting in a lose-lose situation.  
The relationships between Company C and its suppliers were purely transactional. 
After Company C won large promotional orders from international customers, its 
suppliers would bid for those orders. Once the contract was signed, everything was 
fixed and nothing could be negotiated any more. In contrast to Company B, both as 
focal manufacturing firms in the same industry, Company C exerted very limited effort 
in collaborative initiatives, and rarely cared about suppliers. The root cause of this 
phenomenon could be that Company C kept the production of most component parts 
in-house, and only outsourced a small portion of non-critical spare parts, meaning that 
suppliers did not play such an important role as those of Company B. Moverover, it was 
very hard of the suppliers to maintain continuity of production and achieve economy of 
scale, since most of the orders of Company C, except for a few big promotional orders, 
were small in quantity, which involved many different items with different specifications. 
Therefore, it was almost impossible to induce them to cooperate. Company C would 
rather focus on bulk purchasing of commodities, which had significant impact on 
manufacturing cost. Unsurprisingly, instead of starting to pay more attention to 
suppliers as Company B did, Company C maintained a traditional and adversarial 
relationship with suppliers.   
The relationships between Company D and its SC partners were purely transactional 
as well. Domestic focal manufacturing firms managed to push all costs and risks to Tier 
1 suppliers such as Company D, while Company D could only satisfy all those 
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unreasonable requests by domestic customers to maintain business. Some of the 
leading domestic focal manufacturing firms demanded price cutting with no room for 
negotiation. While Company D was required to provide a VMI service, some customers 
did not even permit Company D to count its own inventory that was piled up in the 
customers’ warehouses. This kind of practice is, basically, bullying. Domestic focal 
manufacturing firms took advantage of their strong positional power to maximize their 
benefits at the expense of their suppliers. The worst outcome was the ultimate 
disintegration of business relationships between Company D and this type of customer. 
Hence, it can be seen that the relationship between Company D and SC partners was 
price oriented and adversarial.    
5.1.3.1 Supplier Development 
All four companies realized that the development of suppliers’ capabilities was of great 
importance to buyers’ competencies in terms of cost reduction, quality improvement, 
and JIT delivery performance (see Table 5.3). They participated actively in a wide array 
of supply development activities. Among the four companies investigated, Company A 
invested the most resources in both direct and indirect supplier development initiatives. 
It provided equipment, tools and capital to a few strategic suppliers who possessed 
core technologies. It also attempted to transfer part of its in-house organizational 
capabilities to core suppliers through hand-on supervision activities, which demanded 
a huge amount of investment of human resources and time. Engineers were assigned 
and allocated to suppliers’ sites to assist in quality control and efficiency enhancement. 
Sometimes, Company A would even request the change of the whole layout of a 
supplier’s shopfloor. In response, most of the suppliers cooperated with Company A 
closely in making the improvements without hesitation. However, a few were unwilling 
to open the door, and regarded the assistance as intervention, out of the fear that 
customers such as Company A might learn more about their operations and cost 
structure and thereby use the information they provided opportunistically.  
The situation was slightly different in Company B. Instead of directly investing 
resources, it engaged mainly in indirect supplier development, by adopting incentive 
mechanisms to prompt suppliers to improve. Company B measured suppliers’ 
performance every month in terms of quality, cost, on-time delivery, and service. 
Feedback was returned to suppliers so that they knew the level of their own 
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performance among all suppliers and the problems with their products. Engineers were 
sent to suppliers’ sites to help them improve logistics, technology and quality. In the 
case of an underperforming supplier, Company B took them to other suppliers’ sites to 
learn better operations, technologies and practices. Company B also instilled 
competition by splitting contracts among a few suppliers and rewarding the best 
suppliers with increased business volumes and designating them as preferred vendors.  
By contrast, Company C invested much less resources and effort than Company B in 
indirect supplier development. Company C assessed and ranked suppliers every 
month. The result of this evaluation was communicated to the suppliers. Improvements 
were suggested to those suppliers who ranked lowest. The supplier with the poorest 
performance would be replaced as a result. Similar to Companies A and B, Company 
C also provided assistance to suppliers to help them with quality improvement, cost 
reduction, technology transfer, and production efficiency enhancement. If the quality of 
parts produced by suppliers could not meet the requirements, engineers of Company 
C were assigned to help suppliers to optimize the design or structure. In addition, 
Company C attempted to foster more competition within the supplier base by assisting 
the weakest suppliers. Lastly, in order to match the target cost of spare parts, Company 
C exerted great efforts to help suppliers reduce production costs.  
Company D was involved in indirect supplier development as well, but this effort was 
much more limited. Technology staff were deployed to suppliers’ sites to solve problems 
together. Important training was also provided to suppliers to participate. However, if 
any critical problems occurred at a supplier’s site and could not be resolved within the 
limited time scope, Company D had to replace the supplier so that its normal production 
would not be affected. In addition, Company D had some leading suppliers who were 
very strong in the industry and provided technology assistance to Company D, who 
could use the knowledge to help other less capable suppliers.  
5.1.3.2 Trust and Commitment 
The level of trust and commitment between the four manufacturing firms and their SC 
partners was disappointingly low (see Table 5.3). For example, Companies A, B and C 
believed that it was dangerous to source from a sole supplier because it was very likely 
that they might be cheated or threatened by the supplier. As a result, it was very difficult 
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to rationalize the number of suppliers owing to the fact that companies had to maintain 
three to four suppliers for each item to ensure adequate competition among the 
suppliers.  
When it came to total cost analysis, both Companies A and B believed that suppliers 
did not provide them with the true cost of parts. This was because suppliers did not 
trust buying firms and always hid some costs so that they would not be exploited by the 
customers later. Companies A and B also agreed that it was common for suppliers to 
breach agreements signed between the two parties. For instance, Company A signed 
collaborative agreements with major suppliers to guarantee stable supply of parts at 
low prices while rewarded the suppliers with big order quantities and other preferential 
policies. However, the suppliers still breached the signed contracts and supplied to the 
existing customers’ competitors because they might get higher profits or they did not 
believe that they were treated preferentially by Company A. A similar situation was also 
applicable to Company B. In order to maintain the business relationship with Company 
B, some suppliers had no choice but to sign the collaborative agreement. When some 
issues or disputes arose at later stage, the suppliers acted opportunistically instead of 
complying with the signed agreement. While a JIT approach was deployed, both 
Company A and Company B still had to inspect and scrutinize all items delivered by the 
suppliers. Consequently, the efficiency of JIT delivery was largely compromised.   
Having suffered through the experience that many previous employees had become 
new competitors in the same industry, Company C almost did not trust anyone, and 
raised self-protection to an extremely high level. Managers designed very specific 
contract terms trying to cover as many contingencies as possible. As soon as the 
contract was signed by both parties, no more negotiation would be allowed. The 
company also inspected and verified every batch of items delivered by suppliers as all 
the other three companies did. As the purchasing manager of Company D explained, 
Chinese suppliers frequently use inferior materials and cheated on production 
processes, even though premium purchasing prices were paid by buyers. In short, the 
level of trust between the four manufacturing firms and their SC partners was incredibly 
low. Both parties just suspected each other of opportunistic behaviours. Trusting other 
partners would be at one’s own risk.   
Nevertheless, a significantly high level of trust between very limited numbers of SC 
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partners was also observed. Company A was a good example. One of the customers 
– a Fortune 500 international company – exerted a considerably high level of trust in 
Company A and used it as a sole supplier. This customer treated Company A as one of 
its own departments and collaborated with it faithfully. In appreciation for the high 
degree of trust, Company A provided products and services to this customer with the 
highest quality and offered continuous price cuts every year. Consequently, the 
collaboration between the two firms was highly extensive. Another example was the 
collaboration between Company A and one of its strategic suppliers. Since the supplier 
owned core technology but was lacking funds to purchase facilities, Company A made 
asset-specific investment in this supplier by purchasing all the facilities and tools, then 
contracted the management of the facilities to this supplier. Both firms trusted each 
other and had been cooperating seamlessly for more than twenty years. As such, 
despite the prevalent low level of trust among SC partners, some high level of trust 
could still be developed. 
5.1.3.3 Power Asymmetry 
Power asymmetry was found to be significant between Companies B, C, D and their 
SC partners (see Table 5.3). The production manager of Company B claimed that his 
company realized that abuse of coercive power to take advantage of weaker partners 
was inappropriate. The production manager also stated that Company B tried to share 
more valuable information with suppliers. For instance, instead of sharing a weekly plan 
only, Company B tried to share monthly and annual plans with suppliers as well, as to 
how seasonal variation was distributed and how annual production capacity was 
allocated. However, a significant power asymmetry could still be observed. For example, 
the IT manager believed that, instead of sharing more information with suppliers, 
Company B preferred to make sure suppliers’ information was visible. He also 
contended that franchisees were cunning and that no valuable information should be 
shared with them. Overall, as a focal manufacturing firm, Company B held more power 
than its SC partners.  
The power asymmetry between Company C and its SC partners was more significant. 
Since Company C had no idea about the importance of collaboration with suppliers, 
squeezing suppliers for cost minimization was still the main focus of its SCM effort. 
Customers forced Company C to provide the lowest prices, who, in turn, forced 
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suppliers to quote the lowest prices. Once suppliers signed the contract with Company 
C, they had to fulfil their responsibilities no matter how the prices of raw materials 
fluctuated. Apparently, there was substantial power asymmetry between Company C 
and its SC partners.          
Power asymmetry between Company D and its SC partners was prominent in that 
coercive power was widely used by domestic customers. As focal manufacturing firms, 
these domestic customers did not care about Company D’s interests and abused 
coercive power to appropriate great value for themselves. They demanded sharp price 
cutting, extremely short lead time, and switched orders between suppliers without any 
consideration of the suppliers’ production plans. These customers also made use of 
VMI to force Company D make early production and accept much longer time for 
payment. Company D was even not allowed to count its own stock in customers’ 
warehouses, and would suffer great loss if the goods were never used. As a result, 
Company D resented the exploitative use of power by these customers and even 
terminated the business relationship with one of the major domestic customers. Thus, 
power asymmetry exerted a great negative impact on SCC between Company D and 
its SC partners. Table 5.3 summarizes the cross-case comparison in SC partnering 
practices. 
Table 5.3 Cross-case Comparison of SC Partnering Practices 
Key 
Elements 
Company A Company B Company C Company D 
SC Partnering 
Building up partner 
relationships with SC 
partners. 
Trying to build up 
partner relationships 
with suppliers. 
Arm’s-length relationships 
with SC partners. 
Adversarial or hostile 
relationships with SC 
partners. 
Supplier 
Development 
Offered wide array of 
assistance to 
suppliers. 
Provided some 
assistance to 
suppliers. 
Provided some support to 
suppliers. 
Suppliers provided 
supervision.  
Trust 
Built up trust with 
strategic SC partners. 
Low. Very low. Extremely low. 
Power 
asymmetry 
Relatively equal 
relationship. 
Disagreed with using 
power to take 
advantage. 
Used power to take 
advantages. 
Disadvantaged by 
power asymmetry. 
 
5.1.4 Process Integration 
The SC processes of the four manufacturing firms under investigation required 
substantial integration (see Table 5.4). By comparison, the SC processes of Company 
A were better integrated than all the other three companies. Company A adopted JIT 
operation from the 1990s and lean operation from 2006 to remove redundancies and 
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improve operational efficiency. Currently, the JIT operation of this company is already 
very mature. Daily and hourly JIT deliveries were provided by Company A to both 
international and domestic customers. Suppliers also offered JIT delivery of raw 
materials to Company A. The lean manufacturing of Company A was far behind that of 
international customers but comparatively better than other CMFs. The lean initiative 
of Company A involved many perspectives, such as the layout of facilities, inventory 
control, and the flow of materials. Continuous and creative improvement was 
encouraged and rewarded. However, optimization of the SC processes of Company A 
was necessary. The scheduling of production planning was inaccurate and had caused 
many problems and extra costs. Coordination between different departments had to be 
improved to ensure accurate information was provided and raw materials could be 
delivered on time, so that a vicious cycle could be eliminated to smooth the whole SC 
process.  
The SC processes of Company B required substantial integration as well. This 
company started JIT operation and lean manufacturing after 2009. More than 70 per 
cent of spare parts were delivered by suppliers in half an hour to two hours. More than 
30 per cent of inventory cost had been reduced. On the other hand, to make further 
improvements with JIT operations, many issues needed to be addressed, such as 
sharing extra costs associated with smaller order quantities and more frequent 
deliveries, standardization of packaging of spare parts, and reasonable quality 
inspection. Lean manufacturing was employed, but only limited effort had been made 
toward streamlining the manufacturing process. Therefore, the SC processes of 
Company B needed to be integrated and optimized considerably.  
The SC processes of Company C were slightly better integrated than those of Company 
B, but also required substantial integration. If a few new products were launched 
together during the peak season, the limitation of manufacturing processes would 
become apparent. Both JIT and lean approach were inapplicable, because most of the 
orders had different specifications and were in small quantities, so that the continuity 
of production could not be maintained. As Company C kept most of its production in-
house, lean manufacturing was employed to realize cost reduction, lead time 
shortening, and quality improvement. For example, lead time was shortened through 
changes of processes, structure and materials. Production efficiency was improved by 
simplifying the design of products, changing the layout of facilities to synchronize the 
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processes, and making reasonable arrangements of workforces. Nevertheless, 
ongoing effort was essential for Company C to make continuous integration of its SC 
processes.          
Since both customers and suppliers of Company D dominated the market, the process 
integration of Company D was conducted internally. As the customers had switched 
sourcing strategies from cost minimization to better quality, Company D had put more 
emphasis on quality control and streamlining production processes. Company D 
offered JIT delivery of products to customers’ warehouses as requested. Lean 
manufacturing was employed to enable standardization and simplification of production 
processes, better utilization of facilities, and maximization of production capacity. As a 
result, consistency of quality was enhanced.    
5.1.4.1 Sales and Operation Process 
The S&OP processes of Companies A and B were much better than those of 
Companies C and D (see Table 5.4). Both Companies A and B understood the 
significance of demand forecasting and planning, and started to develop their own 
rolling forecasts. However, these processes were immature and needed to be 
formalized to achieve improved matching of demand and supply.  
Company A was lacking in sophisticated forecasting tools, but generated forecasts 
based on historical data and predicted customer demand. Information offered by 
different departments had to be exported and imported between different information 
systems to make further analysis. Forecasts was only used for preparation of raw 
materials and workforces but not for actual production. As such, the planning of 
Company A was inaccurate and often had to be changed at the last minute.  
Similarly, due to lack of advanced forecasting tools, Company B computed 3+3 rolling 
forecasts using spreadsheet, email, and telephone. The forecasts were mainly based 
on historical data and qualitative estimation. Estimates of future sales collected from 
more than 10,000 franchisees, combined with discount and promotion policies, were 
used to adjust monthly forecasts. The spreadsheets of aggregated demand and 
planning information were emailed to suppliers for them to make their own production 
and delivery plans.  
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The forecasting provided by international customers of Companies A and C was much 
more accurate than that by domestic customers. Generally, leading international 
customers shared annual, seasonal, monthly, weekly and daily planning and forecast 
information with Companies A and C through on-line platforms. This information was 
crucial and extremely helpful for Companies A and C to make their own planning and 
forecasting accordingly. The overall forecasting error of international customers was 
less than 10 per cent.  
Although accurate planning and forecasts were provided by Company C’s major 
international customers, Company C only used them for their own planning, but did not 
share information with its suppliers. Company D claimed that it was impossible for them 
to do forecasting and planning because customers never provided an accurate plan for 
them but demanded extremely short lead times to finish production and make delivery. 
Otherwise, they would just switch orders to other suppliers without any consideration 
of Company D’s production capacity and planning.  
5.1.4.2 VMI Operation 
The VMI initiative was adopted by Companies A, D and their SC partners (see Table 
5.4). Company A served major leading international customers by building warehouses 
near customers’ plants throughout the world to manage inventories. Safety inventory 
was held so that Company A had enough time to replenish the inventory if demand 
changed. Frequent communication was not necessary as long as safety inventories 
were available. However, a different mode of VMI was employed by domestic 
customers of Company A. It was mainly used by them to prompt suppliers to organize 
production in advance rather than for reducing overall inventory in the SC. As a leading 
supplier of domestic customers, Company A had relatively equal power to customers, 
and therefore would not arrange production unless an order was actually received. If 
the inventory produced was not used before the deadline, domestic customers were 
required to take responsibility and make payment.  
The situation was much worse for Company D. As the market was very competitive and 
therefore customers had more sourcing options, customers tended to set exploitative 
VMI policies for Company D. The company was required to deliver goods to customers’ 
warehouses, but payment was not settled until the goods were actually used. Company 
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D was not allowed to count its own stock in customers’ warehouses. Therefore, it had 
no idea how much of its own inventories were accumulated in customer’ warehouses, 
and had to wait for the customers to update the information. As a result, Company D 
suffered great loss because of the implementation of the VMI approach. 
5.1.4.3 Distribution Process 
Distribution processes of all the four manufacturing firms investigated were not yet 
appropriately designed (see Table 5.4). All of them either contracted transportation to 
3PLs or pushed costs to suppliers. A few of them had noticed the low efficiency of 
logistics operations. However, it would take a great deal of effort to improve their 
distribution capabilities. 
Table 5.4 Cross-case Comparison of Process Integration Practices 
5.1.5 Collaborative Synchronization 
Collaborative synchronization of all the four manufacturing firms investigated was not 
observed (see Table 5.5). End-to-end SC visibility of all firms was not available, and 
critical information needed for SC operation and decision making was unknown. 
Synergistic planning and forecast capability, and inventory optimization, were not in 
place either.    
Key Elements Company A Company B Company C Company D 
Process 
Integration 
Substantial integration is required. 
JIT Initiative Mature JIT operation. Started JIT operation. Unsuitable. 
Provided JIT 
delivery. 
Lean Manufacturing 
Relatively better than 
other Chinese 
manufacturers. 
Minor improvement 
to streamline the 
production 
processes. 
Realized cost 
reduction and lead 
time shortening. 
Simplification of 
manufacturing 
processes. 
S&OP Process Immature. Immature. Very immature. Very immature. 
VMI 
Different VMI between 
domestic and 
international 
customers. 
N/A N/A 
Disadvantaged by 
partially imitated VMI 
policies of 
customers.  
Distribution Process Not designed. 
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5.1.5.1 Collaborative Innovation  
All four companies realized the importance of leveraging suppliers’ technological and 
innovative competencies for their own success, and had therefore involved suppliers in 
NPD activities (see Table 5.5). For example, the technology department of Company A 
was responsible for communication with customers for NPD. Suppliers were also 
consulted for the selection of component parts to reduce cost and improve performance. 
In the case of Company B, suppliers were involved throughout the NPD process and 
consulted for the design of outlines, structures and the selection of components as well. 
There had also been extensive communication between the R&D department of 
Company C and SC partners about product innovation. Company D was engaged in 
the NPD of customers so that the manufacturing processes could be simplified for lower 
cost. The cross-case comparison of collaborative synchronization is shown in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 Cross-case Comparison of Collaborative Synchronization 
Key Elements Company A Company B Company C Company D 
Collaborative 
Synchronization 
Not observed 
SC Visibility Not available 
Synchronized DP Not observed 
IO Not observed 
Collaborative 
Innovation 
Adopted 
5.2 Summary of Cross-Case Analysis 
Based on the overall performance of the four investigated manufacturing corporations 
in the five major elements of SCC – SC objective alignment, information sharing, SC 
partnering, process integration, and collaborative synchronization – the current levels 
of SCC in the Chinese E & E manufacturing industry can be classified into four types, 
which can be labelled as “Developing”, “Beginning”, “Limited”, and “Very Limited” (see 
Figure 5.1).  
Supply chain collaboration observed between Company A and its strategic SC partners 
falls in the first category of “Developing”. Characteristics of the collaboration between 
the two parties include the following: (1) SC objectives for long-term SCC were 
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established; (2) incentives were aligned to share costs and benefits; (3) wide array of 
tactical and operational information was shared; (4) level of trust was high and multiple 
supplier development initiatives were taken; and (5) planning and forecasting 
information was shared timely and accurately. In essence, collaboration between 
Company A and its strategic SC partners is in place and ongoing, but that with other 
non-strategic partners still remains adversarial. 
Figure 5.1 Different levels of SCC of Companies A, B, C, D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Collaboration between Company B and its SC partners falls in the second category of 
“Beginning”. Company B realized the importance of adopting a SC vision and started 
to build up its common interest community. However, SC common objectives were 
difficult to achieve, owing to the fact that some of the suppliers were speculative. 
Company B started to consider sharing the extra cost that was caused by small order 
quantities and more frequent deliveries on the supplier side as a result of the JIT 
initiative. Company B believed that abuse of mediated power by bullying the weaker 
partners was inappropriate. A rolling 3+3 planning and forecast for the next six days 
was shared with suppliers on a daily basis to facilitate JIT supply. In sum, the 
collaboration between Company B and its SC members has just started. 
Collaboration between Company C and its SC partners falls in the third category of 
“Limited”. International customers shared tactical and operational information with 
Company C who, however, shared very limited information with its suppliers in turn. 
Company C was internally connected through the SAP information system, but the 
connection with suppliers was not established. Cost minimization was the main focus 
D 
C 
B 
A 
Scope of 
collaboration 
Depth of 
collaboration 
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of the majority of its customers. The supplier relationship was purely transactional, in 
that trust was limited to contractual and with strong power asymmetry. Basically, the 
collaboration between Company C and its SC partners was adversarial. 
Collaboration between Company D and its SC partners falls in the last category of “Very 
Limited”. Company D believed that it was the victim of SCC practices. There was no 
strategic relationship between Company D and its SC partners or customers, as the 
latter were rarely concerned about Company D’s interest. Similar to Company C, the 
level of trust between Company D and its SC partners was very low and power 
asymmetry was prominent. Company D believed that it was victimized by VMI practices 
because all its customers adopted VMI to push inventory risks and costs to upstream 
suppliers. Essentially, Company D did not believe in SCC in the sense that it suffered 
from higher costs and risks associated with SCC initiatives. 
Through a cross-case comparison between the four companies investigated in this 
research, some common themes were identified, which are underlined in Table 5.6. 
Both Companies A and B set common SC objectives with strategic SC partners, but 
not Companies C and D. However, it was difficult for both Companies A and B to 
achieve those objectives because some suppliers were speculative. The CEOs of 
Companies A and B were engaged in SCC initiatives proactively. Their engagement 
was regarded as critical to the implementation of SCC initiatives in terms of resource 
allocation, removal of resistance, resolving conflicts and so on. Since the top 
management of Companies C and D was lacking in awareness of SCC, their 
involvement was not seen. The CEO of Company C, especially, held a very 
conservative attitude towards SCC because of some negative exeprinces.  
The level of information sharing between Companies B, C, D and their SC partners was 
very low. First of all, these companies were lacking in inter-organizational information 
systems. The connections between these companies and their SC partners were either 
unavailable or under development. Massive investment and resources were required 
to facilitate inter-organizational connection and communication. Secondly, the quality 
of information shared by these companies and their SC partners was relatively poor. 
The accuracy of data collected and shared had to be improved significantly. The 
frequency of information sharing needed to be increased enormously to facilitate 
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internal and external integration. Lastly, unwillingness to share information was strong, 
which could be a major inhibitor to higher levels of information sharing.  
Table 5.6 Cross-case Comparison of the Four Companies 
Key Elements 
Company A 
(Developing) 
Company B 
(Beginning) 
Company C 
(Limited) 
Company D  
(Very Limited) 
SCOA Partly aligned No SCOA 
Executive  
Sponsorship 
Proactive involvement No involvement 
Incentive 
Alignment 
Costs and risks were 
shared with strategic SC 
partners. 
Limited or no cost and risk sharing 
Information 
Sharing 
Extensive IS.  Limited information sharing 
Information 
Connectivity 
Partly connected. 
Lack of 
information 
systems 
Well-connected 
internally and 
externally only with 
customers.  
Lack of information 
systems 
Quality of 
Information 
Relatively high. Low Low Low 
Willingness to 
Share Information 
Relatively high. Unwilling to share information 
SC Partnering 
Built up partner 
relationships with a few 
SC partners. 
Superficial partnership with SC partners 
Supplier 
Development 
Adopted 
Mutual Trust 
Trust with strategic SC 
partners. 
Very low 
Power asymmetry 
Relatively equal 
relationship. 
Significant 
Process 
Integration 
Substantial process integration is required. 
JIT Initiative Daily or hourly JIT delivery Unsuitable 
Daily or hourly JIT 
delivery 
Lean 
Manufacturing 
Relatively better than 
other Chinese 
manufacturers. 
Low level 
S&OP Process Need to be formalized Very immature 
VMI  Disadvantaged by VMI Unsuitable Disadvantaged by VMI 
Distribution 
Process  
Not designed 
Collaborative 
Synchronization 
Not observed 
 SC Visibility Not available 
Synchronized DP Not observed 
IO Not observed 
Collaborative 
Innovation 
Not observed 
Major  
Barriers 
- Lack of awareness of SCC. 
- Lack of trust. 
- Abuse of mediated power. 
- Transactional relationship. 
- Weak information sharing capability. 
- Institutional constraints including lack of legal protection, unstable government 
policies and culture. 
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The partner relationship between all four companies and their SC partners was mainly 
superficial and transactional. While Company A had built up collaborative relationships 
with a few strategic SC partners underpinned by high levels of mutual trust, the 
relationships between this company and all its non-strategic SC partners were mainly 
at arm’s length. In general, the level of mutual trust between all four companies and 
their SC partners was generally very low. Power asymmetry between Companies B, C, 
D and their SC partners was significant. Abuse of coercive power by leading focal 
manufacturing firms was prevalent. Instead of sharing costs and risks with SC partners, 
these companies intended to maximize their own interests and push all costs and risks 
to upstream suppliers. Nevertheless, supplier development initiatives had been 
employed by all companies and their SC partners to enhance SCM capability of the 
suppliers.  
The SC processes of all four companies needed substantial integration and 
optimization. The manufacturing processes of those companies were mainly labour 
intensive, with low added-value and limited know-how. Those processes were designed 
and subdivided so that uneducated new workforces could be recruited and trained 
within half an hour to become skilled workers. Limited advanced machinery was 
deployed to improve efficiency and quality. It is believed that large amounts of waste 
and redundancy could be eliminated through simplified design, reasonable layout, 
streamlined processes, and continuous improvement.   
Collaborative synchronization between the four companies and their SC partners was 
very limited. Owning to the weak information sharing capability, SC visibility was 
generally very low. Collaborative planning and forecasting was inaccurate because of 
the poor quality of information shared between parties. Consequently, the bullwhip 
effect was prominent and could not be eliminated even though the practice of 
collaborative planning and forecasting was adopted. VMI was employed primarily to 
push inventory costs to upstream suppliers rather than to maximize the benefits of the 
entire SC. As a result, the significant benefits of SCC could not be capitalized to attain 
competitive advantage. 
The common major barriers encountered by all four companies include lack of 
awareness of SCC, lack of mutual trust, abuse of coercive power, transactional 
relationship, weak information sharing capability, and institutional constraints, such as 
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the lack of legal protection, unstable government policies, and traditional Chinese 
culture.  
5.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has made a cross-case comparison between the collaborative behaviours 
of the four manufacturing firms under investigation. The collaborative practices of the 
four manufacturing firms were classified into different levels according to their 
performances on five major perspectives. Pursuant to the within-case analysis and 
cross-case comparison made in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively, the next chapter 
will discuss the research findings and develop a framework of SCC for CMFs.   
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CHAPTER 6 Findings and Discussion 
This chapter provides an overview of the research findings. The main characteristics of 
SCC of the Chinese E & E manufacturing firms are discussed first. Then, weaving 
together the research findings and the literature, the key elements of and the 
institutional barriers to successful SCC in China are analysed.   
6.1 Overview of the Findings 
Drawing from AT, SET, Institutional Theory, and SCC literature, the present research 
sought to provide insights on how effectively SCC is being implemented by the Chinese 
manufacturers. This research empirically examined the five key elements of and seven 
institutional barriers to the successful implementation of SCC by the firms under 
investigation (see Table 6.1). The findings reveal that multiple Western SCC practices 
are being implemented by the Chinese E & E manufacturing firms. However, they are 
not adopted in whole but are partially imitated by the firms for maximization of their own 
short-term benefits at the expense of the overall SC performance and efficiencies. 
Table 6.1 Summary of Research Findings 
Key Elements Findings 
1. SC Objective Alignment 
Executive sponsorship was critical to the successful 
implementation of SCC practices. 
2. SC Partnering 
Superficial partnership was the dominating relationship 
among Chinese firms.  
3. Information Sharing Level of information sharing was far from desirable.  
4. Process Integration 
Partial imitation of Western practices had been used to take 
advantage of SC partners.  
5. Collaborative 
Synchronization   
Advanced collaborative synchronization was not observed.    
Institutional Barriers 
1. Lack of awareness of SCC 
2. Lack of trust 
3. Abuse of power 
4. Transactional relationship 
5. Weak information sharing capability 
6. Insufficient government effort and innovation 
7. Guanxi 
 
The findings of the present research corroborate all four underpinning theories used. 
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They show that the Chinese manufacturers and their SC partners behave 
opportunistically for own benefits and tend to exploit each other, which is consistent 
with the tenet of traditional AT. The results also exhibit that there is increasing 
collaboration between CMFs and their strategic SC partners in an effort to obtain 
collaborative competitive advantage, which is in line with both contemporary AT and 
ERBV. The findings further demonstrate that the level of trust between manufacturing 
firms and their SC partners can be enhanced or worsened, which coincides with the 
reward proposition and the aggression proposition of SET. The study also indicates that 
institutional factors exert considerable impact on how manufacturers implement SCC, 
which corroborates Institutional Theory.     
6.2 Characteristics of SCC in the Chinese E & E Manufacturing 
Industry 
The following unique characteristics of the SCC elements in China were observed: 
6.2.1 Executive Sponsorship 
For the element of SCOA, the findings indicate that executive sponsorship was critical 
to the successful implementation of SCC practices among the CMFs. This is consistent 
with the outcome of many other studies that confirm the significance of executive 
sponsorship in SCC initiatives (Mentzer et al., 2000; Ellram, 1991c; Frankel et al., 2002; 
Daugherty et al., 1996; Bowersox et al., 2003; Fawcett et al., 2008a; Pagell, 2004; 
Baumann and Andraski, 2010). Executive sponsorship plays a key role in the effective 
implementation of SCC in terms of communicating shared SC vision, deploying 
valuable resources, sharing useful information and fostering collaborative relationship 
with strategic SC partners (Wu et al., 2014; Li and Lin, 2006; Mentzer et al., 2000). The 
involvement of executive sponsorship is considered to be the most critical factor for the 
success of collaborative programs (Krause and Ellram, 1997; Modi and Mabert, 2007). 
Especially in China, executive sponsorship is the single most important factor for the 
adoption of new initiatives (Chen and Wu, 2007; Chen et al., 2010). This is because in 
the Chinese culture the senior executive in charge is the only person in the company 
to make all decisions. Without the support of executive sponsorship, the chances of 
success in embracing SCC initiatives by the CMFs would be very slim. The findings of 
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the present research corroborate those of previous research by emphasizing the 
importance of executive sponsorship in the implementation of SCC by Chinese 
manufacturers. 
6.2.2 Superficial Partnership 
For the element of SC Partnering, the findings suggest that superficial partnership is 
the dominating type of relationship between the investigated Chinese manufacturers 
and their suppliers. Superficial partnership is observed by some SC scholars to be a 
common approach adopted in Western countries (Szwejczewski et al., 2005; SMMT 
and DTI, 1994). This type of relationship is also described as close but adversarial 
(Mudambi and Helper,1998) or collaboration without trust (MacDuffie and Helper, 2006), 
which implies that collaboration is built up without embedded mutual trust and 
commitment. MacDuffie and Helper (2006) further explain that it is easy to set up the 
formal aspect of collaborative alliance between SC partners, but very difficult to develop 
the informal mutual trust and commitment that is closely associated with historical 
reciprocity between both parties.  
Traditionally, the buyer-supplier relationship in China has been kept at arm’s-length or 
is adversarial. Mutual suspicion is inherent in collaborative activities. Although SC 
partners might work together to create synergy, they do not trust each other. This finding 
is in line with AT, which argues that, in agency relationships, given that profit 
maximization and self-interest persist, the principal attempts to minimise agency costs 
while the agent inclines to maximize rewards (Eisenhardt,1989b; Fleisher, 1991). In the 
SC context, conflict between buyers and suppliers exists constantly, and the SC 
member is likely to attempt to exploit other members (Ketchen Jr. and Hult, 2007). 
Especially in China, the level of trust between buyer and supplier is generally low, which 
would not be improved easily because of the establishment of partnership on its own. 
As a result, the so-called partnership is often transactional in nature. The finding of this 
research further validates the prevalence of superficial partnerships between the 
Chinese E & E manufacturing firms. 
6.2.3 Low Level of Information Sharing Capability 
For the element of information sharing, the findings reveal that the level of information 
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sharing between the Chinese E & E manufacturing firms is very low. This corroborates 
existing research findings (Chen et al., 2007; Lockstrom et al., 2010). Mostly as in 
requested by international or domestic customers, CMFs have started to build up IOS, 
but while rarely acknowledging the strategic importance of information sharing to 
business success. Some of them have invested large amounts of funding in various 
types of information technology during the past few years. However, only very limited 
information has been shared between SC partners, let alone the realization of the 
strategic value of information systems. This is because a variety of problems were 
encountered by most firms during the implementation of inter-organizational 
information systems, which can manifest not only in inadequate and fragmented 
physical information connectivity but also in strong cultural unwillingness to share 
information.  
Previous research asserts that huge investment and great effort in information sharing 
would not ensure business success unless there is a co-existence of physical 
information linkages up and down the SC, and a well-cultivated information-sharing 
culture between SC partners (Fawcett et al., 2007; Fawcett et al., 2008b; Fawcett et al., 
2011; Prajogo and Olhager, 2012; Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; Min et al., 2005). 
Apparently, the CMFs are naïve in both IT implementation and information-sharing 
skills. In this sense, the present study reveals the weakness of the CMFs’ information-
sharing capabilities, and points out the urgency for them to make substantial 
improvement in this regard.  
6.2.4 Partial Imitation of SCC Processes 
For the element of process integration, partial imitation of SCC processes prevails 
among CMFs. Findings from the interviews reveal that a variety of SCC practices have 
been employed by different firms, which suggests an increasing trend of the adoption 
of SCC by the industry in recent years. This is consistent with contemporary AT, which 
asserts that the rivalry for self-interest and profit maximization will ultimately be 
substituted by cooperation and collaboration in an effort to generate added-value for 
consumers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989b). However, most of the 
SCC processes were incorrectly implemented by CMFs. Under hyper-competitive 
market pressure, managers try to seek solutions to reduce costs and increase profit. 
Page 161 / 220 
 
While SCM and SCC are frequently considered to be able to meet these purposes 
effectively, SCM and SCC initiatives are easily accepted. Owing to a lack of deep 
understanding about the nature of SCC, or to deliberately manipulating standard 
operations for opportunistic aims, firms commonly take a local perspective, borrowing 
the concept of SCC to solve immediate problems and reap short-term benefits. This is 
in line with Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) and Fisher (1997), who observe that SC 
partners habitually have a local perspective, operating as a separate unit and 
conducting opportunistic behaviour. Partial imitation of some facets of the successful 
SCC models is unlikely to create value and advantage, because this kind of behaviour 
occurs at the expense of other members and diminishes overall profitability. Thus, it is 
very unwise for the CMFs to continue to implement SCC practices in an adversarial 
manner.  
6.2.5 Lack of Advanced Collaborative Synchronization    
For the element of collaborative synchronization, neither on-site observation nor 
subsequent analysis of research findings has revealed any advanced collaborative 
synchronization. The existing collaborative initiatives are confined to initial coordinative 
activities, such as the exchange of operational information with suppliers and the 
sharing of planning and forecasts by international customers. Given the current low 
level of information-sharing capability, superficial partner relationships, and lack of 
knowledge of SCM, it can be argued that the realization of advanced collaborative 
synchronization appears to be a great challenge for CMFs.  
In summary, the observations reveal that, for the CMFs, four out of the five key 
elements of successful SCC implementation are either non-existent or being used by 
individual firms for local benefit at the expense of the overall performance of the entire 
SC. SCOA, as a result of strong executive sponsorship, is the only element that serves 
as a driver for SCC implementation in a couple of cases. These findings clearly indicate 
that SCC among the CMFs is still at a “brewing” stage, with various capabilities to 
develop and barriers to overcome before an advanced and a mature stage of 
collaboration can be reached. 
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6.3 Institutional Barriers to SCC 
Based on the analysis of research findings, some institutional barriers that significantly 
inhibit the implementation of SCC between SC partners were repeatedly mentioned by 
the interviewed managers. These barriers include lack of awareness of SCC, low trust 
dynamics, abuse of mediated power, weak information-sharing capabilities, 
transactional relationships, insufficient government effort and innovation, and Guanxi. 
In comparison with the proposed theoretical framework presented at the beginning of 
the present thesis, abuse of mediated power is revealed to be an additional major 
barrier. As weak information-sharing capabilities and transactional relationships have 
been discussed as part of the characteristics of SCC in the Chinese context above, 
only the other five major barriers are to be discussed in the following sections. 
6.3.1 Lack of Awareness of SCC  
Being consistent with existing research findings (Handfield and McCormac, 2005; Daly 
and Cui, 2003), the outcome of the present research indicates that lack of awareness 
of SCC among the CMFs is common. It is observed that the interviewed senior 
managers rarely had comprehensive understanding about the meaning of SCM and 
SCC, let alone holding a SC vision and collaborative attitude. Consequently, the 
implementation of SCC practices tends to be superficial, and the effectiveness of those 
approaches is largely undermined. Easton (2003) observes that finding and retaining 
professionals in the SCM discipline is one of the most difficult tasks for CMFs. 
Consequently, lack of awareness of SCC will remain as one of the major barriers to the 
extensive collaboration of CMFs for some time to come. 
6.3.2 Low Trust Dynamics 
The present research findings disclose that the Chinese E & E manufacturers and 
suppliers are in a vicious circle of low trust dynamics. This means that a low level of 
trust leads to disbelief and misunderstanding which, in turn, further undermines the low 
level of trust (Fox, 1973). The interviewed managers uncover that the focal 
manufacturers did not trust the suppliers owing to the fact that the latter frequently 
conduct opportunistic behaviours for maximization of their own benefits. As a result, the 
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focal manufacturers have to strictly control as much information as possible and heavily 
rely on very detailed contracts or monitoring mechanisms to prevent potential unethical 
activities of their suppliers, so that they would not suffer heavily from inferior 
components or unexpected supply disruptions. As managers from the focal 
manufacturing firms pointed out repeatedly, they could not trust their suppliers, 
otherwise their companies would be in trouble.  
On the other hand, suppliers did not trust the focal manufacturers either. Suppliers 
seldom believe that focal manufacturers would truly consider their interests. They try to 
withhold as much information as they can, especially related to cost and core 
technology, so that they do not lose their negotiation power in the transactions. As the 
managers of those suppliers emphasized constantly, they could not trust the 
manufacturers since the latter never really cared about the benefits of the former but 
tried every means possible to take advantage of the former. This finding is consistent 
with SET, which stipulates that organizational attitudes and behaviours are contingent 
upon the rewarding and penalizing responses of the exchange partners (Homans, 1958; 
Emerson, 1976; Blau, 1964).  
This low trust phenomenon is deeply and culturally embedded in the Chinese 
manufacturer-supplier relationships. Most of the interviewed managers agreed that the 
low trust dynamics has been worsened as business competition is further increased. 
The possibility of making considerable improvement in the short term therefore seems 
remote. Sako (1997) argues that the mutually reinforcing nature of low trust between 
business partners makes it very difficult for both parties to take the first courageous 
step to break the vicious circle, as this will increase the vulnerability of the party that 
takes the initiative to disclose proprietary information. Especially in a country like China 
with an ineffective legal system, any effort to display trustworthiness to business 
partners could be taken advantage of easily. Neither the manufacturers nor the supplier 
are willing to make the first attempt to develop trust, with the manufacturers preferring 
to further the monitoring and enforcing of their supplier’s compliance with the much-
specified contract terms. 
However, the critical importance of trust to collaboration success has been highlighted 
by a large body of literature (Sako, 1997; Sako and Helper, 1998; Fawcett et al., 2004; 
Johnston et al., 2004; Cai et al., 2010; Mentzer et al., 2001; Fawcett et al., 2008b; 
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MacDuffie and Helper, 2006; Zhao et al., 2008; Ha et al., 2011). Lack of trust not only 
increases transaction costs (Ryu et al., 2008; Beccerra and Gupta, 1999) associated 
with monitoring, inspection and enforcement, but also prevents the value of SCC from 
being fully tapped (Beccerra and Gupta, 1999; Sako, 1997; Easton, 2003). In order to 
reap the benefits of enhanced competitiveness, which can only be generated through 
collaborative effort, vicious low trust dynamics have to be ameliorated eventually. It 
would be important for the Chinese manufacturers and their suppliers to make a move 
to work towards establishing trust without further hesitation.  
6.3.3 Abuse of Mediated Power 
In line with Gulati and Sytch (2007), our research findings unveil that Chinese E & E 
manufacturers tend to abuse mediated power, i.e. coercive power, reward power, and 
legitimate power (French Jr. and Raven, 1959), to exploit dependence-disadvantaged 
suppliers. While the escalating competition continues to squeeze the already razor-thin 
profit margins, focal manufacturers tend to seek immediate solutions by leveraging their 
power advantages to appropriate more gains at the expense of the weaker SC partners. 
Having limited knowledge about the negative impact of the exploitative use of power 
advantage in the long term on the entire SC, or deliberately resorting to traditional 
practices for prompt benefits, the Chinese focal manufacturers keep pushing 
boundaries and forcing their suppliers to comply with their unreasonable requests. 
Being vulnerable to the influence of customers’ decisions and to the lack of effective 
mechanisms for monitoring customers’ behaviours, the suppliers usually have no 
choice but to satisfy the customers’ requests. Our research findings echo those of 
Nyaga et al. (2013), who contend that, in buyer-supplier relationships with significant 
power asymmetry, the powerful buyers are likely to take advantage of the weaker 
suppliers. Having limited options and being fearful of losing business, the latter could 
be coerced into a disproportionate distribution of gains and costs. However, the 
powerful party should be also aware that forced participation leads to exit behaviour if 
opportunity arises (Mentzer et al., 2001).  
6.3.4 Insufficient Government Effort and Innovation 
The research outcomes support the view that insufficient government effort and 
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innovation is one of the most substantial barriers to the realization of successful SCC 
in China. The institutional environment in China has long been complained about due 
to inconsistent government policies and economic uncertainty (Feuling, 2008; Luo, 
2007; Luo et al., 2012), as well as continuous changes in regulations (Lau et al., 2002). 
Similar to Su et al. (2008), most of the interviewed managers were deeply concerned 
about unstable economic policies and regulations that have considerably affected the 
SCC operations and performances. For instance, the heavy investment made by the 
Chinese government in the real estate market, instead of formulating supportive 
policies for the development of the manufacturing industry, has exerted a negative 
impact. Driven by brutal competition, continuously mounting cost, and shrinking profit 
margins, many manufacturing firms have lost confidence in the future of the Chinese 
manufacturing industry. This situation has intensified their unwillingness to make further 
investment in collaboration facilities. Instead, they would rather pour huge investment 
into the booming real estate market, which could provide higher profit returns. As Kong 
et al. (2016) point out, excessive investment in the real estate by the Chinese 
government has reduced investment in the manufacturing industry, which is very 
harmful for the growth of the entire economy. Apparently, insufficient government effort 
in formulating supportive economic policies has negatively impacted the development 
of the manufacturing industry and made manufacturers less motivated to invest in SCC. 
 
Insufficient government effort in intellectual property protection and information security 
issues is also mentioned by the managers during the interviews. They expressed 
hesitation in their investment in technology and research due to deep concern about 
the effectiveness of Chinese intellectual property law. Innovations can be easily 
imitated by peers and are rarely protected by the Chinese law. Manufacturers have to 
be extremely cautious about information security. On the other hand, the extensive 
information sharing between SC partners for advanced collaboration seems unrealistic. 
Consequently, enhanced government effort in intellectual property laws and information 
security has to be made promptly.  
6.3.5 Guanxi 
Guanxi is an unwritten rule for businesses to operate in the Chinese context. It might 
be able to facilitate collaboration as some researchers have argued (Chen et al., 2010). 
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However, the managers from different companies all believed that the importance of 
guanxi for their outsourcing decision making is moderate. Although guanxi can be used 
by suppliers to get business opportunities, the final decision of the manufacturer is 
made based on the competitiveness of the supplier in terms of price, quality, service, 
and other aspects of performance. This means that guanxi does not guarantee the 
preference or priority as it used to do. Some managers even stated that they do not 
prefer to use suppliers with guanxi as it disturbs the selection process and objective 
decision-making. This might be because, in order to make themselves competitive 
enough, manufacturers have to choose the most competitive suppliers as their partners 
for collaboration. Some managers also mentioned that guanxi could be a barrier to 
promoting information-sharing capabilities, as a few major suppliers lack information 
technologies and pay no attention to the importance of information sharing. Overall, 
guanxi is regarded as having a negative impact on to the implementation of SCC by 
Chinese manufacturers.  
6.4 The Capability-based Strategic Framework of SCC 
In Chapter 2, a tentative strategic framework was initially developed from existing 
literature to guide this research. This framework has to be refined according to the 
empirical outcome of this research generated through critical analysis of data. Based 
on the research findings and the current SCC literature, a capability-based strategic 
framework was developed as an effective guide to enhance SCC capabilities of CMFs 
(see Figure 6.1). Being consistent with the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 
2, this strategic framework comprises the five key elements of and seven institutional 
barriers to SCC of the CMFs. Contrasting to the theoretical framework which shows 
only the linkages of key elements and obstacles to the realization of successful SCC, 
this improved outcome-based strategic framework is able to depict the inter-
relationships between the five key elements and seven major barriers. The framework 
is capability-focused because it explicitly points out the five key capabilities that are 
essential to successful SCC among the CMFs. They are, adequate organizational 
capability, collaborative relationship capability, strategic information-sharing capability, 
sophisticated process capability, and advanced synchronized capability. This 
framework thus provides actionable insights for practitioners to build key capabilities 
for the successful implementation of SCC, to attain a competitive edge.  
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The building process of SCC capabilities can mainly be divided into four stages – (1) 
Initiation stage; (2) Preparation stage; (3) Capability-building stage; and (4) Maturation 
stage. The Initiation stage aims at building up the basic organizational capability 
through the alignment of common objectives between SC members and the 
involvement of executive sponsorship of different organizations. The Preparation stage 
focuses on the development of collaborative relationship capability and information 
sharing capability.  Upon development of the three fundamental capabilities, i.e. 
organizational capability, collaborative relationship capability and strategic information-
sharing capability, the Capability-building stage, which involves more sophisticated 
process integration, can be facilitated. As manufacturers and suppliers keep improving 
inter-organizational process capability, they would understand more the importance of 
SCC, become more committed to the partnership, and continuously enhance their 
willingness to share valuable information in a timely manner. When the first four basic 
capabilities are cultivated, the Maturation stage featuring advanced collaborative 
synchronization capability can ultimately be achieved. There is no sharp dividing line 
between the different stages of collaboration, as this process is evolutionary and 
progressing over time (Ellram, 1991a and Cooper et al., 1997).     
As shown in the framework (Figure 6.1), solid lines indicate the observed impacts of 
major barriers on each key element. Dotted lines indicate the anticipated interative 
impacts between each key element, which have been reported in existing literature but 
yet to be achieved by CMFs. The following section will provide a detailed description of 
each of the key elements and sub-elements.  
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6.4.1 SCOA 
SCOA (see Figure 6.1) is the starting point of the implementation of SCC initiatives, 
which helps to attain organizational capability. It enables every SC member to develop 
understanding of the common objectives of the entire SC. It also requires each SC 
member to understand that the alignment of objectives is central to successful 
collaboration (Mentzer, 1993; Cai and Yang, 2008; Yan and Dooley, 2014; Frankel et 
al., 2002). Only when the entire SC works towards the same direction can collaborative 
effort of all chain members create ultimate competitiveness. SCOA constitutes 
prerequisites for all other collaborative activities. Most of the interviewed managers 
stated that they attempt to align common goals with key suppliers by signing up 
agreements. However, suppliers tend to overpromise and end up breaching the 
agreements readily for more profits, or simply do not believe that customers would truly 
care about their interests. Not surprisingly, all the effort in the alignment of common 
objectives between buyers and suppliers would thus turn out to be in vain. This is 
because, even though common objectives were set, each of the chain members would 
keep focusing on its own benefit and ignore the benefits of other parties, or even worse, 
jeopardize the interests of the weaker parties. This type of zero-sum game mind-set of 
the CMFs is harmful to all collaborative attempts. Crucially, focal manufacturers have 
to take the interests of their suppliers into consideration and appropriately align 
common goals with them, rather than using strong power asymmetry to force them to 
sign agreements. Given that most of the collaborative decisions are made by 
executives, the involvement of executive sponsorship is essential for the alignment of 
SC objectives. Put simply, all participants of the SC have to work towards the same 
direction so that the common goals can be achieved.   
SCOA is the precursor to other collaborative initiatives. It serves as a guide for the other 
four key elements. Only with properly aligned SC objectives would the enhancement of 
other key elements be meaningful. Properly aligned SC objectives between SC 
partners are likely to help foster close partner relationships by restricting opportunistic 
behaviours. SCOA also promotes information sharing between SC partners, given that 
all participants work towards the same direction. It sets up common goals for SC 
members, therefore facilitating process integration and enabling collaborative 
synchronization. 
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6.4.1.1 Executive Sponsorship  
Executive sponsorship (see Figure 6.1) is the sub-element of SCOA. Alignment of SC 
objectives must be supported by executive sponsorship of all SC members involved in 
the SCC initiative. Executive sponsorship from every SC organization has to be 
involved from the start of SCOA process. Only when executive sponsorship initiates the 
implementation of SCC practices can the chances of success be increased. Many 
managers interviewed in the present study emphasized that only executives can 
provide the persuasive influence to promote all employees within the organization to 
embrace SCC initiatives. Otherwise, staff members would not believe in the move. 
Many scholars in SCM area agree that executive sponsorship is especially necessary 
for the removal of internal resistance and scepticism to new concepts like SCC 
(Ramesh et al., 2010; Frankel et al., 2002; Vieira et al., 2009; Maheshwari et al., 2006). 
During the deployment of SCC initiatives, executives have to be there to promote 
awareness of SCC within the organization. They play key roles in terms of setting rules 
of collaboration, allocating resources, and settling disputes. In addition, with executive 
sponsorship, organizational capability can be improved in that all functions and 
individuals have to make an effort to make changes and adapt to the new initiative. 
Without the strong and steady support from top management, the alignment of SC 
objectives in the Chinese context would be unachievable. 
With the commitment of executive sponsorship of all SC members, SC objectives are 
more likely to be aligned, partner relationships are more likely to be fostered, and 
information is more likely to be shared between SC partners. Streamlining and 
integrating inter-organizational SC processes requires strong support or even the 
championship of executive sponsorship. Especially, executive sponsorship is critical to 
the success of S&OP process and cross-organizational collaborative synchronization. 
In essence, executive sponsorship is fundamental to the implementation of SCC 
initiatives.  
6.4.1.2 Incentive Alignment 
Proper incentive alignment (see Figure 6.1) between SC partners has a positive impact 
on collaborative relationships. It is also critical to the success of SCC. The interviewed 
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managers frequently mentioned that incentive misalignment is common between 
manufacturers and suppliers. Manufacturers tend to appropriate most of the gains 
obtained from collaborative efforts, while pushing all the costs and risks to suppliers. 
The latter are forced to bear extra costs incurred due to the adoption of collaborative 
activities initiated by the former, but are rarely rewarded. Consequently, the majority of 
suppliers have lost their confidence in collaboration with manufacturers, given that 
suppliers’ interests are seldom considered. Obviously, this phenomenon is contrary to 
the anticipated compensation fairness between SC partners pursuing collaborative 
goals. 
Many past studies have highlighted, the fair distribution of gains and costs is crucial to 
the achievement of SCC (Zhao et al., 2008; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2004; 
Matopoulos et al., 2007; Narayanan and Raman, 2004). Narasimhan et al. (2008) 
suggest that rewards and incentives should be used to demonstrate an intention of the 
powerful partner to have a long-term collaboration with the weaker partner, so that the 
latter could value the relationship and accommodate requirements for joint activities. 
SET posits that the willingness to share gains by the powerful partner incentivizes the 
reciprocation of positive actions by partners (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Logan, 2000). As such, 
an incentive alignment mechanism has to be built to motivate SC members to work 
towards their mutual strategic objectives and ensure optimal decisions are made for 
the entire SC (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005b).  
6.4.2 SC Partnering 
SC partnering (see Figure 6.1) is one of most critical determinants of successful SCC. 
It is the most capricious and intricate facet of collaboration, while essential to all 
collaboration activities (Lambert et al., 2004). The aim of this key element is to nurture 
a collaborative relationship capability. Findings in the present research reveal that the 
current SC partnership between CMFs is mainly adversarial in nature. Buyer and 
supplier might work together for a common purpose when necessary. Nevertheless, 
they might also constantly negotiate with each other for a bigger share of benefits. Both 
parties could be opportunistic thus exploiting the other party whenever possible. As 
some managers pointed out the so-called partnership is purely transactional. With a 
transactional partnership, both parties are price-oriented and tend to vigorously pursue 
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their own interests (Williamson, 1998). This type of partner relationship discourages 
information sharing (Sako, 1994; Mahapatra et al., 2010), inhibits the fair distribution of 
gains and risks between SC partners (Cooper and Gardner, 1993; Hoyt and Huq, 2000), 
and hinders knowledge transfer (He et al., 2011). The superficial partnership between 
the Chinese manufacturers and their suppliers would impede the implementation of 
SCC, therefore losing the feasibility to generate a collaborative competitive edge. This 
situation would be fatal to the future of the entire manufacturing industry. Consequently, 
it can be argued that both manufacturers and suppliers are necessary to understand 
the significance of real partnership in successful collaboration, and develop 
collaborative partnerships with strategic partners (Goffin et al., 2006). With continuous 
effort, partnerships will develop gradually based on mutually satisfied performance and 
steady cultivation of trust (Ellram, 1991c). Only when collaborative partnership is 
established would it be possible for SC partners to leverage SCC to create synergy, 
improve operational performance, and acquire collaborative competitiveness. Based 
on the findings of this research, the closeness of partnership is largely determined by 
four sub-elements, namely incentive alignment, supplier development, mutual trust, 
and power asymmetry.  
6.4.2.1 Supplier Development  
Supplier development (see Figure 6.1) is an effective way to improve supplier 
performances and capabilities therefore enhancing manufacturer-supplier relationships. 
Supplier development activities promote an atmosphere of cooperation (Sanchez-
Rodriguez et al., 2005; Humphreys et al., 2005), which encourages continuous 
collaboration and long-term partnership (Hartley and Choi, 1996). According to the 
interviewed managers, a variety of supplier development initiatives have been 
employed by the CMFs, but most of these initiatives are limited to basic technology 
assistance. It can be argued that those manufacturers have started to understand the 
importance of suppliers to their success. One of the interviewed managers emphasized 
that if they do not treat suppliers well, the latter would not share their latest innovations 
with the former. However, the investment in resources and time made by manufacturers 
on supplier development is primarily confined to quick problem fixes, and often comes 
with conditions for immediate price reduction or profit return. More advanced supplier 
development initiatives, such as asset specific investment by the manufacturer, are 
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rarely observed. 
Traditionally, suppliers of the Chinese manufacturing industry feature family workshop, 
lack of high technology, and short-term interest-oriented family businesses. Both 
manufacturers and suppliers have no intention to make investment in continuous 
learning and transfer of tacit knowledge internally or externally. To enable them to 
compete in a global market, manufacturers need their suppliers to upgrade 
performance and capabilities to not only match their requirements but also enhance 
their competitive edge. Unfortunately, owing to a lack of resources and knowledge, 
many suppliers are less capable of catching up with the customers’ advances. It is 
essential for manufacturers to guide suppliers and enable both parties to engage in 
continuous learning and knowledge-sharing activities, instead of frequently replacing 
their suppliers, so that suppliers can make improvement and enhance capabilities.  
6.4.2.2 Mutual Trust  
Mutual trust (see Figure 6.1) is a key relational mechanism in governing and 
coordinating inter-organizational activities (Lai et al., 2008; Ireland and Webb, 2007). It 
is deemed to be the cornerstone for the development of a satisfactory partnership 
(Johnson et al., 2004; Nyaga et al., 2010; Spekman, 1988). It is also identified as the 
most crucial prerequisite and facilitator to the success of inter-organizational 
collaboration (Fawcett et al., 2008a; Ryu et al., 2009). While low trust dynamics was 
the dominant theme discussed by most of the managers interviewed, this research also 
observed the existence of goodwill trust between limited numbers of strategic SC 
partners. This finding implies that a high level of mutual trust can be nurtured even in 
an environment in which low trust is ubiquitous.  
Hallen et al. (1991) consider that the process of fostering mutual trust increasingly 
evolves, while trustworthiness is reciprocally and consecutively presented by partners. 
One of the interviewed managers noted that various forms of trust enhancement, such 
as accurate and timely information exchange, supplier development, investment in 
dedicated or specific assets, and long-term commitment, have been employed by his 
firm to entail the transitioning of contractual trust into goodwill trust. More specifically, 
reliable product quality and continuous cost reduction are provided to customers to 
indicate the firm’s competence in product quality and willingness to subordinate their 
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own immediate interests to a positive outcome for long-term mutual interests. 
Consequently, the supplier’s benevolence is rewarded by customers designating the 
supplier as the sole source of supply. Simultaneously, the firm provides technical and 
financial assistance, asset-specific investment, and long-term commitment to suppliers, 
to demonstrate its trustworthiness. In this way, the perceived likelihood that suppliers’ 
vulnerability would be exploited by this manufacturer is considerably lowered. As a 
result, this manufacturer’s favourable behaviours are appreciated by some strategic 
suppliers, who reciprocate commitment to the exchange relationship, although these 
initiatives are also disadvantaged by speculative behaviours of a small number of 
suppliers. As both parties have engaged in the constant exchange and maintenance of 
a high level of commitment and credibility, the contractual trust within the relationship 
gradually evolves to a high level of goodwill trust.   
This typical example of trust-building initiative sheds light on the possibility of the 
cultivation of goodwill trust between manufacturers and suppliers in China through a 
gradual evolving process. Sako (1997) demonstrates the feasibility of creating trust by 
the more powerful customers in the automobile industry by taking initiatives to commit 
to a relationship before receiving assurances of trust from the weaker suppliers. On the 
contrary, suppliers, as a weaker partner, normally feel vulnerable to make a 
commitment without promised reciprocation from the stronger customer. It can be 
argued that this approach could be borrowed and applied in the Chinese context to 
promote a culture of trust between manufacturers and suppliers, as the former in China 
usually has overwhelmingly greater influential power than the latter. If manufacturers 
could be proactive and step out of the established comfort zone to promote the 
development of mutual trust, suppliers would have greater confidence in the 
relationship and less concerns about opportunism in the relationship. Satisfied with 
each other’s performance and benevolence, it is expected that manufacturers and 
suppliers would dedicate continuous effort to the relationship (Corsten and Kumar, 
2005). Progressively, the low trust dynamics of the Chinese manufacturer-supplier 
relationship could be replaced by a high level of mutual trust which can facilitate 
openness to information sharing and realization of advanced SCC.   
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6.4.2.3 Power Asymmetry 
Power asymmetry (see Figure 6.1) is the most crucial factor in manufacturer and 
supplier relationships. There have been contradictory arguments about the impact of 
power asymmetry on SCC. While some researchers consider that power asymmetry 
encourages opportunism, which allows manufacturers to take advantage of suppliers, 
and is hence harmful to collaboration (Benton and Maloni, 2005; Jonsson and Zineldin, 
2003), many other scholars advocate that the presence of power asymmetry promotes 
SCC (Belaya et al., 2009; Crook and Combs, 2007; Maloni and Benton, 2000; Hingley, 
2005; Zhao et al., 2008; Cox, 1999; Cox, 2004). However, a vast majority of scholars 
assert that the exploitative use of power has a negative effect on partner relationships 
and supplier performance (Benton and Maloni, 2005; Johnson et al.,1993; Gulati and 
Sytch, 2007; Handley and Benton Jr., 2012; Jonsson and Zineldin, 2003).  
The interviewed managers of one of the Tier 1 suppliers disclosed that some leading 
manufacturers not only repeatedly coerced them to adjust processes and operations to 
meet their requirements but also demanded substantial price-cutting and unreasonable 
cost sharing. Having no choice, the supplier was forced to act opportunistically so that 
they would not lose money for the business. The opportunistic behaviours were later 
discovered and severely punished as the customer strictly monitored and controlled 
operations and product quality. Inevitably, the relationship between the manufacturer 
and the supplier ended up with dissatisfaction and termination. Bucklin and Sengupta 
(1993) point out that a coerced party may incline to seek possibilities to diminish its 
vulnerability, which may ultimately destroy the cooperation. Many other researchers 
also agree that the exercise of mediated power is very likely to have sizable negative 
effects on relationships, such as resentment, conflict, dissension, boycott and 
relationship termination (Munson et al., 1999; Jonsson and Zineldin, 2003; Benton and 
Maloni, 2005; Nyaga et al., 2013; Maloni and Benton, 2000; Handley and Benton Jr., 
2012). This finding is consistent with SET, which stipulates that buyer and supplier 
reciprocate reward and punishment (Emerson, 1976). Even though powerful firms 
appear to gain some benefits initially, the overall value creation reduces with the use of 
coercion, and buyer and supplier are most likely to both result in a lose-lose situation 
(Johnson et al., 1993, Gulati and Sytch, 2007).  
Historically, coercive tactics were adopted by the U.S. automotive industry to manage 
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buyer-supplier relationships, which consequently caused them to lose their competitive 
advantage to the Japanese rivals that preferred collaborative approaches (Cox, 1999). 
Over the past two decades, many U.S. firms have learned from their mistakes, and 
have started to employ relational tactics and take a long-term SC perspective to restore 
their competitive edge (Carter and Narasimhan, 1996). Thus, it is vital for Chinese 
manufacturers to avoid repeating the U.S. companies’ mistakes, because the whole 
industry cannot afford to lose competitiveness in the age of globalization.     
Nyaga et al. (2013) also suggest that coercive approaches should not be the choice for 
buyer-supplier relationships owing to the fact that such behaviours can be 
counterproductive. It is crucial for the Chinese manufacturers to understand the serious 
consequences of the exploitative use of mediated power. It is also imperative for them 
to reflect the power and dependency correctly, and use it in a more appropriate way so 
that a collaborative manufacturer-supplier relationship and win-win situation for both 
parties can be created for long-term success (Hansen and Rasmussen, 2013; Cox, 
2004; Maloni and Benton, 2000). In power-imbalanced relationships, it is further 
underscored that modifications to power approaches must originate from the powerful 
party (Benton and Maloni, 2005; Griffith et al., 2006). It is necessary for the powerful 
manufacturers to build up social indebtedness and demonstrate justice first, therefore 
encouraging reciprocity from suppliers. In this way, willingness to share proprietary 
information and adaptation to integrated inter-organizational processes can be 
promoted. Ultimately, competitiveness in the global market can be engendered through 
real collaborative relationships.  
6.4.3 Information Sharing  
Information sharing (see Figure 6.1) is the key enabler of cross-organizational 
collaboration. Effective information sharing allows companies to lower transaction costs 
and risk, and engage in collaborative initiatives to outperform competitors. The purpose 
of this key element is to enhance the strategic information-sharing capability of 
manufacturers. The present research reveals that the Chinese manufacturing firms 
have neither sufficient, reliable SC connectivity along the SC, nor cultural willingness 
to share information with SC partners. The interviewed managers repeatedly 
mentioned that information cannot be shared with other departments due to the 
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existence of information silos. Information also cannot be shared due to the 
incompatibility of information systems between channel members. Most of the 
interviewed managers firmly believe that proprietary information could not be shared 
with others. Obviously, multiple obstacles exist, and these hinder the transmission of 
information among SC partners. In order to facilitate SC-wide collaboration, these 
obstacles have to be eliminated and turned instead into drivers. Wu et al. (2014) 
recommend that, when focal firms endeavour to implement collaborative paradigms, 
they should first develop IT infrastructure and IOS to enable effective communication. 
As such, manufacturing firms need to build up SC connectivity first so that SC members 
can be electronically linked. In the meantime, willingness to share information with SC 
partners has to be nurtured progressively to support the seamless exchange of large 
amounts of data between SC partners. Information-sharing capability has to be 
embedded across the SC to facilitate close coordination and alignment of business 
processes and strategies between SC members (Wu et al., 2006), so that it can be 
developed into a unique competitive advantage. Frohlich and Westbrook (2002) 
stresses that manufacturers should strive to enhance upstream and downstream e-
integration whenever possible. Therefore, continuous effort has to be made by the 
Chinese manufacturers to strengthen their information-sharing capability.  
While successful partnership is a prerequisite for information sharing, the improved 
level of information-sharing capability in turn enhances SC relationships. It is also a key 
facilitator of cross-organizational process integration. Such capability is indispensable 
to the realization of collaborative synchronization, as collecting, analysing and 
disseminating real-time and dynamic information among SC participants is essential.  
6.4.3.1 Information Connectivity 
Information connectivity (see Figure 6.1) is the technical foundation of information 
sharing. It serves as the nervous system of an SC, connecting partners electronically, 
thereby enabling real-time communication and orchestration of collaborative activities. 
This research indicates that the CMFs lack integrated information linkage with SC 
partners. Many issues associated with undesirable information connectivity were 
revealed by the senior managers interviewed. For instance, most of the manufacturers 
investigated took the lead to install sophisticated IOSs, but failed. Large amounts of 
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investment had been made in this regard. However, there were too many issues which 
had to be resolved before those investments could be capitalized. Most of the firms 
installed more than three different information systems that did not communicate with 
each other. Many IOSs were available on the market, but none of them was customized 
to individual manufacturer’s business operations. Even worse, all of them were very 
expensive and fell short of their advertised performance. The implementation process 
of the new information systems caused radical changes in the work of many employees, 
and created a large amount of extra workload, therefore leading to strong resistance 
among the employees to make changes. Although being confronted with all of the 
above challenges, however, IT managers still have to move ahead by solving problems 
slowly, as they know that sharing information is the right trend to follow.  
Being unaware of the importance of information connectivity, most of the suppliers were 
unwilling to make heavy capital investment to get connected with their buyers. More 
importantly, they believed that, by using the traditional way of communication, their 
internal operation would not be invaded by powerful customers. As such, they were 
settled with outdated communication tools such as fax and telephone. It is hard to 
believe that some small-sized family suppliers do not have a computer and do not know 
how to use it at all. Clearly, an enormous amount of effort has to be made to improve 
SC-wide connectivity between the CMFs. Fawcett et al. (2007) suggests that 
manufacturing firms should try to avoid simply jumping into the trap of the technology 
bandwagon but choose the most suitable information systems for their own operations. 
Prior to implementation, IT managers need to improve their knowledge about available 
IOSs and enhance their managerial skill in implementing those systems. In this way, 
expensive investment in IT facilities would not be wasted, and the implementation and 
adaptation process would be less painful. Ye and Wang (2013) point out that, although 
Chinese manufacturers might be weak in IT implementation, integrated information 
systems do yield advantages for those firms, providing that information connectivity is 
successfully built up between SC partners. Hence, although enormous difficulties are 
yet to be overcome, CMFs need to continue building cross-organizational information 
connectivity so that the strategic value of information systems can be achieved in the 
near future.  
   
Page 179 / 220 
     
6.4.3.2 Willingness to Share 
Willingness to share information (see Figure 6.1) is a cultural driver for information 
sharing. Many scholars in the SCM discipline advocate that technology itself is 
insufficient for organizations to replicate the outstanding performance of the SC 
exemplars (Wu et al., 2006; Fawcett and Magnan, 2001; Constant et al., 1994). A high 
degree of willingness to share has to be cultivated to transform SC operations and 
processes for better performance and collaborative decision making.  
The strong unwillingness of the CMFs to share information with SC partners is a major 
impedance to effective information sharing. A large amount of useful information is only 
shared between limited numbers of SC dominators. Many interviewed managers stated 
that accurate forecasting and planning information shared by international customers 
is largely withheld by focal manufacturing firms, rather than being passed on to 
upstream suppliers to facilitate better planning. Some domestic manufacturers even 
deliberately manipulate forecast and planning information to lure suppliers to produce 
more than necessary. Frequently suffering from opportunistic behaviours and unethical 
activities of suppliers, and being deeply concerned about information security, focal 
manufacturers thus strictly control their information flow and only share as little as 
possible with SC partners. On the other hand, perceiving information as a form of power, 
suppliers were reluctant to share information with focal manufacturers as well. They 
believed that, once valuable and sensitive information is leaked, they would lose their 
bargaining power and become vulnerable, therefore being disadvantaged.  
Williamson (1988) argues that unwillingness to share information can minimize the 
benefits of investment in information technologies, given that critical information, such 
as on forecasting and planning, point of sale and inventory level, cannot be shared. 
While the CMFs are struggling to develop cross-organizational information connectivity 
between SC partners, cultural unwillingness to share would make the huge investment 
in various IOSs invalid. This circumstance seriously inhibits the implementation of 
integrated information systems among Chinese manufacturers, and presents a sizable 
hamper to the adoption of advanced SCC initiatives.    
Fawcett et al. (2011) contend that a company’s technological connectivity, in 
conjunction with its cultural willingness to share, determines how effectively 
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information-sharing capability can be leveraged for business success. Many 
researchers consider that a culturally embedded willingness to share information can 
enlarge the value of physical connectivity by sharing an increased amount of real-time, 
high quality information (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Lee et al., 2000; Mendelson, 
2000). As such, it is vital for the Chinese manufacturers to alter their attitude towards 
information sharing, while making enormous investment in the adoption of information 
technologies.  
To nurture a high degree of cultural willingness, increased training and resources need 
to be committed to improve awareness of the significance of a willingness to share and 
adopt proper organizational mechanisms, to promote information sharing between SC 
partners. Only when SC members understand the importance of a willingness to share, 
and start to exchange valuable information in a timely way with each other, can trust be 
gradually developed. Consequently, an increased amount of accurate and sensible 
information can be disseminated for collaborative decision making. SET stipulates that 
organizations are motivated to make more interactions when their behaviours are 
rewarded (Emerson, 1976). In addition, the more valuable to a member an exchange 
is, the more likely the member of the exchange is to perform the action again (Blau, 
1964). Many scholars also ascertain that sharing high quality information with SC 
partners indicates trustworthiness and may promote partners to proactively participate 
in information sharing (Baihaqi and Sohal, 2012; Moberg et al., 2003, Li and Lin, 2006). 
With the imperative importance of information sharing to business success in the age 
of big data, the Chinese manufacturers need to have a clear understanding of the 
current undesirable situation of information sharing, and take initiatives without 
hesitation so that successful implementation of SCC can be made possible.  
6.4.4 Process Integration  
The main purpose of process integration (see Figure 6.1) is to simplify, standardize and 
streamline various SC processes to reduce cost, remove redundancy, and improve 
efficiency (Flynn et al., 2010; Kim, 2006; Swink et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2011; 
Daugherty et at., 1996; Chen et al., 2009b). Process integration is one of the 
prerequisites for achieving collaboration with SC partners (Mentzer et al., 2000; Barratt, 
2004). It improves the level of performance significantly (Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001), 
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therefore making the realization of more advanced SCC possible. The goal of this key 
element is to develop the sophisticated process capability of manufacturers. Based on 
the observations of the manufacturing firms in the present study, many SC processes 
remain fragmented, being not effectively designed or efficiently coordinated, thus 
leading to many duplications and unnecessary steps. Different departments within a 
firm and multiple SC partners across the SC traditionally behave as functional silos and 
incline to optimize only their local subsystems. Many interviewed managers revealed 
that process integration became one of the major challenges for the achievement of 
SC synchronization, because of the extreme complexity of process rationalization, the 
involvement of too much information and relationships, and insufficient knowledge of 
SCM. Consequently, large amounts of effort and resources had to be deployed by the 
CMFs to promote process integration and therefore to pave the way for a high level of 
SCC. A seamless linkage between business processes and a smooth flow of materials 
and information has to be facilitated so that high efficiency can be achieved.  
Process integration can only be engendered by the development of the three 
fundamental elements, namely strategic objective alignment, long-term partnerships 
and information integration. It is essential for the successful implementation of 
advanced SCC at the later stage. 
Process integration is manifested in the following key aspects of business operations. 
Mature Lean and JIT manufacturing capability has to be developed to remove 
redundancies and inefficiencies. A formalized S&OP process has to be established to 
improve forecast accuracy and reach supply/demand maturity. VMI operation has to be 
standardized to improve overall SC performance and benefit both customers and 
suppliers. The distribution networks and processes have to be designed to reduce costs 
and improve responsiveness. Overall, this stage is to have basic organizational 
relationship capabilities and technological capabilities in place to make preparation for 
the most advanced collaborative synchronization. 
6.4.4.1 Streamlined Lean/JIT Operation 
With the alignment of common objectives between SC partners, the development of 
information-sharing capabilities, and the evolvement of partner relationships, basic 
process integration initiatives such as Lean/JIT (see Figure 6.1) become possible. The 
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objective of Lean/JIT initiatives is to eliminate all kinds of non-value-added activities 
except the minimum amount of resources that are absolutely essential to operations 
(Matsui, 2006; Shingo, 1985; Tucker and Davis, 1993; Womack & Jones, 1996). This 
is to seek continuous improvement in productivity, quality, flexibility and responsiveness 
to customer demand, through simplification of design, modularization of product, and 
standardization of components, production and processes (Hall, 1983; De Toni and 
Nassimbeni, 2000; Womack et al., 1990). Successful implementation of Lean/JIT is 
fundamental for the advancement of SCC. 
According to the interviewed managers, Lean/JIT approaches have been adopted by 
their firms where they are deemed appropriate. The degree of maturity however varied 
depending on how much effort had been made by the different firms. However, a 
majority of them struggled to tackle numerous challenges during the implementation of 
the Lean/JIT approaches. Based on this finding, it is considered that continuous 
improvement in Lean/JIT capabilities is essential for CMFs to embark on SCM 
initiatives and move towards ultimate synchronization capabilities.  
6.4.4.2 Formalized Sales and Operation Process 
A formalized S&OP process (see Figure 6.1) is a solidified demand/supply balancing 
process with the support of executive sponsorship and the expanded ownership across 
the enterprise (Ball, 2015). It is a process to align SC with organizational strategy to 
drive the priorities and performances across the SC (Russell, 2015). According to the 
descriptions of the interviewed managers, no formalized S&OP process has been 
formed by the manufacturers, and their demand planning and forecasting capability is 
very weak. Basically, demand planning and forecasting activities are solely conducted 
by the marketing or sales department, and then are utilised by other departments within 
the organization. Offering of inaccurate planning information to suppliers by 
opportunistic focal manufacturers diminishes the value of inter-organizational planning 
activities. Due to a lack of IT facilities and POS data, and low visibility of inventories 
throughout the pipeline, forecasting was made mainly based on estimation or rule of 
thumb. Having no awareness of an SC perspective and a lack of knowledge of SCM, 
forecast accuracy was measured based on how many products were produced against 
how many were delivered to the next downstream SC members. Consequently, 
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reaching supply/demand balance had remained a difficult task for those interviewed 
manufacturers. Thus, the development of a formalized S&OP process is an essential 
step for CMFs to improve their basic supply/demand matching capability.  
6.4.4.3 Standardized VMI Operation 
VMI (see Figure 6.1) is to let the supplier manage the inventory replenishment process 
on behalf of the customer. It entails transferring both responsibility and authority of the 
whole replenishment process from the customer to the supplier (Kaipai et al., 2002). 
The aim is to reduce inventory costs through collaboration between the customer and 
the supplier, such as by sharing of real-time demand information, to make better 
replenishment decisions so that both parties could reap the benefits as a result of 
efficient operations. According to the interviewed managers, VMI has been widely 
employed by both domestic and international customers. However, it appears to be an 
approach that provides far more benefits to the customer than to the supplier. VMI is 
partially adopted by domestic focal manufacturing firms to push their own risk of 
inventory keeping to upstream suppliers. However, accurate demand data has never 
been shared by the manufacturers with the suppliers to enable more efficient 
replenishment. Consequently, the suppliers suffered from the increased costs as a 
result of more frequent transportation of goods and longer inventory holding time. Put 
simply, VMI is used by a customer to reduce its own inventory costs at the expense of 
the supplier, rather than to create the desired bilateral positive outcome; which is 
contradictory to the basic philosophy of VMI. Dong et al. (2007) argue that VMI is 
unlikely to succeed if the operation is not arranged for mutual benefit. Thus, it is 
necessary for CMFs to standardize VMI operation so that VMI is used for the 
improvement of the overall SC efficiency, favourable to both customer and supplier as 
anticipated.  
6.4.4.4 Integrated Distribution Process 
Integrated distribution process (see Figure 6.1) means physical coordination and 
integration of inbound and outbound delivery activities, such as transport, material 
handling and storage (Bennett and Klug, 2012), to reduce variability, eliminate non-
value-added activities, and fulfil customer orders in a synergistic and cost-effective 
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manner (Frohlich and Westbrook, 2002; Treacy and Wiersema, 1993). In order to 
support the growing Omni-channel activities, direct-to-consumer fulfilments, and the 
Internet of Things (IoT), a more responsive and scalable distribution network and 
process has to be reengineered (Bond, 2015; Cunnane, 2013). Based on the on-site 
observations and the interviews with the managers, the present research finds that 
distribution processes of the CMFs are largely fragmented and undeveloped. Most of 
the interviewees considered that their distribution capability is very weak and that an 
upgrade to this capability is essential. Nevertheless, none of the interviewed 
manufacturing firms have commenced the design of a distribution network or the setting 
up of a distribution centre. Transportation of materials and goods is mainly contracted 
to 3PLs to cut costs. Apparently, a large amount of efforts and resources have to be 
allocated by CMFs to integrate distribution activities to achieve distribution excellence.  
6.4.5 Collaborative Synchronization 
Given the growth of Omni-channel fulfilment and B2B and B2C convergence, 
collaborative synchronization (see Figure 6.1) of supply and demand becomes the key 
capability that allows best-in-class corporations to stand out from their rivals. In 
essence, collaborative synchronization is to orchestrate all SC partners to operate in a 
mutually supportive, seamless and synergistic manner. It is the core and ultimate goal 
of SCC. The goal of this key element is to strive for ultimate advanced synchronization 
capability. Although this capability currently might seem hard to attain even by world-
leading performers, and the majority of the CMFs are not adequately equipped or 
operationally prepared to gain such advanced capabilities, it is imperative for CMFs to 
follow global leaders’ footsteps and take initiatives to enhance their synergistic 
capabilities if they aim at becoming world-class manufacturers.   
All the other four key elements, namely objective alignment, SC partnering, information 
sharing, and process integration, are prerequisites for the achievement of collaborative 
synchronization. Only if all the four other key capabilities have been evolved and 
improved to an advanced level, can realization of the collaborative synchronization be 
possible.   
In this research, collaborative synchronization is manifested in four building blocks, 
which are end-to-end SC visibility, synergistic planning and forecast, optimized 
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inventory and distribution, and collaborative innovation.   
6.4.5.1 End-to-End SC Visibility  
End-to-end SC visibility (see Figure 6.1) refers to the automated real-time access to 
the specific information regarding the status of event, cost, and physical movements of 
orders and inventories across multi-tiered global supply-demand networks (Heaney, 
2014). Gaining end-to-end SC visibility goes beyond basic track-and-trace capability. It 
requires a holistic view and granular control of information, so as to enable deep insight 
into specific situations that require agile responses to mitigate unexpected disruptions, 
eliminate waste or expedite delivery.  
SC visibility is a prerequisite for the realization of collaborative synchronization. Full 
visibility into multiple-staged inventories throughout the chain would enable 
manufacturers to consolidate all inventory information then eliminate buffers and put all 
inventory into play, to satisfy demand effectively. Only if manufacturers have visibility 
into demand and supply plans would it be possible for all partners to work jointly on the 
agreed schedules, rather than operating independently, to sub-optimize the local 
performance. Having a single view of supply and demand is the foundation for 
synchronization of SC activities collaboratively between all partners.  
6.4.5.2 Synergistic Planning and Forecasting 
Synergistic planning and forecasting (see Figure 6.1) moves beyond the basic 
demand/supply balance. It advances the basic S&OP process to become ‘the one plan 
for the business, the point of direction, and a predictive process model that drives 
priorities and performance’ (Ball, 2015, p. 2). Instead of looking at forecasting 
algorithms only, a more comprehensive process has to be performed to form a sound 
demand statement, measure accuracy, retain constant vigilance over divergences, and 
take corrective actions immediately. The basic S&OP process intends to be predictive 
and aggressive since it requires the organization to provide satisfied customer service 
using the most profitable method. At this stage, close internal and external collaboration 
is essential.  
SPF can be manifested in multiple more advanced capabilities. For instance, it requires 
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the ability to incorporate promotion and other demand-shaping activities, and to 
manage the business in a more prescriptive manner (Ball, 2012). It also requires the 
ability to optimize product portfolios, inventory and service levels from multiple 
perspectives, and to incorporate profit optimization into the decision process. The ability 
to conduct unconstrained and constrained scenario planning to maximize the utilization 
of all assets and eliminate fire-fighting is also needed. Similarly, the ability to sense 
channel demand by leveraging the existing data affecting current volatility in a timely 
and scalable manner, to improve very near-term forecasts (Cecere, 2014; Aberdeen 
Group, 2013; Kahn et al., 2006) is necessary. SPF also demands the ability to apply 
advanced analytics to facilitate intelligent responses, so that more future-looking 
suggestions and insights can be provided for decision making (Heaney, 2015). 
6.4.5.3 Optimized Inventory  
Proper optimization of inventory (see Figure 6.1) levels with volatile channel patterns 
to meet anticipated service level is critical for manufacturers involved in the emerging 
Omni-channel environment. Inventory optimization can be defined as allocating the 
right amount of inventory across channels in a predictive manner by using analytics 
and managing various constraints while achieving service level targets. Inventory 
optimization needs better understanding of the trade-offs between inventory 
deployment and service level. Normally, it involves improvement in inventory modelling, 
safety stock setting at critical nodes, and inventory mix (Ball, 2014). It also needs to 
rapidly identify channel shifts, and fine-tune stocking policies, throughout the network. 
It requires adoption of a sophisticated, multi-echeloned approach, to determine 
inventory levels methodically and diminish the “rule of thumb” buffers.  
6.4.5.4 Collaborative Innovation 
Collaborative innovation (see Figure 6.1) means the introduction of new technologies 
for the development of new products, through joint learning and innovative activities 
between SC partners. It is deemed as a source of competitive edge owing to the 
possible substantial merits, such as reduced cost, improved design and quality, 
increased value to customer, and enhanced timeliness of products (Azadegan et al., 
2008; Koufteros et al., 2005; Clark, 1989). The practice has been increasingly adopted 
by manufacturers to leverage SC partners’ technological and innovative capabilities 
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(Swink and Mabert, 2000; King et al., 2003; Walter, 2003; Simpson et al., 2002; Wynstra 
et al., 2001).  
As it is well acknowledged, products made in China mainly feature low technology and 
limited added-value features for customers. Consequently, it is hard for the CMFs to 
differentiate their products from competitors. Being challenged by intensified 
competition and global economic turmoil, CMFs are competing at cost, and struggling 
for survival. According to the interviewed managers, they have realized the vital 
importance of collaborative innovation and have engaged in a variety of joint innovative 
activities with SC partners. However, these joint efforts are mainly confined to simple 
problem solving and the involvement of SC partners in NPD initiatives. This is far from 
sufficient if the upgrade of the technological and innovative capabilities of the whole 
manufacturing industry is anticipated. More extensive and constant collaborative 
learning activities, such as regular training, concurrent engineering, and SD initiatives, 
have to be organized to transfer knowledge internally and externally. Ultimately, this 
effort will enable the building up of a solid knowledge and technology foundation 
accumulatively, to enable a sustainable development and modernization of the whole 
manufacturing industry.   
6.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided an extensive discussion of the research findings. The main 
characteristics of SCC in the Chinese E & E manufacturing industry have been 
described. The key elements of and major barriers to SCC in China have also been 
highlighted. The findings corroborate all four theoretical paradigms used in the research, 
and reveal that the environment and process of SCC in China is not identical to that of 
the developed economies. This chapter also develops a capability-based strategic 
framework of SCC in China to facilitate the development of the SCC capability of CMFs. 
A detailed explanation of the inter-relationships between each construct in the 
framework is given. The next chapter will present conclusions for this thesis.       
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CHAPTER 7 Conclusion and Implications 
This chapter draws conclusion from the research. It then discusses the important 
contributions of this study from both the theoretical and managerial perspectives. 
Finally, it points out the limitations of the study and suggests future directions for further 
research in this field. 
7.1 Conclusion 
SCC is constantly promoted and strongly advocated by the leading SC performers in 
the world. How SCC is adopted by the Chinese manufacturing industry has, however, 
remained unknown. Borrowing insights from AT, SET, ERBV and Institutional Theory, 
this research examines how effectively SCC is being implemented by Chinese E & E 
manufacturing firms. A multiple-case study approach has been employed to collect 
information from chosen manufacturers and suppliers for in-depth analysis. 
Through evaluating the common themes and practices revealed in the multiple 
interviews with senior managers from four leading manufacturing firms currently 
engaged in cross-organizational collaboration, five key elements of and seven major 
barriers to the achievement of SCC have been identified. Based on the analysis of 
research findings, a capability-based strategic framework incorporating the unique 
characteristics of the SCC among the CMFs has been proposed. The framework can 
serve as a guide for Chinese manufacturers aiming to implement SCC, to carry out 
necessary and appropriate improvement in collaborative capabilities. 
Results from this study suggest that the successful implementation of SCC will likely 
remain elusive to Chinese E & E manufacturing firms until all major barriers that impede 
advanced SCC are overcome and all key capabilities are gradually enhanced. The 
findings of this research support the use of the above-mentioned four theories.  
According to the research findings, it can be argued that the journey to the successful 
implementation of SCC by CMFs will be a long one, as building of key capabilities and 
elimination of major barriers cannot be achieved in a short-run. Firstly, the evolvement 
of key capabilities, from the current very basic level to an advanced level, requires 
considerable effort and a large amount of resources. Secondly, the development of a 
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high level of trust between SC partners in an institutional environment such as China 
is challenging. Thirdly, significant power asymmetry is culturally embedded and very 
difficult to change. Lastly, the unique institutional environment in China might take a 
very long time to change and be regulated to become favourable for the advancement 
of SCC capabilities. In essence, the transitioning from existing superficial partnerships, 
low information-sharing capability, and weak organizational capability, towards an 
extensive collaboration between SC partners, can be a substantial challenge for 
Chinese manufacturers. 
In the next section, contributions of this research from both the theoretical and the 
managerial perspectives will be discussed. 
7.2 Theoretical Implications 
The results from the present study have some important theoretical implications. Firstly, 
it provides a holistic view of the state-of-the-art of SCC practices of the Chinese E & E 
manufacturing firms. The existing literature on SCC initiatives of CMFs is 
incomprehensive, and mainly focuses on certain aspects of the collaborative actions. 
To explore how SCC can be successfully adopted and implemented by the CMFs, it is 
essential to portray a broader picture of the current collaborative practices of CMFs. 
This research incorporates five key elements of and seven major obstacles to 
successful SCC from both the manufacturers’ and the suppliers’ perspectives. It thus 
offers a better understanding about the unique collaborative behaviours of CMFs. The 
findings of this research present systematically gathered empirical evidence to support 
the increasing implementation of SCC by CMFs. 
Secondly, the present study highlights the complementary roles of AT, SET, ERBV and 
Institutional Theory in the examination of the complex nature of SCC. AT explains inter-
organizational activities from an economic perspective, while SET provides a social 
point of view. ERBV complements AT and SET by taking the resources, capabilities and 
competencies of SC partners into consideration. By evaluating the impact of 
institutional environment on the adoption of collaborative practices, Institutional Theory 
offers an alternative viewpoint in managing supply chains. The present study is the first 
attempt to investigate SCC from four different perspectives. This research echoes 
   
Page 190 / 220 
     
Halldorsson et al. (2007), who claim that several theories can be used in a 
complementary manner to provide a more comprehensive explanation of phenomena 
in SCM. The four theories selected in the present research are well supported by 
empirical evidence collected from the Chinese E & E manufacturing firms. 
Thirdly, the present research investigates the collaborative initiatives of the CMFs from 
both the manufacturers’ and the suppliers’ perspectives. Although SCC initiatives are 
designed to improve the overall efficiency of all firms throughout the chain, 
manufacturers and suppliers generally hold different views of SCC, given that the 
benefits and risks are not evenly distributed. This study has examined the collaborative 
activities taking the interests of both parties into account.   
Fourthly, the present study also makes comparision of collaborative activites between 
international and domestic focal manufacturing firms. The research findings reveal the 
significant differences in the same collaborative initiative as employed by international 
and domestic manufacturers. Hence, the present research points out the right direction 
for the CMFs to adjust their SCC implementation approaches so as to enhance their 
chances of success.     
Furthermore, this study develops a capability-based strategic framework to enable 
manufacturers to evolve their SCC through the enhancement of collaborative 
capabilities. Existing frameworks of SCC identified in the literature are generally 
established based on the analysis of practices in developed countries. They tend to 
assume that all key capabilities essential for successful SCC have already been well 
established. However, the institutional situation in many emerging economies, such as 
China, is very different. In order to explore how collaborative capabilities can be 
improved by the CMFs to enhance their competitiveness in the global market, a holistic 
framework of SCC incorporating resources and competencies incorporating economic, 
social, and institutional factors is considered indispensable.  
Lastly, the capability-based strategic framework can be used by manufacturers as a 
guide to improve collaborative capabilities by allocating resources to the development 
of key elements and the gradual removal of major barriers. It might also be used by 
manufacturers in other emerging economies such as India, Vietnam, and Indonesia to 
improve their SCC capabilities.  
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7.3 Managerial Implications 
The evidence gathered in this study has several managerial implications for 
manufacturers and the government. Firstly, it suggests that partial imitation of 
successful Western collaborative practices for short-term gain can actually lead to 
negative impacts on partner relationships and SC performance. SC managers, 
particularly in focal manufacturing firms, should understand that the aim of SCC is in 
fact to enhance the competitiveness of the entire SC in the long run through joint efforts 
between SC members. Partial imitation of the standard SCC practices to maximize 
short-term benefits at the expense of the weaker SC partners and overall SC efficiency 
can undermine the competitive advantage of the entire supply chain. This kind of of in-
ward looking parochial approach to SCC would only result in a lose-lose situation for 
all SC members. 
Secondly, consistent with prior studies, the findings indicate that executive sponsorship 
is critical to the successful implementation of SCC. This suggests that executives of 
manufacturing firms should be aware that their involvement in all important SC decision 
making can play a key role in the success of collaborative practices. Their involvement 
is also crucial for the development of organizational capabilities in terms of alignment 
of SC objectives, improvement of knowledge of SCC through training provided to 
employees and suppliers, and better understanding about the importance of close 
internal and external collaboration to business success. Without continuous and strong 
executive sponsorship, achievement of advanced collaboration would be difficult. 
Thirdly, like the situation in many Western countries, superficial partnerships are typical 
among the Chinese SC partners as well. Manufacturers should realize that a superficial 
partnership is adversarial by nature. With a superficial partnership, local profit 
maximization remains the focus of organizations. Collaborative competitive edge would 
thus not be generated, since it requires enormous collaborative endeavours in proper 
incentive alignment, continuous supplier development, cultivation of a high level of trust, 
and appropriate management of power asymmetry. Managers should put more effort 
into these aspects so that true partnership embedded with a high level of trust can be 
nurtured. 
Fourthly, the findings of this research indicate that the information-sharing capability of 
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the CMFs has yet to be developed. This is mainly due to lack of information systems 
and the strong unwillingness to share information with SC partners. The value of 
effective information systems might not be fully realized by the manufacturers, as they 
still rely on traditional approaches to exchanging information. For the suppliers, many 
of them refuse to adopt information systems due to additional costs and computer 
illiteracy. Hence, managers should learn more about the importance of information 
sharing to organizational efficiency and competitiveness. Increased investment should 
be made to adopt or upgrade information systems so as to facilitate internal and 
external real-time information transmission. At the same time, managers should also 
be aware that the investment in information systems can only be capitalized through 
effective information sharing for better decision making. Therefore, they should change 
their mind-set and manage to share more information with SC partners rather than 
hinder information exchange or take advantage of weaker parties. The development of 
trust is also essential for the improvement of an information-sharing capability.  
Furthermore, this study demonstrates that institutional factors have significant impacts 
on the implementation of SCC by the Chinese firms. This result coincides with that of 
Liu et al. (2010), who contend that different dimensions of institutional pressures have 
direct effects on the adoption of SCM initiatives. Managers need to recognize that even 
the most successful Western SCC practices might not be completely applicable in the 
Chinese context, owing to complex institutional pressures. It is a challenge for 
manufacturers to implant best practices rooted in developed countries. Not only do they 
need to adapt strategically to the domestic institutional forces, which are not particularly 
favourable to SCC, but they also need to consider the benefits of the entire supply chain 
in the long run. 
Lastly, the findings of this study show that government effort and innovation play vital 
roles in shaping the institutional environment. To facilitate a desirable institutional 
situation to promote close collaboration and enhance competitiveness of the 
manufacturing industry, government effort and innovation on the following dimensions 
would be promoted or supported through incentives. Firstly, the government could 
adopt sustainable and favourable industry policies to ensure the continuous and stable 
development of the manufacturing industry. Secondly, the government could impose 
regulations and enhance the enforcement of legitimate policies to reduce opportunistic 
behaviours, protect intellectual properties, safeguard information security, and 
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encourage healthy competition. Thirdly, the government could also introduce incentives, 
recognition and rewards for practices which help transform the business culture in 
China to one that fosters inter-firm mutual trust. In time, these initiatives, together with 
the continuous collaborative engagement of manufacturing firms and the government, 
may nurture an advantageous institutional condition to promote collaboration and 
generate a competitive edge for CMFs.   
7.4 Limitations of the Study   
Despite the various theoretical and managerial implications derived from the findings, 
conclusions reached in this research should be viewed with caution due to certain 
limitations of the study. Firstly, lack of external validity is the major weakness of case 
study research in general. This critique is also applicable to the present research.  
Secondly, this research has predominantly focused on only one sector of a particular 
industry. While it has provided valuable insights into the collaborative capabilities of the 
Chinese E & E manufacturing firms, the findings might not be completely applicable to 
reflect the behaviour of the entire manufacturing industry in China.  
Thirdly, this study developed a comprehesive framework based upon four widely 
adopted theories in the SCM field, namely AT, SET, ERBV and Institutional Theory, 
other theoretical lens, such as the RV, may also provide a valid explanation of the 
collaborative behaviours between manufacturers and suppliers. RV argues that a pair 
or a network of firms can generate relational rents through asset specialization, 
knowledge-transferring mechanisms, complementary resource endowments, and 
effective governance (Dyer and Singh, 1998). These are some of the collaborative 
efforts that have been employed by the CMFs, although others were not widely 
observed in the present study, probably due to the nascent stage of SCC in China.  
Another limitation exists with respect to the proposed framework for SCC. Whilst it 
provides a theoretical foundation and important implications for manufacturing 
corporations and the government in China, it has yet to be tested using empirical data 
collected across multiple industries and regions.  
Lastly, institutional barriers to extensive collaboration between corporations in one 
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country might not be applicable to others owing to different socio-institutional and 
cultural settings. Thus, there is a limitation to the extent to which the research outcomes 
of the present study can be generalized. In this regard, a comparative research 
analysing the SCC practices in different developing countries would be valuable. 
7.5 Directions for Future Research 
One possible future avenue of investigation is to incorporate cases from a wider variety 
of manufacturing industries in different regions of China. Engaging more manufacturers 
from different types of industry, such as automotive, manufacturing and processing 
machinery, and consumer goods industries, can further test the generalizability of the 
research findings. The characteristics of SCC of different industries in different regions 
might vary due to different SC settings and specific industry features.    
Future research could also pay more attention to the collaborative activities of 
manufacturing firms of different ownership types. Manufacturing firms in China have 
different ownership types such as state-owned, joint-venture, foreign-owned and 
private-owned firms. The way they collaborate with their SC partners could also be 
different across ownership types. In particular, foreign-owned manufacturing firms from 
Japan or Western countries tend to be very sophisticated in SCC initiatives. Their 
collaboration with Chinese suppliers might be more mature.  
Furthermore, future research could examine the SCC initiatives of manufacturing firms 
by involving more business partners across the SC such as retailers and sub-tier 
suppliers. They all play important roles in the success of the collaborative initiatives of 
the focal manufacturing firms. On the one hand, retailers are close to customers, 
thereby having a deep insight into any behaviourial changes and variations in demand. 
On the other hand, sub-tier suppliers are often vital to the avoidance of supply 
disruptions. Incorporating viewpoints of retailers and sub-tier suppliers could therefore 
enhance the effectivenss of collaborative efforts significantly.   
In addition, future research could investigate collaborative endeavours of 
manufacturing firms by incorporating a Relational Perspective. Relational Perspective 
can be employed to explain how a firm can improve quality, efficiency and productivity 
through creating inter-firm specific assets. This perspective can also be embraced to 
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elucidate how inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines can be leveraged to create mutual 
benefits. Furthermore, this perspective can be adopted to describe how complementary 
resource endowments of alliance partners can be used to generate greater 
idiosyncratic competitive advantages. Lastly, Relational Perspective emphasizes that 
effective governance minimizes transaction costs, thereby improving efficiency. All of 
the above four sources of relational rents can only be realized through synchronized 
SCC.  
Finally, another direction for research is to investigate collaborative behaviours of the 
entire manufacturing industry using a quantitative approach or a mixed method. A 
survey-based research could be conducted to examine the level of SCC between 
manufacturing firms and their SC parters throughout the nation. Hence, the 
generalization of the present research findings could be further verified. 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
With an aim to leverage SCC to enhance competitive edge of CMFs, this thesis 
explores how effectively supply chain collaboration is being implemented in China. A 
multiple-case study approach is employed to investigate the collaborative behaviour of 
four leading Chinese E & E manufacturing firms. In addition to depicting the main 
characteristics of SCC in China, the study has helped identify five key elements of as 
well as seven major barriers to the successful SCC implementation. The findings 
indicate that multiple Western SCC practices are being implemented by the Chinese E 
& E manufacturing firms. However, they are not adopted in whole but are partially 
imitated by the firms for maximization of their own short-term benefits at the expense 
of the overall SC performance and efficiencies. The conclusion of this study is that 
successful implementation of SCC is likely to remain elusive to Chinese E & E 
manufacturing firms until all major barriers impeding advanced SCC have been 
overcome and all key capabilities been gradually enhanced. Based on the findings, a 
capability-based strategic framework is proposed to enable manufacturers to evolve 
their SCC through the enhancement of collaborative capabilities. This chapter 
completes the thesis by discussing the theoretical and the managerial implications of 
the research findings. It also points out the limitations of the study and suggests certain 
directions for future research.  
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
A. Introduction to the Case Study 
1. Research Questions 
a) What is the state-of-the-art of SCC implementation by the Chinese E & E 
manufacturers? 
b) What are the key elements of and major barriers to SCC of the Chinese E & E 
manufacturers? 
c) What strategies can be formulated to advance SCC among the Chinese E & E 
manufacturers? 
 
B. Data Collection Procedures 
1. Name of the manufacturing firm: 
    Contact person: 
    Phone No.: 
    Address: 
2. Data collection plan 
a) Type of data: interview record, field note, documents 
    b) Data collection procedure:  
      1) Chief Executive Manage 
      2) Marketing Manager 
      3) Supply Chain Manager 
      4) Purchasing Manager 
      5) Production Manager 
      6) Logistics/Transportation Manager 
      7) Warehouse Manager 
 
 
C. Case Study Questions 
1. Elements of Supply Chain Collaboration  
a) Objective Alignment   
Q1: In which aspects do you and your supply chain partners set common 
objectives?  
Q2: How do you measure the performance of your supply chain partners? 
What performance metrics are used to measure the collaborative effort of the 
supply chain partners?  
Q3: What financial incentives and penalties are used to encourage 
collaborative effort?  
Q4: Are there protocol for security and protection of confidential information 
shared among supply chain partners?  
Q5: How do you promote internal and external collaboration? 
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b) Information Sharing  
Q1: How do you share information with customers and suppliers? What types 
of information do you share with them respectively?  
Q2: How frequent is the shared information updated?  
Q3: What is the quality of the information shared?  
Q4: Please describe how information technology is used to facilitate 
information sharing.  
Q5: What are the most important factors facilitating or inhibiting effective 
information sharing? 
 
c) Integrated supply chain processes  
Q1: What is your customer relationship management policy? What is your 
supplier relationship management policy? 
Q2: Please describe your order fulfilment process. 
Q3: Please describe your production management method.  
Q4: Please describe your logistics distribution process. How do you design 
your distribution network?  
Q5: Please describe your warehouse management method.  
 
d) Collaborative Synchronization  
Q1: What kind of issues on which collaborative decisions are made between 
you and your supply chain partners?  
Q2: What are the aspects in which collaborative planning is carried out 
between you and your supply chain partners?  
Q3: How do you forecast sales collaboratively? How accurate is the sales 
forecast in general? How do you improve it? What are the exception criteria 
for sales forecast? How do you generate new orders? What are the exception 
criteria for order forecast? 
Q4: How do you replenish collaboratively with customers and suppliers?  
What is your inventory policy? How do you maintain an optimal inventory level?  
 
e) Collaborative investment and innovation  
Q1: What kind of investments have you made on your suppliers in terms of 
technology, people and money? 
Q2: What kind of training do you provide to your suppliers? How do you solve 
problem collaboratively with retailers and suppliers? 
Q3: How do you invite retailers or suppliers to participate in the new product 
development process? 
Q4: What other key elements do you think are important to supply chain 
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collaboration? 
2. Institutional Barriers to Supply Chain Collaboration  
Q1: In your opinion, what are the major institutional barriers to supply chain 
collaboration? 
Q2: Please describe how transactional relationship hinders supply chain 
collaboration? Why? How can this barrier be removed?  
Q3: Please describe how inter-organizational system technology hampers 
supply chain collaboration? Why? How can this barrier be removed? 
Q4: Please describe how inefficiency of third-party logistics service providers 
hinders collaboration? Why? How can this barrier be removed? 
Q5: Please describe how institutional environment inhibits collaboration. Why? 
How can this barrier be removed? 
 
3. Benefits of Supply Chain Collaboration and How to Overcome All Those 
Barriers and Improve Supply Chain Collaboration  
Q1: What are the benefits of supply chain collaboration for your company?  
Q2: In your opinion, how can the above-mentioned barriers be removed or 
overcome to improve supply chain collaboration capability of the 
manufacturing firms in China? 
 
4. Company information  
a) Organization type  
_______________________________________________________. 
 
b) Annual sales volume of your company  
________________________________________________________. 
 
c) Number of employees in your company  
________________________________________________________.  
 
d) Main products  
________________________________________________________. 
 
e) Major markets  
 ________________________________________________________. 
 
 
